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In 2009 I enthusiastically submitted a grant application to a funding body for a project on 
Singaporeans living in Australia.  One of the reviewers dismissed the project questioning why 
I was insisting on pursuing a topic that was quite uninteresting since Singapore is nothing 
more than ‘a government project’.  Whilst the Singapore economy is no doubt the result of 
steadfast government planning and execution, I would like to think that Singaporeans – 
myself included – are more than just the result of an elaborate scheme orchestrated by an 
omnipresent government.  Sure, the government may be a fixture in the everyday life of 
Singapore citizens and the prime mover in creating a largely patriotic and nationalist society, 
Singaporeans have not altogether responded positively to governmental presence and 
dominance.  Being a diasporic Singaporean living in Australia, I started to wonder how I 
could explore Singapore to (re)discover the place, its people and its culture.  Likewise, being 
outside of Singapore forced me to rethink the lens I was going to use to disprove that my 
homeland, the society I came from and the culture I grew up in, were merely a government 
venture but something more remarkably fascinating.  The use of screen – or more specifically, 
film – was a clear avenue for me in the pursuit of my quest.  After all, my doctoral research 
was on Chinese cinema and I really do like Singapore-made films. 
 
As I wrote, it became clear to me that this was not a typical project that fits neatly into the 
traditional Film Studies or Cinema Studies nexus.  Rather, this project makes use of some 
locally made yet significant Singapore films by critically acclaimed film-makers to provide 
insights into Singapore.  While I may not engage in long film analyses, I make use of the 
films as a window of opportunity to learn and discuss about Singapore society and culture.  
This project thus blends various interrelated disciplines such as Cultural Studies, Media 
Studies and Sociology, together with Film and Cinema Studies to aid this investigation. 
 
This project is a journey into my own Singaporean identity.  I have always been fascinated by 
ethnicity primarily because I never fitted into any of the recognizable Singaporean ethnic 
groups (Chinese, Malay and Indian).  People I encountered in Singapore often questioned my 
ethnicity and wondered aloud ‘what’ I was.  The dissonance that my ethnicity caused 
prompted me to write Chapter 2 which deals with the discomfort of ethnic ambiguity.  Being 
a diasporic Singaporean means that I keep in touch with the homeland through discussions 
with students from Singapore whom I meet, through social media chats with Singaporean 
friends and through a daily digest of Singapore news available online.  Over time, the 
recurrent theme I discovered is the aversion to new migrants entering Singapore.  The second 
part of this book is dedicated to analyzing why this is and how Singaporeans are coping with 
what they clearly view as a threat to the fabric of their society. 
 
Singapore society is complex and this book only scratches the surface of this fascinating 
place.  After all, this is a young country which has developed into a first world globalized 
nation within decades and a young society which is coping with the changes that come with 
globalization.  This book thus attempts to unravel the way Singapore society is dealing with 
the challenges it faces on a daily basis.  At the same time, this project is also a tribute to 
locally made Singapore films.  It is an acknowledgement of how screen has become 
embedded in Singapore society and culture that it manages to successfully provide a parallel 
dimension of the everyday familiar in a subtle yet honest manner.    
 
I would like to thank Kirpal Singh and the Wee Kim Wee Centre at the Singapore 
Management University for their enthusiasm in publishing this material and for warmly 
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hosting me as a visiting academic while I did related research.  This book would not have 
been possible if not for the six-months of research leave that was generously provided by the 
School of Media and Communication, RMIT University.  I would particularly like to thank 
Stephanie Donald and Jo Tacchi for believing in this project.  I also would like to thank Drew 
Roberts, Marsha Berry, Delphine McFarlane and Olivia Guntarik for helping me make 
improvements on the text itself by providing much needed guidance on communicating my 
ideas.  I would also like to thank filmmaker Tan Pin Pin for taking the time to read the chapter 
dedicated to her cinema, for her comments and for her encouragement.  Finally I would like 
to thank Andrew Newlands for patiently reading this manuscript and for putting up with all 
the idiosyncrasies I displayed while in the throes of writing.  This, my first book, is for you. 
 
Parts of this book have appeared in other publications.  Earlier versions of  Chapter 5 and 
‘The Everyman’ section in Chapter 2 have been published as Gomes, C. (2011), ‘Maid-In-
Singapore: Representing and Consuming Foreign Domestic Workers in Singapore’, Asian 
Ethnicity, 12: 2, pp. 141-54 and as Gomes, C. (2012), ‘The Everyman Hero: Cinema and 
Identity in Singapore’, Asian Currents, June, <http://asaa.asn.au/publications/ac/2011/asian-
currents-11-06.pdf>, respectively.  Some parts of this book are extensions of work I have 
done previously in Gomes, C. (2010), ‘Active Remembering in Utopia’, in O. Guntarik (ed.), 
Narratives of Community: Museums and Ethnicity, Edinburgh: MuseumsEtc., pp. 290-316, 
Gomes, C. (2009), ‘Keeping Memories Alive: Maintaining Singapore Nationalism Abroad’, 
Asia Journal of Global Studies, 3:1, pp. 37-50 and Gomes, C. (2013), ‘Xenophobia Online: 
Unmasking Singaporean Attitudes Towards ‘Foreign Talent’ Migrants’, Asian Ethnicities, 
first published online on 8 April, 
<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14631369.2013.784511#.UmSDVfmnolQ>. 
 
Chinese names of persons in this book are written as family name followed by given name.  
For example in the name Tan Pin Pin, ‘Tan’ is the family name while ‘Pin Pin’ is the given 







In a heartbeat, we will always be 
Together, united; you and me 
‘In a Heartbeat’ (Ratonel 2011) 
 
One people, one nation, one Singapore 
That's the way that we will be for evermore 
Every creed and every race, has its role and has its place 
One people, one nation, one Singapore 
‘One People, One Nation, One Singapore’ (Monteiro 1990) 
 
While I was working in a government department in my homeland of Singapore, a colleague 
once asked me if ethnicity mattered in my choice of a life partner.  To her surprise, I 
answered that ethnicity was not an issue.  She then blurted out: ‘You mean you like Chinese 
guys?’  I am not ethnic Chinese.  On another occasion, a friend once commented that she felt 
uncomfortable whenever she saw a biracial couple as the sight of a fair person with a dark 
person was too challenging for her to comprehend.  My ethnic heritage has layers of 
multiracial couplings.  Whenever I opened the employment section of the local newspaper, I 
encountered numerous non-government job advertisements listing ‘able to speak Mandarin’ 
as one of the essential qualities required.  Bahasa Melayu (Malay language) and not Mandarin 
is my second language.  It is perhaps fair to say that ethnicity dominated a lot of my everyday 
experiences growing up and living in Singapore.   
 
I am Singaporean born and bred, having spent all my childhood and some part of my early 
adult years living in the country of my birth.  However, I have always felt a sense of 
dissonance in Singapore particularly with regard to ethnicity.1  While Singapore prides itself 
as a multicultural nation with public policies in place that maintain racial harmony, 2 there are 
strong yet subdued tensions simmering below the surface of Singaporean society.  Paranoia 
and anxiety over ethnicity in other words, are part of the Singaporean cultural landscape.  
However, Singapore maintains a happy facade of peace and harmony amongst a culturally 
and racially disparate population by successfully instilling a strong sense of loyalty and 
allegiance to the nation.  Nationalism in other words, is very much part of everyday life in the 
nation-state.  As a young adult, I found myself unable to fully understand Singaporean 
society’s cultural attitudes towards ethnicity particularly since Singapore brands itself as 
multicultural.  My sensitivity to issues surrounding ethnicity in particular perhaps stems from 
my belonging to neither one of the major racial categories (Malay, Chinese and Indian) but to 
an essentially hybrid minority or biracial group born out of the European colonization of 
Southeast Asia known as Eurasian.  Concerns over ethnicity, in other words, became personal 
issues of belonging and identity to the homeland.  Singaporean society’s cultural attitudes 
towards ethnicity however, I have noticed, have now taken a new turn with the entry of 
permanent and temporary worker migrants into Singapore. 
 
As part of Singapore’s blueprint for globalization, modernity and domination on the global 
economic and financial stages, it has looked beyond its borders for an international workforce 
that not only reflects this global outlook but also keeps the engines of progress running.3  
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Encouraging non-Singaporeans to take up skilled and non-skilled occupations is not a new 
phenomenon in Singapore as the backbone of this nation-state’s history is built on migrant 
labour.  While Singaporeans trace their lineage to migrants, they consider new migrants those 
who have entered the country in the post-independence period, particularly the 1980s and 
beyond.  However, the presence of these new migrants, who are colloquially referred to as 
‘foreigners’ even though many have permanent residence and citizenship and hail from the 
very countries most Singaporeans consider their ancestral home, are highly disliked by 
Singaporeans, many of whom have been taking their grievances online.  Attacking both the 
new migrants and the government for facilitating their entry into the country, it is perhaps fair 
to say that Singaporeans are attempting to make sense of their significance and place in a 
homeland that many feel is changing rapidly both ethnographically as well as culturally.   
 
Thankfully, I am not the only one who finds such dissonance in Singapore society intriguing.  
Singapore’s film industry has long been fascinated by this dissonance, with thriving 
underground and commercial movements existing side by side that provide critical 
commentary through metaphorical expression.  By film, I refer particularly to the works of 
well known, acclaimed, respected and intellectually stimulating independent and mainstream 
film-makers Eric Khoo, Tan Pin Pin, Kelvin Tong and Jack Neo and to the films which have 
done well at the Singapore box-office such as Army Daze (Ong 1996).  Khoo, for example, is 
influential in both independent and mainstream local cinema as writer, director and producer 
particularly through his Zhao Wei Films studio while others such as mainstream film-maker 
Neo’s productions have resonated well with the Singapore cinema-going public and dominate 
the box-office. 
 
In this book I put forward the idea that while on the surface Singapore may seem like a 
successful multicultural nation where diverse peoples live harmoniously together, it is instead 
a country whose citizens are grappling with existing anxieties over ethnicity which are now 
compounded by the increasing numbers of new migrants (skilled workers who have the 
opportunity to become permanent residents and unskilled temporary guest workers) entering 
the country.  Singapore’s multicultural identity is primarily made up of three broad ethnic 
groups – Chinese, Malay and Indian – with the Chinese by far being the largest community.  
While there is an ‘Others’ category which allows for those Singaporeans such as Arabs, 
Armenians and Eurasians who fall outside the Chinese, Malay and Indian groups to be 
classified, they are not as culturally nor ethnically recognizable because of their relatively 
small numbers.4  I argue that communities or individuals outside of these recognizable 
classifications are viewed with trepidation by Singapore society and that while the Chinese 
are the prevailing ethnic group, they do experience concerns regarding their identity and 
cultural traditions.  I suggest that the new migrants entering the nation-state both permanently 
and temporarily – many of whom come from the ancestral homes of locally-born 
Singaporeans and from the surrounding Southeast Asian region – have created such unease 
and angst among citizens that it has led to many Singaporeans expressing themselves through 
xenophobic comments online.  Yet the presence of the new migrants has curiously united 
Singaporeans like no other issue this society has encountered since independence.   
 
My point of entry into mapping Singaporean anxieties of ethnicity and migration is through 
film.  It is film that I use as a tool in various ways to understand and unpack this young yet 
disparate society.  More than just a form of entertainment, Singapore films attempt to make 
sense of the Singapore-specific concerns which people are confronted with on a daily basis.  
These concerns take place against a thematic backdrop of high levels of cultural and linguistic 
diversity in this multicultural population, income disparity that defines and sometimes 
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segregates the classes, an omnipresent government and a high influx of foreign workers.  This 
book uses films to launch into an understanding of Singapore society, therefore allowing for 
an interrogation into the ways in which the community reacts to the related topics of ethnicity 




One of the distinctive things I remember from my childhood in Singapore was my ability to 
belt out almost every patriotic song ever written.  Each morning, I sang the national anthem 
with my fellow schoolmates.  At most music classes and school assemblies I learnt the latest 
national song that expressed love to country and national unity ‘regardless of ethnicity, 
language or religion’ as stressed in the Singapore National Pledge.  Today I can still sing the 
songs of my childhood, such as ‘We Are Singapore’ (Harrison 1987) and ‘One People, One 
Nation, One Singapore’ – of which the chorus is quoted above – on demand.  This is in part 
because these songs are still actively broadcast through Singapore media, particularly in the 
run up to Singapore’s National Day.   
 
I recall that as a young adult in Singapore¸ my friends, colleagues and family always beamed 
with pride whenever they spoke of Singapore’s achievements as a peaceful, prosperous and 
modern nation where everyone lived harmoniously together despite ethnic diversity.  
Patriotism through music obviously works.  However, the same people also frequently 
complained about the government and often spoke unflatteringly about ethnicities other than 
their own.  Moreover, while such Singaporeans revel in Singapore’s modern global city-state 
status, they also hang on tightly to cultural traditions and organized religion as they 
aggressively oppose certain aspects of globalism.   
 
Stemming from its history as a British colony and entrepôt trading centre, Singapore has a 
complex multicultural identity (Ang and Stratton 1995) that both unifies as well as divides 
ethnic communities (Gomes 2010).  Multiculturalism takes pride of place in Singapore 
society.  The country and its people are immensely proud of its achievements in establishing a 
seemingly peaceful and harmonious multiracial and multiethnic society.  Singaporeans do 
revel in the products of multiculturalism which they strongly connect to and identify with 
such as an array of fabulous culinary delights and a unique hybridized local language known 
as ‘Singlish’ which boasts a combination of the different primary ethnic languages (Hokkien, 
Teowchew, Malay and Tamil) intermingled with English.  At the same time, Singapore’s 
version of multiculturalism where people are classified into the Chinese-Malay-Indian-Others 
(CMIO) categories are, as Chua Beng Huat (2003b) argues, highlights difference rather than 
integration and is a way in which the state controls its disparate population. 5  
 
Racial and ethnic tensions are a ubiquitous but largely hidden aspect of everyday experience 
in contemporary Singapore (Velayutham 2009).  These play out in quotidian encounters 
between people on a subtle often subconscious level.  Such intercultural anxieties are deeply 
entrenched in a history that Singapore is still negotiating and coming to terms with.  For 
instance, some Singaporeans may harbor feelings of suspicion about people and ethnicities 
outside their own communal group because of the way Singapore officially remembers its 
history which emphasizes a fear of Malay nationalism through the remembering of Malay-
incited riots which took place in the 1950s and 1960s (Gomes 2010).  The entry of new 
migrants who come to Singapore for work as unskilled or skilled workers, as international 
students or other reasons such as marriage, have challenged this society as it comes to terms 
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with a rapidly changing ethnographic landscape which goes beyond their previously 
understood Chinese-Malay-Indian nexus.    
 
 
Enter the ‘Foreign’ Migrants 
Since the 2000s Singaporeans have been incredibly critical of ‘new’ migrants – the 
overwhelming majority of whom come as workers – entering their country and have been 
expressing their anger through xenophobic comments online.  Despite strict laws against 
racial vilification, these comments can be seen in some of the more popular online forums 
such as those in Asiaone.com (http://www.asiaone.com/A1Home/A1Home.html), The Online 
Citizen: A Community of Singaporeans (http://theonlinecitizen.com/), Sam’s Alfresco Haven: 
Celebrating Singapore’s Golden Period! (www.sammyboy.com) and The TR Emeritus 
(http://www.tremeritus.com/) formerly known as The Temasek Review, in personal weblog 
entries and on social media platforms.  Known as ‘foreign talent’, these migrants are 
professional arrivals from Mainland China, South Asia, the Philippines and beyond who have 
been entering Singapore in droves since the mid-1990s.  Unlike the transitional foreign 
domestic workers and unskilled labourers who have been flocking into Singapore since the 
1980s, foreign talent migrants are educated professionals who often take up permanent 
residence in their adopted country.  The Singapore government sees foreign talent migrants as 
an investment in Singapore’s economic future and argues that it has to open the country’s 
doors to new migrants because Singaporeans are not reproducing enough in order to replenish 
the workforce and new migrants will help take care of the ageing Singapore population.  With 
these reasons in mind, the Singapore parliament endorsed Population White Paper: A 
Sustainable Population for a Dynamic Singapore which would see the nation’s population 
increase to 6.9 million by 2030 through migration in February 2013.   
 
Singapore has also been attracting large numbers of international students into the country as 
well as part of its plan to become a global education hub.  In 2010 there are over 91,500 
foreign students in Singapore (Yeoh and Lin 2012) with plans to increase numbers to 150,000 
by 2015 (Davie 2012).  The government has been making it attractive for these students to 
study in Singapore by providing them with government scholarships to study in public funded 
institutions as well as making permanent residence easy for them (Singapore Education 
2006).  Some foreign talent migrants might have been previously foreign students studying in 
Singapore who gained local employment.   
  
The online xenophobic comments reveal that Singaporeans view foreign talent migrants with 
great suspicion as they anecdotally feel that they are threatening their livelihood and way of 
life.  Moreover, the comments expose Singaporean displeasure at the ruling People’s Action 
Party (PAP) whom they hold responsible for the influx of the foreign talent migrants as 
revealed by any online discussion by Singaporeans on the matter.  Here Singaporeans note 
that they are no longer able to identify with Singapore due to the increasingly overcrowded 
and changing ethnographic landscape which they blame on government policies.   
 
While Singaporeans have always grumbled about the PAP government and its policies in 
private, the rise of online forms of communication have allowed them to express their 
dissatisfaction with the government more prolifically and loudly.  Doing so has created a 
space for Singaporeans to identify with each other on issues that they are concerned about 
which, most often, are caused by government policies: the cost of living, widening income 
gap and elitism of PAP members of parliament.  However it is the presence of new migrants – 
transitional and permanent – that has dominated Singaporean online discourse like no other 
11 
issue; uniting Singaporeans and functioning as a catalyst to push locals into greater political 
awareness.  Singaporeans, fed up with the influx of these new migrants – whom they call 
‘foreigners’ despite many overseas born professionals taking up permanent residence and 
citizenship – have progressed from being apathetic to becoming politically aware as 
demonstrated by the greatest withdrawal of electoral support the PAP has ever encountered at 
both the General Elections and Presidential Elections in 2011.6   
 
 
Unpacking Singapore Society through Film 
Singapore films provide an accessible art form available to mass audiences.  This allows for 
more nuanced and layered readings of its films by different audiences.  Like other creative 
industries in Singapore, film is a forum for the production and consumption of fictional and 
creative works of art in a country where the government features prominently in everyday 
life.  Arguably, the creative industries provide a less inhibited forum more free from 
government influence and control than the economic and political spheres primarily because 
subtlety through creative license is allowed to flourish and therefore communicate everyday 
concerns.  It provides a space for a critical appraisal of Singapore and the ubiquitous role 
played by the government in Singaporean society7.  Cinema’s space, in other words, allows 
audiences to choose, identify and decode films (Hall 1973) at different levels of appreciation 
and understanding.  
 
In his assessment of the film and television scene in Singapore, Kenneth Paul Tan (2008) 
suggests that Singapore productions struggle to honestly and openly provide critical 
commentary of Singapore because of the dominance of an authoritarian government and 
because of the consumption needs and patterns of the audience.  He notes, correctly, that 
television shows in particular, while popular with local audiences, have to follow certain 
strictly enforced codes of practice that leave productions toothless and banal.  A possible 
reason for their popular consumption in Singapore lies in their conventional character 
portrayals and seemingly inoffensive narratives that mirror everyday life in Singapore.  Yet, 
as I point out throughout this book, the portrayal of everyday life in Singapore is a useful 
device for unpacking the layers of Singapore society. 
 
Tan suggests that the ability of Singapore’s most successful film-maker, Jack Neo, to not only 
entertain Singaporeans with films about everyday life but also generate approval by 
Singaporean leaders is testament to the lack of aggression present in Singapore films (K.P. 
Tan 2008: 147-48).  Even though Neo’s films critique the Singapore government and its 
policies through political satire, as is the case in his 2002 production Xiaohai Bu Ben/I Not 
Stupid (New Straits Times 2004; Lim 2005), there is always resolution at the end with the 
message that government knows best and obeying government dictates leads to a successful 
Singapore and a prosperous self (K.P. Tan 2008: 147-48).  While Tan’s assessment is not 
incorrect, I suggest that while the Singapore film industry is bound by stern guidelines, it still 
manages to question hegemonic discourses that on the surface seem to champion active 
support of the status quo.   
 
The prolific growth of the Singapore film industry has been slowly attracting academic 
scholarship (e.g. Khoo 2005, Leow 2010, Marchetti 2005a and K.P. Tan 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 
2010 and 2011), as film studies scholars attempt to explore and comprehend the industry in 
terms of the challenges it faces because of strict censorship laws and also in terms of how it 
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represents Singapore and what it means to Singaporeans.  Recognition of Singapore films 
have become apparent through the local box office successes of commercial productions as 
well as the critical acclaim accorded to independently made films screened at local and 
international film festivals.  At the opposition National Solidarity Party (NSP) charity 
screening of The Blue Mansion (Goei, 2009) on 13 November 2011, Singapore-born film-
maker Glen Goei eloquently and passionately states during the question and answer session, 
available on YouTube, that although Singapore is highly developed, its people are unhappy.  
He says:   
 
When I came back to Singapore [after living in Europe], I came back to a 
Singapore that is very different…[than what]…I grew up in.  I grew up in 
Singapore in the 60s and 70s when life was more simpler but more happier.  I 
came back twenty, thirty years later in the early 2000s … Singapore had 
changed beyond recognition.  It was, on the surface, a richer Singapore, you 
know.  A glistening sparkling, glass, cement¸ steel all over the place.  
Shopping malls and MRT stations.  But I felt that people were significantly 
less happy.  (Goei, 2011) 
 
Goei also describes his role as a film-maker when he says: ‘As an artist I try to, in my work, 
to be a mirror to that society that I live’ [sic].  While Goei refers to himself here, his words 
perhaps express what many film-makers in the local film industry also believe is their 
responsibility to Singapore society.   
 
The Singapore film industry is comparatively young when compared to other significant and 
prolific Asian cinemas such as those in Hong Kong and India.  In addition, Singapore films 
often look ‘alien’ to foreign audiences because they contain Singapore-specific cultural 
nuances.  Some films, such as those by Jack Neo – including Qián Bùgòu Yòng/Money No 
Enough (1998) and I Not Stupid – have found commercial success because they inject a 
quintessentially Singapore flavour through language, employing Singlish (Singapore 
English) and Chinese dialects such as Hokkien, as well as likable Everyman characters with 
whom most Singaporeans can identify.   
 
These Everyman characters are often portrayed as ‘heartlanders’, as they are popularly 
known, take on the roles of heroes and heroines in these films, which deal with 
contemporary struggles affecting Singaporeans, such as wealth, income, education, 
immigration, position in society, health and social ills education and finance.  Locally made 
art-house productions – for example, Royston Tan’s 15 (2002), Eric Khoo’s Mee Pok Man 
(1995), Be With Me (2005) and Ekachai Uekrongtham’s Pleasure Factory (2007) – are also 
in demand by (niche) Singaporean audiences since they are able to capture the complex 
nature of Singapore society by the sheer nature of their experimentation in style and format.  
Such films also sensitively portray underlying, confronting and controversial topics such as 
sexuality (e.g. 15 and Be With Me) and the sex trade (e.g. Mee Pok Man and Pleasure 
Factory).   
 
This book thus turns to some enigmatic Singapore films to provide not just a starting point but 
a deeper understanding of Singapore society.  In their own way, Singapore films capture the 
heartbeat of local society by expressing some of the anxieties Singaporeans have concerning 
ethnicity and migration that paradoxically both unite Singaporeans with each other, even as 
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they divide them.  This book specifically looks at these anxieties through the overlapping 
topics of identity, memory and place which are played out through the strongly recurring 
theme of authoritarian leadership.   
 
Singapore films, in other words, functions as a useful artifact as defined by E. Deidre 
Pribram, who suggests that it 
 
conveys meanings beyond its tangible form, just as a more traditional 
archaeological artifact, such as an ancient shard of poetry, imparts a sense of 
or is open to interpretations about the past.  An artifact is tethnicity evidence of 
other qualities: concepts, beliefs, meanings, times, and places.  More than a 
material entity, an artifact is a means of expression and communication that 
absorbs aesthetic, social, and ideological concepts and practices.  In other 
words, it absorbs histories. (Pribram 2002: 44)  
 
National and state cinemas functioning as tools that document, reflect, unpack and critically 
appraise the societies that create them is nothing new to scholars, cinephiles and general 
audiences hungry to decipher any films that hint at social unrest or social ills.  However, any 
cinema that does so in such a way that is coded for its own local audience is always worth a 
look.  Singapore cinema falls into this category since it seems to exclusively be about 
Singapore and its people.  To aid my investigation, I turn to other sources such as online 
comments by Singaporean netizens (people who actively use the Internet, particularly as a 
platform for commentary and discussion) who spiritedly discuss political and social issues 
openly on blogs, popular online forums and through social media8.  I also refer to government 
policies, public exhibitions and film reviews.  In addition, I turn to history and historical 
narrative in my analysis.  This book is not an exhaustive study of Singapore films, which 
writers Uhde and Uhde (2010) have already successfully done.  Instead, this book explores 
some of the complexities of Singapore multicultural society – in terms of the struggles and 
paranoia that concern its people regarding ethnicity and migration – by looking at some of the 
more critically and commercially successful films by some of the most well-known 
Singaporean film-makers, including Eric Khoo, Tan Pin Pin, Kelvin Tong, Jack Neo and Ong 
Keng Sen among others.   
 
Chapter 1 serves as an introduction to Singapore in terms of its cinema, its government and its 
people and to contextualize discussions of ethnicity and migration that follow.  In this chapter 
I explore a few characteristics of Singapore films such as the featuring of everyday 
Singaporeans through the ‘Everyman’ figure and local cultural traits such as language and 
food.  By looking at Singapore film as the ‘heartbeat’ of the nation, this chapter exposes some 
of the growing pains afflicting this young and successful nation.  This chapter provides an 
introduction into Singapore society’s relationship with its government and suggests that it 
responds to the PAP government in ways that are both conventional and innovatively 
rebellious as the proceeding chapters will show.  Chapter 1 also serves as an entry into the 
focus of this book: using specific films to reflect and analyze the ways in which ethnicity and 
migration affect Singaporeans. 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 examine anxieties on ethnicity while Chapters 4 and 5 are dedicated to the 
struggles Singaporeans have towards new migrants.  Chapter 2 discusses locally made 
English-language films in Singapore such as Army Daze and One Leg Kicking (Koh 2001) 
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which feature, unusually, a cast of mixed ethnicities.  Most English-language films feature an 
ethnic Chinese cast usually speaking Singlish with splashes of Mandarin and Chinese dialects 
(Hokkien, Teochew and Cantonese).  While such films celebrate the government’s idealized 
vision of multicultural harmony, with casts of characters seemingly colour blind to each 
other, they also rely on ethnic stereotypes for comedic effect.  By looking at the ways in 
which the ethnic Chinese protagonist dominates the silver screen, as well as the portrayal of 
Eurasians in local cinema, this chapter suggests that Singapore may not be as multicultural in 
practice as it imagines itself to be. 
 
Chapter 3 looks at the work of Singapore’s most well-known independent documentary film-
maker, Tan Pin Pin by paying attention to the ethnic Singaporean-Chinese and their 
understanding and negotiation of culture and tradition in Singapore’s changing physical 
landscape.  Here I suggest that Tan’s films ‘rewrite’ and ‘reclaim’ Singapore history while 
subtly questioning government discourse by challenging official remembering and revealing 
the price that has been paid for Singapore’s journey to modernity particularly on 
Singaporean-Chinese.  Tan’s films do this by featuring the memories of everyday 
Singaporeans who are situated outside the official discourse of significant events in 
Singapore’s history (e.g. the height of communism in colonial Singapore) and traditional 
everyday public events in the lives of ordinary Singaporeans (e.g. such as the cultural 
importance of burial rituals).   
 
Chapter 4 moves the focus from Singaporean-Chinese to mainland Chinese migrants in 
Singapore.  It is the first of 3 chapters dedicated to reflecting in the anxieties Singaporeans 
seem to feel with regard to the permanent and temporary migrants entering the country.  By 
analyzing the film Shier Lou/12 Storeys by independent film-maker Eric Khoo, one of the 
most illustrious and significant individuals in the Singapore film industry, this chapter 
examines the unease and suspicion Singaporeans have of the mainland Chinese, many of 
whom they believe are taking advantage of locals and living off the resources of the country.  
As a film-maker Khoo is highly regarded for his distinctively pessimistic work featuring the 
lower working classes.  This chapter suggests that while Khoo’s films seem to highlight the 
social issues of a particular group of Singaporeans, in reality the films really present some of 
the everyday issues gnawing at the broader Singapore society.  This chapter also provides an 
insight into the xenophobic attitudes expressed by Singaporeans online. 
 
Chapter 5 looks at the 2005 Kevin Tong film The Maid, a Singapore-made horror production 
featuring a foreign domestic worker as its protagonist.  Released to very favourable reviews 
in the local press, the film was used by critics to praise the development of the local film 
industry, while the social commentary on the foreign domestic worker experience in 
Singapore was ignored.  This chapter aims to address this lack of commentary on the issues 
surrounding foreign domestic service raised in the film.  Doing so reveals multilayered 
representations of social order in Singapore based on ethnicity and class, where the images of 
foreign maids are dramatized, reconstructed and consumed in various discursive forms by 
various social agents.   
 
Chapter 6 brings the discussions of ethnic disparity and migrant worry together.  Here I look 
at language in local films and observe the significance of Singlish (Singapore English) to 
unite and empower Singaporeans.  This chapter suggests that Singlish in Singapore films not 
only captures the uniqueness of being Singaporean but it is a vernacular that Singaporeans use 
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as a non-political form of defiance against the ruling party and its unpopular new migrant 
policies.  Here I re-emphasize the observation I make in previous chapters that the presence of 
the new migrants functions as a force for unity in a culturally and ethnically disparate 







Coping With Everyday Life: Singapore Films, Heartbeat of the Nation 
 
In the past decade, Singaporeans have developed a fondness for local, particularly 
commercial productions, as seen in box office returns.  Commercial productions by film-
makers such as Jack Neo, Glen Goei, Royston Tan and Kevin Tong have enjoyed enormous 
local success because of their increasingly sophisticated high production values.1  Likewise, 
independent and avant-garde films by other prominent film-makers such as Eric Khoo, Djinn 
and documentary film-maker Tan Pin Pin have been playing to packed, albeit limited, 
screenings at local and international theatres, events and festivals, even though their 
narratives and plots sometimes seem initially unclear.  Films by independent film-makers that 
earn critical success are often less financially successful due to limited screenings at art-house 
venues.  Since the renaissance of Singapore cinema in the early 1990s, the most successful 
Singapore films  such as those by the country’s undisputedly best known film-maker Jack 
Neo – almost exclusively feature the typical concerns of everyday Singaporeans such as 
wealth, income, education, immigration, position in society, health and social ills.  These 
themes are successfully woven together by the Singapore-specific cultural traits of language 
and food.  Language and food, after all, are the very elements Singaporeans feel passionate 
about principally in terms of national identity and belonging to the homeland. 
 
Like other modern multicultural societies such as America, Australia and Hong Kong, 
Singapore uses cinema to portray, reflect and understand the sociocultural effects and 
conditions of multiculturalism.  Prolific Singaporean cinema studies commentator Kenneth 
Paul Tan (2010, 2011) astutely observes that locally made films provide a useful platform that 
allows Singaporean anxieties and struggles to be performed and played out.  These struggles 
and anxieties are a result of Singapore’s in-between position as a post-industrial global city 
successfully chasing global capital (K.P. Tan 2011) with a value system that is flexibly 
connected to its Asian roots.   
 
Film can offer insight into complex nationalist societies such as Singapore not only through 
readings of their films but also in terms of critical attention and box office receipts.2  Even 
though Singapore is a global city state, its society is rooted in cultural values selected and 
promoted by the government in order to galvanize the fractured communal groups into a 
homogenous, patriotic and obedient entity that functions primarily to create a wealthier and 
more economically successful nation state.  Singapore-made films that have had an impact on 
audiences such as scholars, film reviewers and general filmgoers alike have done so because 
they tap into Singapore society’s heartbeat – the everyday concerns of Singaporeans – 
exceedingly well.   
 
A number of Singapore-made films such as those by Jack Neo (for instance his I Not 
Stupid/Xiaohai Bu Ben and Money No Enough/Qian Bu Gou Yong series made in the late 
1990s and through the 2000s) manage to circumvent the strict policies that severely frown 
upon criticism of the government in the media, and at the same time celebrate Singapore 
society and its cultural identity.3  So while loyalty to nation equals loyalty to the ruling 
People’s Action Party’s (PAP) governance, Singapore films attempt to make full use of this 
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phenomenon of patriotic nationhood by exploring and rejoicing in what it is to be 
Singaporean.   
 
 
The local in Singapore films 
Work by some key film-making industry figures – such as independent film-maker Eric 
Khoo, mainstream film-maker Jack Neo and other emerging yet prominent film-makers such 
as Royston Tan and Kelvin Tong – have garnered the attention of film studies and cultural 
studies scholars, cinephiles, Asian art-house crowds and local audiences who have been 
seduced and intoxicated by the exclusively local content present in the work.4  The growing 
success of the local film industry amongst its home-grown audience is reflected in two 
significant consequences: the financial success some of these films enjoy, and the emergence 
of serious film appreciation societies dedicated to Singapore cinema such as the Singapore 
Film Commission and the online societies Sinema (2012) and SINdie (2012).   
 
Moreover, a number of contemporary Singapore-made films have been enjoying increasing 
financial success and have been making it to the Singapore top ten charts since 1998.  The 
table below shows the financial success of some local films with Singaporean audiences.    
 




Money No Enough/   
Qian Bu Gou Yong (Jack Neo) 
1998 #2 $5.8m 
Liang Po Po: The Movie/Liang Po Po 
Chong Chu Jiang Hu (Bi Lian Teng) 
1999 #3 $3.03m 
I Not Stupid/ Xiaohai Bu Ben (Jack 
Neo) 
2002 #4 $3.8m 
Homerun/Pao Ba Haizi (Jack Neo) 2003 #10 $2.35m 
The Best Bet/Turan Facai (Jack Neo) 2004 #8 $2.53m 
I Not Stupid Too/ Xiaohai Bu Ben 2 
(Jack Neo) 
2006 #3 $4.18 
881 (Royston Tan) 2007 #10 $3.5 
Figure 1.1: Top ten chart positions and box office takings of Singapore films, 1998-2007 
(Uhde & Uhde 2010: 321-22). 
  
One of the Singapore-centric features in Singapore films which could perhaps explain the 
growing popularity of this cinema with its domestic audiences is the familiar and local.  These 
include featuring the everyday Singaporean through the Everyman and the cultural traits of 
food and language.  The Everyman is the everyday Singaporean whom local audiences would 
easily recognize.  Almost always, the Everyman displays essentialised or imagined 
Singapore-specific behavior such as racial stereotypes and the over the top use of Singapore 
English (Singlish).  Yet this figure is also able to represent and expresses the everyday 





The Everyman: Representing Singaporean concerns through film5 
Singapore is a young nation.  Like some other former Western colonies in Asia (e.g. 
Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak) and Africa (e.g. Southern Rhodesia and Kenya 
Colony), Singapore achieved independence from its colonial masters in the 1960s.  In 1963 
the British declared Singapore and Malaysia independent from colonial rule.  Independence 
resulted in these former colonies forming a federation.  However, 23 months later the 
federation with Malaysia dissolved acrimoniously and Singapore became a sovereign nation.  
Unlike other postcolonial nations at the time, Singapore lacked a strong precolonial history 
other than its links to Malay culture and specifically to the Sultanate of Johor.  These links, 
however, were not rooted firmly enough to give Singaporeans an effective precolonial 
national identity because of the migration of different Asian and European peoples into 
Singapore during British colonial rule.  The immigration patterns favoured the Chinese who 
emigrated from Southern China and whose descendants then went on to populate the island 
and emerge as the most dominant ethnic demographic in Singapore.  Prior to migrating to 
Singapore in the 1800s and 1900s, both the Chinese and the Malays from the Malay Peninsula 
and the Indonesian Archipelago had very limited precolonial contact with Singapore, with the 
exception of the relationship between Imperial China and Sultanate of Kedah.6  This lack of a 
strong common cultural identity between the ethnic Chinese and the ethnic Malays posed 
challenges for a postcolonial Singapore government determined to create a unified national 
identity.  It is against this background that Singapore films can be read as contributing to an 
ongoing yet unofficial project of providing a space for discussion of identity in Singapore 
(Owen 2005).   
 
National cinemas reveal a nation’s attempt to deal with sociocultural issues such as trauma, 
confusion of identity and commemoration.  Film-makers and local audiences turn to cinema 
in order to confront, dissect and create ideas of self, community and culture.  Early Singapore 
films, for instance, reflect the many layers of the diasporic identity of Singaporean people as a 
settler society.  The 1920s to the 1960s were dominated by locally made Malay films.  While 
Singapore’s film industry was incredibly successful through joint productions with Malaya, 
particularly during the colonial period and just after independence from British rule, there was 
a dearth of film productions of any kind in the first three decades after independence.  The 
leaders of newly independent postcolonial Singapore have often made it clear that it was a 
conscious decision on their part at the time to concentrate on the economy, rather than any 
kind of development of the arts and culture, as part of nation building for a young, under-
resourced and multi-ethnic country. Malay films were produced by studio heavyweights such 
as the Cathay Organisation and very much reflected the Malay community and culture in both 
Singapore and Malaysia at the time.  While there were different kinds of genres such as 
melodramas also known as sandiwara and horror films, most Malay language films were 
musical pieces styled after Bollywood cinema.  This is because of the presence of Indian 
directors in the Malay cinematic world who, unsurprisingly, used the successful Bollywood 
musicals as templates.   
 
Perhaps the most famous films of the 1950s and 1960s from the Malay musical genre were 
the films of P. Ramlee.  Ramlee was an entertainer extraordinaire.  Amongst other things, he 
was an actor, comedian, musician, director, scriptwriter, conductor, dancer, choreographer 
and composer.  His films such as The Legend of Hang Tuah (1957) and Ahmad Albab (1968), 
which he both directed and starred in, were formulaic musical comedies with himself as the 
romantic lead.  Audiences, regardless of ethnic persuasion, were generally attracted to P. 
Ramlee films for the characters he played, which also embodied the Everyman.7   
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Ramlee’s films were popular amongst the Malay community in Singapore and Malaysia in all 
probability because they reflected Malay kampong (village) life and tradition.  The films 
presented not only a cinematic escape for audiences but, more importantly, they provided the 
Malay community with an identifiable, uniquely Malay identity in an ever increasingly 
multicultural, economically progressive and cosmopolitan Singapore and Malaysia.  Ramlee’s 
films, after all, were screened during the unsettling times of post-war colonial Singapore and 
Malaysia when racial unrest and communist uprisings were not uncommon.  His films were 
also popular throughout the periods of political uncertainty during the height of tensions 
between Malaysia and Singapore as they attempted unity through federation and after 
Singapore’s expulsion in 1965.  Through all the political, economic and social unrest and 
uncertainty, Ramlee’s formulaic films provided a form of unified identity for Malays and 
non-Malays alike.  Older Singaporeans from the different ethnic backgrounds outside the 
Malay community, such as the Eurasians, Indians and Chinese, still reminisce fondly about 
the P. Ramlee films they used to watch in the cinema and on television in their youth.    
 
While Singapore cinema was mostly dormant in the 1970s and 1980s – with the exception of 
a few productions which had minor commercial success (such as the English-language Bobby 
A. Suarez directed 1981 film They Call Her Cleopatra Wong) which was a joint production 
between Singapore and the Philippines) – it was during the late 1990s that Singapore cinema 
started to flourish in popularity and find critical success.   
 
The past decade and a half has witnessed the Singapore film industry coming into its own 
with locally made productions becoming as popular with Singaporeans as the usual 
Hollywood fare.  Some Singapore-made films are transnational productions (e.g. the Hong 
Kong–Singapore studio Raintree Pictures), some feature non-Singaporean cast and crew (e.g. 
Kenneth Bi’s 2005 film Rice Rhapsody) and they are sometimes locally treated foreign 
themes (e.g. Glen Goei’s 1998 film Forever Fever  – Singapore’s version of John Badham’s 
1977 hit Saturday Night Fever).8  Singapore films provide an avenue for contemporary 
Singaporeans to artistically articulate, spread and consume locally made films that narrate 
Singaporean issues and concerns in addition to creating a sense of belonging in the culturally 
diverse nation and ever-evolving global city.   
 
Singapore films are often used as a platform for engaging, demystifying and questioning the 
ruling PAP government.  The government is often woven into the fabric of the narrative of 
Singapore films that examine, narrate and provide commentary on community.  While it can 
be argued that all Singapore films feature the government in some way, shape or form 
because of the heavy investments made by the authorities into the local film industry, the 
portrayal of the government in Singapore films reveal the complicated and intricate 
relationship between Singapore society and the ruling PAP.  Ironically, Singapore films are 
able to explore and contemplate Singaporean concerns precisely because of government 
investment in developing this fledging creative industry.  With the release of the Report of the 
Advisory Council on Culture and the Arts in 1989, Singaporean leaders started investigating 
culture and the arts as necessary developments for Singapore (Ministry of Information, 
Communication and Arts 2008: 1-15).  The government’s reasons for this included creating a 
sense of belonging to Singapore through cultural heritage and the awareness that the creative 
industry is a lucrative and growing worldwide phenomenon.  Film-making courses, for 
instance, are now available at polytechnics (Ngee Ann Polytechnic) and universities 
(LASALLE College for the Arts) as well as offered by private and specialized providers 
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(Objectifs Films).  The film industry has also been helped by overseas investors, private or 
philanthropic organizations and self-funding.   
  
Jack Neo’s commercially successful films Money No Enough and I Not Stupid, and other 
similar commercial productions, appeal to local audiences because of the injection of 
quintessentially Singaporean flavour through language such as Singlish (Singapore English) 
and Chinese dialects such as Hokkien, as well as their likable Everyman characters.  The 
beauty of his films lies in their ability to weave the government into the context of the film.  
For example, the plots of I Not Stupid and its sequel I Not Stupid Too were driven by 
Singapore’s education policies and featured underachievers coping in academically 
competitive Singapore.  In Jack Neo’s Wo Zai Zheng Fu Bu Men De Ri Zi/Just Follow Law 
(2007) features the Everyman as a hapless civil servant struggling within the ridiculously 
inflexible Singapore civil service.  
 
These Everyman character are often ‘heartlanders’, as they are popularly known.  They take 
on the roles of heroes and heroines in these films, which deal with contemporary struggles 
affecting Singaporeans, such as wealth, income, education, immigration, position in society, 
health and social ills education and finance (Uhde & Uhde 2010: 72-155).  These include 
making sure that children get through the education system and into local universities and 
realizing the dream of living comfortable middle class lives free from working long hours and 
a healthy disposable income.   
 
Singapore art-house productions have also managed to capture the complex nature of the 
Everyman in Singapore by the sheer nature of their experimentation in style and format.  
Some Singaporean films such as Djinn’s Perth (2004) and Eric Khoo’s Be With Me (2005) 
are non-commercial productions with disjointed narratives, confusing storylines and slow-
moving scenes.  Others, for example, Royston Tan’s 15 (2002), Khoo’s Mee Pok Man (1995) 
and Ekachai Uekrongtham’s Pleasure Factory (2007) – are also in demand by (niche) 
Singaporean audiences since they are able to capture the complex nature of Singapore society 
by the sheer nature of their experimentation in style and format.  Such films also sensitively 
portray underlying, confronting and controversial topics such as sexuality (e.g. 15 and Be 
With Me) and the sex trade (e.g. Mee Pok Man and Pleasure Factory).   
 
Another Singaporean art-house film-maker of particular note whose films have been lauded 
for featuring everyday Singaporeans but on the fringe of society is documentary film-maker 
Tan Pin Pin.  Tan’s most well-known works include Moving House (2001), Singapore GaGa 
(2005) and Invisible City (2007), which have played to limited but packed local screenings 
and at film festivals. 
 
Tan’s work attempts to make sense of Singapore’s multilayered identity by engaging in the 
unconventional and non-mainstream by featuring the everyday lives and experiences of the 
elderly and the disabled, for instance.  Her work provides avenues for those on the fringe to 
voice their thoughts on the complex layers of identity in Singapore.  Tan’s opus Singapore 
GaGa, for instance, features individuals who are faceless, forgotten or eccentric because of 
their inability to fit nicely into the everyday Singaporean social and cultural landscapes 
forged through government projects that emphasize wealth and popular consumerism.  These 
include both buskers at train stations who are seen by hundreds of people every day but are 
largely ignored, and acclaimed musicians who are underappreciated and misunderstood due to 
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the esoteric nature of their work (for example, internationally recognized yet locally 
undervalued toy pianist Margaret Leng Tan).  Singapore GaGa also features students from a 
madrasa (Islamic school) enthusiastically and happily belting out patriotic tunes, and a former 
communist singing propaganda songs.  Madrasas are few and far between in Singapore, as are 
former communists since most have passed away, migrated overseas, are reformed, or have 
been muted in some way.  Singapore GaGa, in other words, reveals identity in Singapore to 
be not simply the product of a one-dimensional government project, but rather one that is 
highly complex.   
 
Sometimes the Everyman takes the form of easily recognizable caricatures or essentialised 
characters that further certain stereotypes in Singapore when it comes to depictions of ethnic 
minorities (e.g. Army Daze and One Leg Kicking).  While on the one hand these characters 
may be able to represent and express the concerns of Singaporeans, on the other hand, they 
present an added perspective for analysis in terms of their construction – an issue I take up in 
the following chapter on the portrayal of ethnicity in Singapore comedies.  Yet the Everyman 
is quintessentially Singaporean in the sense that they display Singaporean characteristics such 
as speaking in the widely spoken Singlish. 
 
The success of the Everyman is unique when compared with other well-known state-based 
cinemas.  While the Everyman is sometimes the hero in Hollywood cinema, his ordinariness 
is shattered through the extraordinary experiences he faces. Ordinary yet troubled teenager 
John Connor’s development into a visionary and inspirational leader is documented in 
Terminator: Judgment Day (1991) and Terminator: The Sarah Connor Chronicles (2008-
2009).  Others include action heroes with troubled pasts but whose goal is to right wrongs 
(such as Vietnam War veteran Rambo), or conquer the odds for self-fulfillment (such as 
Rocky Balboa).  Meanwhile, the Everywoman overcomes traditionally set gender mindsets by 
questioning female stereotypes.  Thelma and Louise challenged notions of female 
subservience by killing, humiliating or robbing any man who attempted to take advantage of 
them, while Samantha adopted the sexual appetite of the quintessential promiscuous man in 
Sex and the City. 
 
Stuart Hall (1973) explains that there is a symbiotic communication flow between 
broadcasters and audiences, where broadcasters encode their productions with messages 
within a framework of knowledge familiar to audiences.  Moreover, these messages are 
constructed within the cultural framework of the audiences.  Audiences thus find enjoyment 
in these productions because they recognize the messages in them.  These messages, 
according to Janet Staiger (1993), are not simply embedded in a text, waiting to be discovered 
by audiences.  Rather, the meanings of these messages are products of their own particular or 
general historical events.   
 
 
Cultural Traits – Language and Food 
Singapore cinema – like other non-Hollywood film industries – while intentionally destined 
for an overseas market, is strongly local in content.  The cultural traits that Singaporeans 
highly identify with are language and food.  Language and food, as I reveal later in this book, 
not only help galvanize Singaporeans towards each other but may assist in helping them 
warm up to the new migrants entering into the country. 
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The Singapore accent and Singlish language play significant roles in allowing multi-ethnic 
Singaporeans to identify with Singapore and with each other (Chua 2003a).  While matching 
language to nation is not a country-specific phenomenon, it is Singlish that has become an 
unofficial symbol of Singapore’s multicultural national identity.  Singlish is fundamentally a 
creolized variety of English with the Chinese languages of Hokkien and Teochew 
intermingled with Malay and some Tamil, thus displaying multicultural Singapore at its best.  
While most Singaporeans speak their mother tongue in private, Singlish is understood more 
readily between the various ethnicities, even though English is the official language used in 
government and in schools. Singapore films in the English language often take advantage of 
this phenomenon and include a healthy mix of Singlish in their soundtracks and scripts in 
order to cast a wider net for local audiences. 
 
Singapore cinema today is dominated by Chinese-language films with a moderate number of 
English-language productions.  While Malay-language films dominated the earlier years of 
the local film industry, such films are unfortunately all but extinct today.  The same can be 
said of Indian films with the exception of Eric Khoo’s My Magic (2008), filmed in the Tamil 
language.  The uniqueness of Singapore cinema however, is the non-exclusive domination of 
a single language or dialect in a film production.  For instance, Chinese language films often 
support a mixture of the dominant Chinese dialects (Hokkien, Teochew and Cantonese) as 
well as Mandarin and English.   
 
Food also plays a significant part in Singaporean national identity and national solidarity 
(Tarulevicz 2003). The annual Singapore Day (SG Day) events that are held in cities hosting 
large numbers of overseas Singaporeans are testament to the lengths Singaporeans go to for 
familiar cuisine. At the SG Day in Melbourne in 2008, there was an abundance of hawker 
food served from three separate pavilions. Each pavilion was host to hawkers dishing out 
Singapore favourites such as satay (barbequed meat on a stick), ice kachang (sweetened ice 
shavings served with red bean dessert), chendol (coconut and molasses ice desert), hokkien 
mee (fried seafood and pork noodle/vermicelli dish), chicken rice and chilli crab. Some of the 
hawkers in attendance are based in food centres around Singapore and were flown in specially 
to provide authenticity to the occasion. Participants of the event lined up for anywhere 
between 45 minutes to an hour for a small bowl or plate of their favourite Singaporean 
hawker food. The event, which was successfully spread by the online media, was attended by 
an estimated 11,000 Singaporeans (Ee 2008).   
 
In their enthusiastic discussion of Singapore cinema, Tan, Lee and Aw (2003) note that food 
is one of the recurring themes to dominate locally made films.  In some instances, food 
becomes included in the titles of films such as Chicken Rice War (Cheah 2000) and Rice 
Rhapsody are anything to go by.  Television gets a similar treatment.  Singapore Flavours 
(2010) is a 13-part Singaporean television food series with English subtitles, which appears to 
be intended for an overseas audience.  The series is in Mandarin, Japanese and English and 
features hosts that travel around the globe in search of Singapore food.  Australia’s SBS Two 
television channel is one channel that promotes the series which is described in the 
EnhanceTV website (http://www.enhancetv.com.au/shop/product.php? 
productid=163286&cat=332&page=8) as: ‘Singapore has a rich and unique food culture 
which has been exported around the world. This 13-part series will take viewers on a culinary 
tour of cities around the world to investigate the popularity of Singapore dishes overseas. 
Each week, the program will visit restaurants and check if the dish retains its authenticity or 
has been modified to suit foreign tastes.’   
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The series seems to have multiple functions for both international and local audiences.  
Singapore Flavours functions as an excellent tool to encourage Singapore tourism through 
food, directed at Chinese and Japanese-speaking audiences.  Singapore, like the rest of the 
world, recognizes the significance of the Chinese tourist market while acknowledging the 
Japanese tourist market as still strong.  By targeting foreign audiences and revealing to them 
the transnational nature of Singaporean cuisine, Singapore Flavours functions to inform 
audiences of Singapore’s international reach.  It provides Singapore with a softer international 
image that focuses on lifestyle rather than the more serious and complex images of Singapore 
as a successful and hard-nosed economy with incredible social stability due to its 
authoritarian government, or a sterile society dominated by humourless and overworked 
workers.  The series also promotes a form of Singaporean (trans)nationalism for Singaporeans 
both at home and overseas.  This show thus promotes that sense of pride of nation through the 
seemingly innocuous topic of Singaporean food as it travels overseas. 
 
Featuring the local food certainly provides Singaporeans with a link to nation and to each 
other.  Singapore films are awash with productions that feature familiar local flavour that 
Singaporeans cannot seem to get enough of.  Singapore cinema, in other words, is more than 
entertainment but an art form that express the heartbeat of the nation.   
 
 
Art as a Tool for Discussing Society 
Cinema is more than just a medium for popular entertainment.  It is an art form that young 
nations such as Singapore use to express the collective consciousness of their people.  Often 
such social commentary will then be consumed and analyzed by the viewing audience.  In an 
essay entitled ‘Third-World Literature in the Era of Multinational Capitalism’ on the 
incorporation of national allegory in Third World texts, Fredric Jameson implies that art can 
‘be a political act, with real consequences’ (1986: 67).  Art of any culture, regardless of where 
it comes from, is a creative allegory of the collective society where it is a powerful signifier 
of a culture’s collective consciousness.  Most creative texts, regardless of their national origin 
contain national allegory of some sort which readers desire to consume.  American novels, 
such as John Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath (1939) and F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The Great 
Gatsby (1925) are often labeled and marketed as the ‘great American novel’ (Brown 1935: 1-
14).  These texts are considered canonical texts in American Studies.9   
 
Likewise, Hollywood cinema is almost always about American society, regardless of genre.  
For example, fantasy film genres often provide metaphors for a society’s cultural mores.  In 
Tim Burton’s Edward Scissorhands, paranoia and suspicion in American society is explored 
through the relationship artificial man Edward Scissorhands (Johnny Depp) has with a 
suburban American neighbourhood.  The film, set in a 1950s/1990s hybridized era, places 
Edward, a kind-hearted yet bizarre young man with scissors for hands, in American suburbia.  
While popular at first, Edward becomes the pariah of the town because he looks and behaves 
differently from the rest of the members of the neighbourhood (Cooper 1990).  The 
neighbourhood then attempts to destroy Edward at the end of the film.  Edward Scissorhands 
has been described as an eerie echo of Joseph McCarthy’s communist witch-hunts of the 
1950s (Tranter 2006). This film thus deconstructs and questions 1950s Hollywood cinema’s 
representation of that era by focusing on the tensions of suburban America.  Furthermore it 
questions earlier Hollywood portrayals of this period as being perfect and innocent, as 
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reflected in the film Please Don’t Eat The Daisies (1960), and television programmes such as 
Father Knows Best (1954-60) and the nostalgic Happy Days (1974-84).  Likewise, Singapore 
films provide pleasure to local audiences precisely because it is, unsurprisingly, is the only 
cinema available to Singaporeans which feature the local and the familiar.   
 
One purpose of art therefore is to express a society’s political and national concerns.  Cultural 
theorist James Clifford (1988) notes that art is representative of the society it comes from.  
This is particularly relevant in a society undergoing the transformations of modernity where 
the tensions between the contemporary, Westernization and cultural traditions are revealed.  
Such is the case with Hong Kong cinema. 
 
Scholars such as Ackbar Abbas and David Bordwell have long argued that Hong Kong people 
have a symbiotic relationship with their cinema (Ackbar 1997: 16-62; Bordwell 2000: 1-17).  
They observe that Hong Kong cinema represents the ‘pulse’ of Hong Kong society and 
references the collective community’s trauma, angst and fear.  Two distinctive periods in 
Hong Kong history when its cinema captured the essence of its people occurred in the 1960s 
– when the populace was coping with the various changes that the colony was experiencing 
due to modernity – and in the 1980s to the 1990s – in anticipation of the British handover to 
China in 1997.  Veteran martial arts film-maker Chang Cheh (1999) perhaps best explains the 
reason why Hong Kong people value their cinema so much as a tool that dramatizes situations 
that affect them when he notes that cinema is the most prominent and prolific art form in this 
colony.  This seems appropriate – when compared to the civilizations of Europe, America and 
most parts of Asia – as Hong Kong at ‘over one hundred years old’ is still a very young 
society (Zhang 1999:16).   
 
 
Singapore’s Growing Pains 
Like Hong Kong, Singapore is a relatively young society which achieved financial stability 
and economic success early in its national history.10  It is a country whose economic growth 
has been undeniably phenomenal, having begun almost immediately after independence.  
Scratching beneath this utopian facade however, reveals a nation and a citizenry undergoing 
growing pains.  Like the people of Hong Kong, Singaporeans also turn to their cinema to 
make sense of their collective circumstance.  This collective circumstance has to do with the 
complexities associated with the city state’s rapid transformation from a developing 
postcolonial multicultural nation to a high-tech global city with an increasingly transnational 
and transitional population.  While Singaporeans are immensely proud of Singapore’s 
achievements on the world stage, they cope with the effects and consequences of globalism.  
Singapore is a nation that struggles with its position as a global city while also managing 
being a post-industrial nation with traditional anxieties (K.P. Tan 2011).  A list of 
contributing factors in Singapore’s growing pains, which are discussed in various overlapping 
forms throughout this book, follows.   
 
• A strong ethnic Chinese demographic in a demographically Malay-centric geographic 
region 
Singapore has a large ethnic Chinese population even though it is in the middle of the Malay 
Archipelago.  This is because Singapore was an attractive place for Chinese immigrants 
fleeing from war, famine and poverty in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when 
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Singapore was still under British rule.  Singapore proved a welcoming place for the hundreds 
of thousands of mainly Han Chinese arriving from Southern China due to the abundance of 
work available, the protection and stability offered by the British, and the colonizers’ policy 
of non-intervention into the affairs of the Asian communities that settled on the island.  
However, the high population of ethnic Chinese in the Malay-centric region proved to be 
unsettling for both groups, who found difficulties cohabitating in this multicultural 
environment, particularly in the 1960s (Gomes 2010).   
 
The racial unrest that ensued between the (Singapore) Chinese and the (Malaysian) Malays 
resulted in open conflicts between these two communal groups and eventually Singapore’s 
expulsion from the Federation of Malaysia after 23 difficult months in August 1965.  To say 
that the political situation at the time was highly charged is an understatement; the Malays 
were highly suspicious of the Chinese in both Singapore and Malaysia in terms of their 
involvement in communism and the fear that the Malays would be left behind due to Chinese 
entrepreneurship.   
 
After Singapore’s expulsion from the federation however, the PAP managed to create a 
multicultural policy based on very strict laws against racial vilification, and education 
campaigns promoting racial harmony.  In addition, the PAP highlighted the culture of the 
ethnic Chinese as the culture of Singapore (Gomes 2010).  Commentators on Singapore – 
such as former Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam – have accused the government of 
creating a ‘Chinese’ identity for the nation even though the state claims to be multicultural 
(Grattan et al. 2005).  The creation of Singapore as a Singapore-Chinese state was particularly 
evident during the ‘Asian values’ debate in the 1990s when Lee Kuan Yew openly stated that 
Singapore’s ‘Asian values’ were strongly rooted in selected tenets of Chinese 
Confucianism.11 
 
In the process of creating a Singaporean identity that is strongly rooted in the culture of the 
ethnic Chinese pioneers, Singapore downplayed Malay culture.  While the government gave 
the Malay community some public acknowledgement through language – by making Malay 
the official language of Singapore and by using Malay lyrics for the Singapore national 
anthem known as the Majulah Singapura (Progress Singapore) – such gestures were no more 
than superficial.  The Malays have long felt displaced in Singapore due to government 
policies.  For instance, one of the central aspects of their culture – community through the 
kampong (Malay village) – was disturbed through the destruction of kampongs to make way 
for progress in land-scarce Singapore.  While the Malays joined the Chinese and others in 
high-rise living, in government built and maintained council apartments known as Housing & 
Development Board (HDB) flats, they did so with a heavy heart.  This is because the Malays 
felt an important aspect of their culture – communal living – was being eradicated due to the 
government’s policy of HDB blocks reflecting the demographics of the country (Sin 2002).  
Singapore, in other words, frowns on the creation of ethnic ghettos in HDB estates and 
blocks.  As Malays are commonly known to make up approximately 13.6 per cent of the 
Singapore population, then the residents of any block of HDB flats must include only 13.6 per 
cent Malays.   
 
The government actively distinguishes ethnic Chinese in Singapore from mainlanders not 
only because mainland China is communist, but primarily because it eradicated Confucian 
Chinese culture during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76).  The Singapore government’s 
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creation of a unique Singaporean identity based on the culture of the ethnic Chinese settlers 
and divorced from the events and developments of communist China proved so successful 
that Singaporean-Chinese today face an identity crisis through their outright distaste for 
mainlanders who have more recently migrated to the city state. Mainlanders have been 
steadily streaming into and settling in Singapore en masse since the mid-1990s, primarily for 
work.  Many have also migrated permanently to Singapore.  High-profile Chinese immigrants 
include international film stars Jet Li and Gong Li.  Singaporeans, Chinese and otherwise, -
have unleashed their resentment at mainlanders entering Singapore upon the government, 
who they believe has turned against ‘True Singaporeans’ by courting mainlanders and other 
new migrants to take up work visas and permanent residence.  Singaporeans use online 
platforms such as blogs, websites, forums and social media to emotionally state that new 
migrants do not deserve to enjoy the fruits of Singapore, which was born out of their 
ancestors’ hard work and sacrifice.12   
 
• Increasingly diverse multi-ethnic and multicultural society 
Singapore’s population is changing.  In the first couple of decades after independence 
Singapore’s population reflected the broad Chinese-Malay-Indian racial demographics which 
came to define the Singapore ethnographic landscape.  While the Chinese-Malay-Indian 
groupings did not distinguish the different ethnic groups within these racial categories, 
sometime in the 1990s the government started acknowledging more specific ethnic groupings 
on the compulsory identification cards Singaporeans carry with them.13  However, by then the 
Singaporean ethnographic landscape had started to transform, due to an increase in both 
transient and permanent residents flocking to Singapore for work.   
 
Transient migrants, predominantly from other Asian nations, who enter the country for 
employment as unskilled labourers and skilled professionals – known as ‘foreign talent’ – 
have been a cause for concern amongst those Singaporean citizens who either settled in pre-
independent Singapore or who trace their lineage back to settlers who arrived when the nation 
was still a British colony.  Post-independence migrants pose a kind of trauma for the 
citizenry, and this is perhaps caused by Singapore’s uneven immigration policy trends 
between 1965 and the late 1970s.  Initially in the first decade of independence emphasizing 
strict controls over permanent and temporary migrants as a means to establish its identity as 
an independent state, Singapore started to increasingly relax its immigration policies to allow 
skilled and unskilled labour to feed the juggernaut of modernity.  In 1970, for instance, 
foreign workers in Singapore made up 3.2 per cent of the labour force.  By 2000 this had leapt 
to 29.2 per cent (Yeoh et al. 1999).  By June 2014, Singapore’s population had reached 5.47 
million, including 1.6 million non-resident foreigners (Tham 2014). 
 
• An ambitiously cosmopolitan society that enjoys wealth and materialism, but also 
values conservatism through the practice of traditional cultural values and adherence to 
strong religious beliefs 
Singaporean society presents a fascinating culture of contradiction.  On the one hand 
Singaporeans are cosmopolitan and progressive.  They revel in Singapore’s strong material 
culture and enjoy its healthy nightlife and entertainment scene.  On the other hand, Singapore 
society is profoundly conservative.  This conservatism is rooted in cultural values and 
traditions that are tied to ethnicity and religion.  Singaporeans celebrate with vigour the 
traditional festivals, events and superstitions dictated by their respective ethnic cultures.  For 
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instance, the Chinese practice of giving hong baos (red packets filled with money) to children 
and unmarried adults during Chinese New Year.  Hong baos must contain amounts of money 
in even numbers for good luck since odd numbers are bad luck in Chinese culture.  Although 
ethnic cultural traditions are passed down from generation to generation, it is religion that has 
become increasingly popular and intrinsically part of everyday life in Singapore.   
 
Islam, Buddhism/Taoism and Hinduism are ritualistically practiced by Malay, Chinese and 
Indian Singaporeans, respectively.14  Moreover, Islam is the faith of all ethnic Malays in 
Singapore and neighbouring Malaysia and an essential part of their everyday cultural life.  So 
if a person is born ethnically Malay, they are automatically Muslim since ethnicity, culture 
and religion are synonymous of each other in this case.  While Islam, Buddhism/Taoism and 
Hinduism are religions that have successfully circulated in South East Asia for centuries, 
Christianity is the relatively ‘new’ faith that is making a profound impact on the Asian region 
as a whole.  The first waves of Christianity arrived with European and American colonial 
powers in Asia as far back as the fifteenth century.15  Christianity is now a growing religion 
with not only new converts but also expanding denominations that are taking root in 
Singapore.  Some very well-known and popular churches are home-grown with expanding 
ministries overseas, known as mega-churches, such as the New Creation Church (founded 
1984) and City Harvest Church (founded 1989) boasting five-figure memberships.  Often 
offshoots of Baptist, Evangelical and Charismatic branches of Christianity, these new 
Christian communities minister to huge congregations, have very healthy finances and boast 
well-known Singaporeans among their congregations.  For example popular Mandarin pop 
singer Sun Ho is one of the co-founders of the City Harvest Church counts and the wife of its 
principal founder, Pastor Kong Hee.16   
 
• Its youthfulness as an independent nation and the scripting of a national story 
through the officially sanctioned narrative known as The Singapore Story 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Singapore is a former British colony (1919-1963) and 
settler society which became an independent nation in 1965 after being part of a short-lived 
Malaysian Federation (1963-1965).  Under the British, Singapore’s population became host to 
Asian migrants primarily from China, India and the Malay Archipelago, as well as the Middle 
East (Arabs), Armenia and beyond.  Often, these migrants were traders or individuals drawn 
to the growing city in search of work and fortune.  Since independence, Singapore has 
become a global financial centre with robust and diversified national industries including 
manufacturing, tourism, health, technology, education and the creative arts. 
 
Singapore prides itself on having become a modern state in less than four decades, compared 
to the three centuries taken by European nations and the United States.  The state achieved 
modernity primarily because of its dedication to economic growth.  This Singapore did 
through aggressive campaigns to create a national identity amongst its disparate and 
multicultural citizenry.  Such campaigns included an emphasis on hard work and sacrifice of 
self for country to build a better future.  Moreover, the Singapore government resolved to 
script a history that would unite Singaporeans while at the same time promoting the ruling 
party as the triumphant saviours in what is known as The Singapore Story (Hong & Huang 
2008).  The Singapore Story is the national story of Singapore whose name and narrative are 
derived from Lee Kuan Yew’s epic 1998 memoir The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan 
Yew and its sequel published in 2000 titled The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew, 
Vol. 2: From Third World to First: 1965-2000. 
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The PAP has been successful at creating a mythology about itself and its successes in 
Singapore by selecting certain events and people in the years just prior to and immediately 
following independence in order to build a positive and glowing picture of its contributions to 
The Singapore Story.  The Singapore Story and the PAP’s part in it are made even more 
legitimate through the collection and the articulation of the living memories of Singaporeans 
who lived through the trauma and triumphs Singapore faced.  For instance the Singapore 
government has been actively collecting the memories of Singaporeans through various 
projects run by the National Heritage Board’s National Archives of Singapore.  The 
Singapore Story is then packaged for future generations, particularly those born after 1965, as 
a constant reminder of what the government has done for Singapore and for Singaporeans.  
Furthermore, the contributions of other political players in The Singapore Story are either 
downplayed as insignificant (such as former First Minister David Marshall who was actively 
involved in negotiating with the British for self-government in the 1950s) or demonized as 
detractors and obstructers in the progress of the nation (such as veteran opposition figure J.B 
Jeyaretnam).   
 
• An authoritarian government that plays a vital part in the development of Singapore’s 
society and culture which is both lauded and despised by Singaporeans 
Singaporeans accord the PAP and Lee their due honours as architects of the nation who have 
built up a country and created a strong middle class.  For instance, Singapore today is often in 
the international spotlight as a venue for world events such as the World Economic Forum 
and the Formula One Grand Prix.  In addition Singapore boasts the greatest number of 
millionaires per household worldwide (Ng 2011).  
 
Singapore’s enormous successes in the economic sphere and status as a wealthy global city 
state are principally due to the PAP – the only ruling party to govern Singapore.  One of the 
key founders of the PAP is elder statesman Lee Kuan Yew.  Lee is credited as the founder of 
modern Singapore after serving the country as Prime Minister (1959-1990), Senior Minister 
(1990-2004) and Minister Mentor (2004-2011).  Lee and the PAP have had absolute control 
in Singapore, thus ensuring a politically stable nation and a controlled workforce, which 
proved attractive to overseas investors and multinational companies that set up offices in the 
island state.  Arguably, this control contributed to Singapore becoming a wealthy economic 
miracle despite being devoid of any natural resources other than its people.  The current 
Prime Minister of Singapore is Lee’s son Lee Hsien Loong.   
 
To maintain order and control over the Singaporean people, the government embarked on 
long-running and highly effective education campaigns as part of its nation-building efforts.  
The emphasis of these campaigns in the early years of Singapore’s independence was loyalty 
to state and self-sacrifice for the sake of community and country.  Later on, the campaigns 
placed an emphasis on shared history and heritage, trust in the government and a life-long 
commitment to Singapore regardless of geographical boundaries.  Through campaigns 
dedicated to nation building, the government also has created a citizenry that equate nation 
with government.  This deep sense of commitment to and (over)reliance on government has 
meant that the authorities have been successful in controlling contemporary collective 
Singaporean culture and society.  The Singapore 21 campaign is the latest large-scale 
campaign to instill national and social cohesion. 
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Singaporeans have always been reminded that Singapore’s only resource is its people and the 
nation’s continuing success will only be achieved through commitment to country and 
government.  In 1997, then Prime Minister and current Emeritus Senior Minister Goh Chok 
Tong explained that the Singapore 21 campaign is a ‘vision for a new era’, stating that the 
campaign 
 
is about what the people of Singapore want to make of this country.  More than 
a house, Singapore must be a home.  The Government can provide the 
conditions for security and economic growth. But in the end, it is people who 
give feeling, the human touch, the sense of pride and achievement, the warmth.  
So beyond developing physical infrastructure and hardware, we need to 
develop our social infrastructure and software. In Sony Corporation, they call 
this ‘heartware’.  We need to go beyond economic and material needs, and 
reorient society to meet the intellectual, emotional, spiritual, cultural and social 
needs of our people…In future, the competitive advantage of nations will lie in 
their people – how a society is organised to maximise and mobilise the 
potential of its people, and how it serves the material, spiritual, intellectual, 
political, social and emotional needs of its citizenry.  The ideas I have put 
forward are to develop a cohesive and resilient nation, a people fully equipped 
to compete in the future, and a people with emotional stakes in Singapore. 
(C.T. Goh 1997)   
 
Embedded within the Singapore 21 campaign is the ‘The Singapore Heartbeat’ – the current 




The Singapore Heartbeat 
Singapore films, as I contend, do provide an insight into Singapore society and culture.  They 
are the heartbeat of the nation, so to speak.  The term ‘Singapore Heartbeat’ itself is one that 
is utilized by the Singapore government in order to drum up nationalist sentiments in its 
population which has grown weary of the ruling party and who are increasingly becoming 
transnational.  The Singapore government (Singapore 21 2003) explains the purpose of 
‘Singapore Heartbeat’: 
 
As Singapore becomes more connected with other countries in the globalised 
economy, we must ensure that our national bonds do not grow weak.  
Whether we live or work here or overseas, Singaporeans must develop a 
stronger sense of belonging to this country and embrace a common vision of 
the country as a home worth returning to and if need be, fighting and dying 
for. 
We need to feel passionately about Singapore – that this is where our roots are 
and where our future lies. Some of us feel that this is home because we grew 
up here. For others, this island has become home because they have chosen to 
make it so. Whatever our origins may be, we are united by the common vision 
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of Singapore as our home. And only when all citizens share this common 
passion for the country will the Singapore heartbeat be strong.  
 
The PAP’s unwavering commitment to campaigns that instill strong feelings of loyalty to 
both nation and government has had its rewards.  Arguably, such campaigns have resulted in 
the PAP maintaining power in Singapore.  Moreover, a unique cultural trait of Singaporean 
nationalism is its allegiance to the PAP government (Barr & Skrbiš 2008).  Yet this allegiance 
does not always work to the PAP’s advantage.  
 
It seems that while the vast majority of Singaporeans acknowledge the role played by the 
PAP in creating a safe and wealthy environment, they are simultaneously critical of the ruling 
party.17  While they take pride in Singapore’s increasing profile in the global arena, they are 
also unhappy with some of the consequences of the nation’s adoption of global capitalism.  
Many Singaporeans, however, are cautious about the forums that they use to critique the PAP.  
This is perhaps because the PAP is well known to ‘punish’ its critics by taking them through 
the local courts and successfully suing them for defamation as in the high profile case of J.B 
Jeyaretnam.  Singaporeans thus critique the PAP in informal spaces and groups in what is 
colloquially known as ‘coffee shop talk’.  Increasingly, growing numbers of Singaporeans are 
turning to online platforms to discuss the PAP and the consequences of its policies.  Social 
and political bloggers such as Au Waipang (1996) and satirist Lee Kin Mun (2012), who is 
more popularly known by his moniker ‘mrbrown’ (one of the first widely read bloggers in 
Singapore), run sites that provide unbridled commentary and satire on local society, culture 
and government.  Meanwhile other popular political satire sites such as TalkingCock (2012) 
allow Singaporeans to contribute and consume irreverent articles on Singapore which 
indirectly refer to the government.   
 
Most everyday Singaporeans, who heavily utilize online technology and identify themselves 
as netizens, make use of online forums to air their grievances while doing so anonymously, 
which has been noticed and commented upon by current Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong 
(2012).  The forums on sites such as the news site Asia One (Singapore Press Holdings 2012) 
and popular political sites The Online Citizen (2012) and TR Emeritus (2012) (formerly 
known as The Temasek Review Emeritus) are well used by contributors and readers alike.18  
Common topics of discussion pertaining to displeasure with the government have to do with 
the ruling PAP and everyday life in Singapore.  Most Singaporeans get worked up about the 
elitism displayed by the PAP (KP Tan 2008b) and the very high salaries Cabinet Ministers 
and Members of Parliament (Mauzy 1997).  Lifestyle and societal concerns with which many 
Singaporeans take issue include the high rates of immigration into the country which I will 
discuss in various sections of this book.   
 
Singapore is changing.  These changes are attributed to Singapore’s growth towards a global 
city state, which has led to physical amendments in the landscape, ethnographic shifts in the 
population and an explosion of ‘foreign’ cultural practices.  Many Singaporeans see the PAP 
as the cause for the dissonance they feel to the changes going on around them.  This 
dissonance came to the forefront during the 2011 General Elections (GE). 
 
Although Singaporeans tend to become more politically aware and active during election 
time, the 2011 GE was exceptional.  The GE created a lot of fervent anti-PAP and pro-
opposition party discussions online (e.g. The Online Citizen and The Temasek Review 
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Emeritus) and through social media (e.g. Facebook).  These discussions revolved around 
certain issues that Singaporeans have become particularly concerned about:   
 
• Increasing cost and standard of living created by the PAP through the influx of new 
 permanent and temporary migrants 
• increasing income gap levels and rising levels of poverty 
• increasing number of foreigners who are changing the ethnographic and cultural 
 landscapes of Singapore 
• bullying and underhanded tactics by the PAP 
• anger and disappointment at the PAP’s creation of a materialistic, hierarchical and class-
 based society 
• admiration for the tenacity of the opposition  
 
The result was a loss of a Group Representative Constituency made up of 5 seats and a single 
seat constituency – the highest since the PAP swept into power in 1959.  More importantly, 
the 2011 General Elections marked an unbridled political enthusiasm by the Singaporean 
electorate.  Prominent Singaporean writer Catherine Lim wrote enthusiastically in her blog 
the day after the elections that she was pleasantly surprised at the way Singaporeans had 
evolved from political apathy to political consciousness.  Since the GE, Singaporeans have 
been taking to social media to further comment about the state of Singapore as a result of 
government dictates.  Such topics include the issues that dominated the GE as well as the 
mental and financial health of Singaporeans because of the presence of casinos and the 




Singapore is a country that supports a multicultural and multi-ethnic population with their 
own communal nuances based on tradition and religion which navigate cultural practices and 
rituals related to major life events such as death.  These differences run deep in Singapore 
society, yet the vast majority of Singaporeans manage to unite and band together when 
confronted by common concerns that affect their everyday lives.  The film industry manages 
to mirror and confront head on the issues that plague and disturb Singapore society, in a 
somewhat contemplative space.  The following chapters will highlight Singapore films’ 
incredible knack of capturing the struggles Singaporeans have negotiating ethnic cultural 
identity and uniting with each other because of communal differences while simultaneously 
coming together as a people when confronted with the presence of new migrants caused 





 Chapter 2  
Racial Harmony or Comedy of Errors?  Ethnicity and the Singaporean Comedy 
 
We, the citizens of Singapore, 
pledge ourselves as one united people, 
regardless of race, language or religion, 
to build a democratic society 
based on justice and equality 
so as to achieve happiness, prosperity and 
progress for our nation 
‘The Singapore National Pledge’ (S. Rajaratnam 1966) 
 
In his work on the representation of ethnicity in the Singapore media, Kenneth Paul Tan (2009) 
notes that Singaporeans generally do not have sustained face-to-face interactions with their 
‘ethnic Other’.  In other words, many Singaporeans do not have much contact or socialize with 
people outside their own immediate communal group.  It is only through the media, Tan 
asserts, that Singaporeans encounter their ethnic Other.  Television and film in Singapore have 
the responsibility of creating and maintaining positive notions of ethnicity, through both 
conventional and comedic stereotypes that serve to neutralize any paranoia Singaporeans have 
of perceived ethnic threats, as well as to visualize an imagined harmonious Singapore where all 
ethnicities live happily together.  Currently the Singapore media features the three main ethnic 
groups in Singapore: the Chinese, the Malays and the Indians.  While there are subtle 
differences between the terms ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ in scholarship – with the former 
implicating large groups of people united by appearance, culture and ethnicity  in Singapore, 
the terms have been used interchangeably with each other.  The more commonly used ‘race’ is 
used in official and unofficial discourse and is often employed to describe multiple ethnicities.  
For instance, the Indian race includes anyone of diasporic South Asian (e.g. India and Sri 
Lankan) heritage.  Singapore’s use of the term ‘race’ is historical, borrowed from the British 
during their sojourn as imperial masters of the colony in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  
While I actively adopt the term ‘ethnicity’ in this chapter, I do acknowledge the spirited use of 
‘race’ in Singapore, since it is very much part of the contemporary local lingo.   
 
The issue of ethnic identity plagues Singapore society as a whole.  While Singaporeans are 
immensely proud of their Chinese-Malay-Indian ethnic make-up for a variety of reasons – such 
as peaceful coexistence and hybridized cultural productions such as local food  this diversity 
nevertheless also creates superficial and conventional understandings of the ethnic Other.  In 
other words, Singaporeans are happy to live in communal isolation as long as their ideas of the 
ethnic Other remain unchallenged.  To this end, Singapore films do aid in maintaining and 
reinforcing predictable ethnic stereotypes.  However, the conventional portrayal of ethnicities 
becomes muddled somehow when both film and television attempt to represent or deal with 
ethnicities that do not fit nicely into the Chinese-Malay-Indian nexus.  While comedies 
worldwide sometimes make use of comedic portrayals of ethnicity to garner laughs, such 
portrayals in Singapore films is problematic and worth mentioning since mainstream comedies 
are produced and financed by government funded or co-owned companies such as Raintree 




Paradoxically, the visualization of an imagined multicultural Singapore also serves to maintain 
the demographic dominance of the ethnic Chinese as the principal demographic group in 
Singapore, since most locally made English-language films and television programmes are 
graced by ethnic Chinese faces.  While the acting profession is no doubt blessed with an 
abundance of ethnic Chinese actors, it is not surprising that many protagonists in film and 
television shows are almost always ethnic Chinese.  It is also not uncommon for non-Chinese 
actors to play ethnic Chinese characters.  Supporting roles in film and television, however, are 
almost always the domain of other ethnicities.  
 
Stereotyping of ethnicity for the benefit of multicultural harmony is arguably a beneficial move 
for a state-controlled media dedicated to maintaining and upholding the official multicultural 
discourse.  Singaporean viewers become convinced of ethnic harmony in Singapore through 
the reinforcement of stereotypes they can recognize (K.P. Tan 2009).  However, while it is easy 
to stereotype and thus identify the major ethnic groups in Singapore through appearance and 
language, the problem that many local viewers encounter is recognizing ethnicities outside the 
Chinese-Malay-Indian ethnic majorities, such as biracial and Eurasian fictional characters or 
performers.  This chapter suggests that while Singapore is able to on the surface to maintain 
ethnic harmony in a country comprised of diverse ethnicities and cultures, the troubling use of 
actors of different ethnicities to play almost exclusively Chinese characters and the over-the-
top portrayals of Eurasians are indicative of the challenges Singapore society has in dealing 
with ethnicity outside the Chinese-Malay-Indian nexus.   
 
Local films – particularly comedies – have a tendency of reducing ethnicity to simplistic and 
non-threatening representations.1  The representation of ethnicity seems to pose a predicament 
for Singapore cinema.  Providing Singaporeans with formulaic, humorous and non-threatening 
representations of ethnicity that they are able to recognize and identify with is no doubt easier 
than presenting more complex yet potentially unrecognizable representations, particularly in 
commercial productions.  To comprehend ethnicity in Singapore films, I take a look at the 
significance of ethnicity in Singapore and two popular English-language films featuring a 
multi-ethnic cast and characters: Army Daze (Ong 1996) and One Leg Kicking (Koh 2001).  
When Singapore does produce English-language films featuring multi-ethnic casts and 




It’s Complicated – Multiculturalism in Singapore  
Singapore prides itself on being a well-manicured multicultural society that has come a long 
way very quickly from the days of communal politics and violence that dominated the final 
years of British imperial rule and the difficult years of federation.  It is now a nation that has 
seemingly formed a harmonious society that tolerates ethnic and religious difference (D.P.S. 
Goh 2008).  Singaporeans have been brought up to believe that Singapore is a successful 
multicultural nation because there are no obvious signs of racism which  for many other 
countries – take the form of race riots and racially motivated violence.  Likewise, 
commentators (e.g. Chua 2003b) note that Singapore’s version of multiculturalism is a form of 
social control.  He (2003b: 76-77) explains that 
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[i]n Singapore, multiculturalism was adopted constitutionally at its founding.  
This has enabled the government to use ‘multiculturalism’ as an ideological 
basis for the rationalisation of policies and administrative practices on issues of 
race, ranging from macro-national language policies to micro-processes of 
allocation and the use of public spaces.  The result is a series of ad hoc decisions 
that discriminate against different racial groups at different social structural and 
political junctures and historical times, that lack ethical/political consistency and 
that are rationalised under a substantively empty notion of ‘racial harmony’. 
 
One way by which this social control is achieved is through official active remembering such 
as through museums (Gomes 2010). 
 
In addition to the Indian, Malay and Chinese diasporic communities Singapore has minority 
ethnic communities such as the Eurasians, Arabs and Armenians (D.P.S. Goh 2008).  This 
multicultural make-up stems from its history as a settler community.2  British colonists in the 
early twentieth century recognized Singapore’s advantageous geographical position at the tip of 
the Malayan hinterland and between the East-West trading routes (Owen et al. 2005: 139-41).  
The British involved traders and indentured labourers from the region and elsewhere to develop 
Singapore into a global entrepôt that was highly cosmopolitan for its time.  Traders from 
various regions of Asia and the Middle East visited Singapore and saw its potential for robust 
trade.  The country attracted the attention of Western commerce eager for goods from the 
‘Orient’ such as spices and silk.  Indian and Chinese migrant labourers meanwhile had no 
trouble finding work in the thriving city, in areas such as infrastructure development and as 
hired hands facilitating the movement of goods traded at the mouth of the Singapore River 
(Owen 2005: 312-13).  Most often, the traders and labourers were temporary migrants whose 
stay in Singapore was transitional.  However, there were many factors that caused them to 
leave their own countries and make a new home in Singapore.  They fled armed conflict, 
poverty and natural disasters to a place offering an abundance of work and a safer environment 
for entrepreneurship.  This encouraged many transitional migrants to become permanent 
settlers.   
 
It is not surprising to find that ethnicity increasingly dominates the hearts and minds of 
everyday Singaporeans.  The undeniable presence of ethnicity is felt in the scripting of the 
nation’s history and identity (Hong & Huang 2008; Hong 2009).  Ethnicity is also at the 
forefront of the government agenda, and the Singaporean psyche, in terms of official policies 




Singapore is indeed a multicultural and multi-ethnic nation, at least in the ways it brands itself 
internationally through its various tourism campaigns.  Singapore is sold as a one-stop exotic 
destination of gastronomic, cultural and entertainment delights where visitors can sample Asia 
and indeed the world within a small yet safe space.3  The tourism campaigns that romanticize 
Singapore’s multi-ethnic diversity serve to drum up a sense of unity amongst Singaporeans in 
order to convince themselves of the success the nation has achieved as a non-homogeneous 
society (Heng & Devan 1995).   
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On the surface, the different ethnicities of Singapore live and work harmoniously with each 
other.  The idea of racial harmony not only creates a peaceful space for citizens but national 
stability for the purpose of foreign investment.  A nationally coherent workforce, after all, will 
be committed to building a wealthy and cosmopolitan Singapore, according to the government.  
There have not been any open communal conflicts or violent ethnic clashes in independent 
Singapore.  The last racially charged incident took place on 21 July 1964, a year before 
Singapore’s independence, when racial tensions between Chinese and Malays exploded on 
what is known today as the Prophet Muhammad Birthday Riots.   
 
Since independence the Singapore government has spared no expense at making sure that there 
is racial harmony amongst its people.  Racial harmony has endured in the independent nation in 
part because of the strict laws preventing racial incitement.  Singapore Penal Code (Cap 224, 
2008 Rev. Ed.), s. 298A states: 
Whoever — 
(a) by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations 
or otherwise, knowingly promotes or attempts to promote, on grounds of 
religion or race, disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between 
different religious or racial groups; or 
(b) commits any act which he knows is prejudicial to the maintenance of 
harmony between different religious or racial groups and which disturbs or is 
likely to disturb the public tranquility,  
shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 3 years, or 
with fine, or with both.   
 
While these laws prevent open communal conflict from taking place, Singapore also puts in 
place soft approaches committed to promoting and fostering racial harmony. Singapore does 
this through: a national pledge stating unity despite communal differences, quoted at the 
beginning of this chapter; the promotion of racial harmony as part of country’s tourism 
campaigns; the establishment of official think tanks such as the Inter-Racial and Religious 
Confidence Circle (IRCC); and the establishment of racial harmony through the formal 
education system, in particular in social studies texts.  In 2008, Singapore launched Racial 
Harmony Day, which is commemorated in schools on the anniversary of the 1964 Prophet 
Muhammad Birthday Riots, with children wearing traditional ethnic dress such as the Chinese 
cheongsam, the Malay baju kurong and the Indian sari to school.    
 
 
Not Quite Integration: Cultural Harmony without the ‘Multi’ Bit 
Although Singapore supports a multicultural and multi-ethnic population, the government 
purposefully chooses elements of Chinese cultural values as the template for a common 
Singaporean national identity (Gomes 2010: 299-301).  This engineered national identity is 
arguably strategic, since Singapore’s biggest demographic are the ethnic Han Chinese whose 
ancestors migrated from southern China during British rule.  The ruling People’s Action Party 
(PAP), fronted by Lee Kuan Yew, openly encourages and supports the strength of Confucian 
Chinese values as a model for Singapore and its people, since selected elements support 
unquestioning obedience to government, hard work and self-sacrifice – the very features 
Singapore has desired in its people to take it from developing to developed nation status.  The 
template, at least on the surface, has the intended effect of maintaining a shared Singaporean 
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identity amongst a population of people from different ethnic groups; however, this only 
appears to work because the Chinese dominate in terms of population and cultural influence.  
Below the surface, however, the ethnic Chinese also grapple with the changes their culture and 
identity have endured for the sake of the nation state (Chua 2009), which was discussed in 
depth in Chapter 3 in the context of the films of Tan Pin Pin. 
 
While the government constantly reminds its people that Singapore supports a happy and 
tolerant multicultural society, the state also discourages cross-fertilisation of ethnicities and 
cultures by advocating cultural pride through non-political displays of cultural signifiers, such 
as festivals and food as well as through communal self-support.  Communal self-support takes 
the form of what is known in Singapore as community ‘self-help groups’.   
 
There are five self-help groups that exist in Singapore: Council for the Development of 
Singapore (CDC); Yayasan MENDAKI, for the Muslim Malay community; Chinese 
Development Assistance Council (CDAC), for the Chinese community; Singapore Indian 
Development Association (SINDA), for the Indian community; and the Eurasian Association 
(EA), for the Eurasian community.  Self-help groups have the responsibility of servicing their 
own ethnic community and for addressing any communal problems that may arise in the 
community.  Self-help groups also provide social and education schemes, such as cooking 
classes and scholarships, for students in the Singapore education system from primary to 
university level.  These groups also, within reason and along government-sanctioned lines, take 
on an advocacy role in terms of voicing the concerns of their respective communities.  
Advocacy here does not involve any issues that would incite racial tensions, such as criticism 
of other ethnicities or complaints regarding racial inequality.   
 
At the school level, the government requires that Singaporean children are only allowed to 
study a ‘second language’, known as mother tongue – their ‘first language’ being English –, 
which their race assigns them to.  Second language’ or ‘mother tongue’ is a compulsory subject 
in the local school system and pupils are forced to stick with their chosen second language 
from primary school right up to high school.  So if a student is ethnic Chinese, then they are 
only allowed to take up Mandarin as their second language.  Non-ethnic Chinese pupils such as 
Indians and Malays are encouraged to take up their mother tongue as their second language, 
although they have the option of opting for Mandarin instead.  Eurasian pupils, however, have 
a choice of languages, often preferring either Malay or Mandarin since their mother tongue is 
mostly English.  However, certain education practices in Singapore that are tied in with 
Chinese culture and language blatantly favour the ethnic Chinese over and above the other 
races.  While English is the language of choice in the civil service and the schooling system, 
Mandarin is held up as a significant and arguably superior language.  Some of the most highly 
regarded elite secondary schools in Singapore, for instance, are part of an education scheme 
known as the Special Assistance Plan (SAP).  Students who enter into SAP schools have 
excellent results, particularly in Mandarin.  However, SAP schools are gated education 
institutions that only students who excel in Mandarin can enter, and almost always these 
students are ethnic Chinese.   
 
Singapore’s form of multiculturalism thus means that Singaporeans are first and foremost able 
to identify the three primary communal groups in Singapore.  Singaporeans are generally 
aware, on a superficial level, of their ethnic Other as long as they fall into the recognizable 
Chinese, Indian and Malay ethnic and cultural categories.  As Norman Vasu (2012) observes, 
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this is because of the government’s management of multiculturalism in Singapore.  Vasu 
(2012: 738) explains:  
 
The management of Singapore’s multicultural composition displays a deeply 
entrenched belief in the importance of communal identity and the need for the 
state to both protect and preserve inter-group differences. Besides administrative 
enforcement of the racial categories, the state has also essentialized interracial 
cultural identities by tagging each race with “unique” cultural traits. Races can 
be considered essentialized through Singaporean multiculturalism: each race is 
invested with cultural traits such as language and dress derived from the cultural 
hotchpotch of their group’s history and held to be unique to them and distinct 
from others. Moreover, these cultural traits are held to be permanent and passed 
down through the generations. 
 
So while Singaporeans feel a sense of great national pride in their multicultural identity, many 
Singaporeans, as asserted at the beginning of this chapter, have a high tendency to have 
sustained relationships primarily with members of their own broad communal groupings.  This 
lack of integration, arguably, has perhaps resulted in many Singaporeans having very little 
understanding of ethnicities and cultures other than their own.   
 
The groups of Singaporeans who perhaps pose the greatest challenge for locals to recognize 
and identify are those that fall outside the CMI nexus.  Here I refer to Singaporeans who are 
classified as Eurasian, and the first-generation offspring of mixed racial couplings.  The 
Eurasians are the biggest minority group in Singapore and the best-known ‘Other’ in the CMIO 
racial categorization.  With that said, Singaporeans may find it difficult to even recognize 
Eurasians since they vary in appearance such as in skin colour and have surnames that originate 
from a number of European heritages.  While ‘established’ Eurasians have an official 
classification in Singapore, first-generation offspring of mixed unions do not have that luxury.  
Until 2010, the offspring of mixed parentage were ‘assigned’ an ethnic grouping by default 
based on the ethnicity of the father in official documents such as birth certificates and National 
Registration Identification Cards (NRIC) (Daniels 2005; Hoe 2010).  Now, biracial children are 
able to have the ethnicities of both parents listed in official documents with the father’s 
ethnicity accorded primary status (Hoe 2010).  So the offspring of a Chinese father and Indian 
mother will be classified as a Chinese-Indian.  At the time of writing, the impact of this change 
particularly in terms of self-identity, belonging and social relations in Singapore society are 
still yet to be seen.  
 
Singapore and its people indeed struggle with how to understand and negotiate ethnicities 
outside the Chinese-Malay-Indian nexus.  So does Singapore’s films. 
 
 
Stereotypes Galore: English-Language Comedies and the Multi-ethnic Cast of Characters 
While Singapore cinema now tends to feature films that are in the most commonly spoken 
Chinese languages (Mandarin, Hokkien, Teochew and Cantonese), with entire casts of Chinese 
characters and actors, the local film industry does sometimes produce English-language films 
with multi-ethnic casts of characters and actors.  Malay-language films were once the staple of 
the local film making industry from the 1940s to the 1960s, however, non-Chinese and non-
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English films are now a rarity, with Eric Khoo’s Tamil-language My Magic (2008) being the 
best-known commercially screened film since the rejuvenation of Singapore’s film industry in 
the early 1990s.  English-language films however are often comedies featuring multi-ethnic 
casts and characters such as Army Daze and One Leg Kicking.  While the lead characters are 
likable and often everyday Singaporeans – or as I described in Chapter 1, the Everyman whose 
concerns are represented and expressed in film – they are, as I suggest here, sometimes also 
portrayed as conventional ethnic stereotypes.    
 
Army Daze is a whimsical comedy about the national service experiences of a group of new 
recruits during their basic military training (BMT) stint in the Singapore army. Singapore 
practises conscription where all male citizens and permanent residents are called up for 
national service once they reach the age of nineteen (sixteen for those not completing any post-
secondary education and twenty for those completing a polytechnic diploma).  While BMT 
lasts for three months, recruits – known as Operationally-Ready National Servicemen (NSmen) 
– are then seconded to units to serve out their two-year national service with either in the 
Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), Singapore Police Force (SPF), or the Singapore Civil Defence 
Force (SCDF).  Once the two-year stint is over, these young men become reservists until the 
age of 40 for enlisted men and 50 for officers.  While only the males in Singapore are 
conscripted into national service, it is an experience that affects all families, friends and loved 
ones in some way or the other.  The significance of community support for National 
Servicemen (NSmen) can be seen in education programmes aimed at female secondary 
students, for instance.  The government organizes secondary school visits to army camps for 
the purpose of informing school-going teenage girls of the duty menfolk such as brothers, 
(future) boyfriends and male friends have to the nation.  Young girls are told that their primary 
duty to the nation is to be supportive of these young men as their service to the nation.  For the 
vast majority, national service, particularly BMT, is the first time that young male 
Singaporeans are separated from their families for a substantial period of time.  This is because 
BMT involves staying in-camp 6 days a week.  Separation anxiety and worry are common for 
families, friends and loved ones on the outside.    
The film, based loosely on playwright Michael Chiang’s BMT experiences, was initially a 
successful 1987 theatre production.  The film hit cinemas at a time when Singapore’s film 
industry was starting to churn out more productions due to government interest and support.  
Army Daze was produced by Cathay Asia Films at a cost of SGD$700,000 and made a profit, 
with local box office takings reaching SGD$1.6 million.  One of the most successful locally 
made films of its time, Army Daze’s popularity could well be in response to the comedic 
portrayal of an experience that many Singaporeans are well accustomed to yet apprehensive 
about.   
 
One Leg Kicking is a football comedy that follows a group of misfits led by Tai Po (Gurmit 
Singh) who come together to form a team which results in them eventually winning a local 
league competition.  Reminiscent of Stephen Chow’s brilliant and unforgettable Shaolin Soccer 
(Chow 2001), One Leg Kicking is a feel-good film that features formulaic good versus bad, and 
poor versus rich themes.  While international audiences might find One Leg Kicking difficult to 
follow and somewhat alien because of its disjointed narrative and mixture of languages 
(Singapore English and Chinese dialects), local audiences responded incredibly well.  Opening 
on a public holiday, the film grossed SGD$111,973 – the highest ever box office takings for 
any local film at the time – and received positive local press reviews (Scott 2001). 
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Often featuring over-the-top acting performances, these films unashamedly echo state-
sanctioned multiculturalism, with themes of communal harmony and homogeneity through a 
recognizable Singaporean national identity officially dictated by the Singapore Shared Values 
(Gomes 2010).4  While these films include people from the various broad Chinese, Malay, 
Indian and Eurasian ethnic communities, they also awkwardly base their humour on 
embarrassing ethnic stereotypes.  Ethnic stereotyping is alive and well in Singapore.  Growing 
up in Singapore I used to hear conventional positive and negative ideas about the prominent 
communal groups in Singapore include the Chinese as hard-working yet rude money-minded 
businessmen, the Indians as good talkers yet treacherous alcoholic wife-beaters, the Malays as 
friendly yet lazy and complacent, and the Eurasians as good time Charlies who are good 
looking entertainers who have difficulty with academic study.  With a growing non-
Singaporean born population, some Singaporeans I talk to have classified Caucasians as 
professionals but with loose values, while reading online commentary about mainland Chinese 
classify them as vulgar, uncouth and are unable to assimilate into Singaporean society partly 
because of the perceived notion that they do not want to communicate in English.  Online 
comments on new migrants to Singapore which will be dealt with in depth later in this book, 
also accuse South Asians as being disloyal to Singapore, leaving when something better arises 
in another country.  Conventional portrayals of ethnicity in Singaporean comedies are thus 
something that home-grown audiences are able to respond to and identify with.  
 
Siva Choy’s Indian-Singaporean character Sammy Best in One Leg Kicking, for example, is 
always drunk on toddy (Indian homemade liquor made from coconut) while Ahamed Asad’s 
character Krishnamoorthy and his on-screen girlfriend Lathi (Jacintha Charles) in Army Daze 
are obsessed with Bollywood musicals.  Whenever together in the Army Daze, lovebirds 
Krishnamoorthy and Lathi perform Bollywood-like song and dance numbers.  Meanwhile 
‘Eurasians’ Kenny Pereira (Army Daze) and Vernon (One Leg Kicking), played by Kevin Mark 
Marghese and Moe Alkaff respectively, are portrayed as incredibly effeminate.  The ethnic 
Chinese meanwhile are categorized into two groups: the English-educated and the Chinese-
educated.  The wealthy English-speaking educated middle or upper-class Chinese are portrayed 
as arrogant and selfish, or naive and silly.  The Chinese-educated on the other hand speak the 
Chinese dialect of Hokkien and Singapore English (Singlish).  They are portrayed as rough 
around the edges yet kind-hearted heartlanders commonly known as Ah Bengs (masculine) and 
Ah Lians (feminine).   
 
In his work on depictions of ethnicity in Singapore, K.P. Tan (2009) observes that the moving 
picture landscape is marked overwhelmingly by ethnic stereotypes that help attract audiences 
well-versed in conventional notions of ethnicity in Singapore.  Tan’s comprehensive overview 
of ethnic stereotyping in the local film and television landscape articulates that while audiences 
identify with these stereotypes in order to enjoy the productions, they do so as a way of coping 
with their anxieties about their ethnic Other.  These anxieties are supported, if not instigated by 
Singapore’s scripted history, which highlights communal violence as a threat to Singapore’s 
stability (Hong & Huang 2008).  The villains of this communal violence are primarily the 
ethnic Malays (Gomes 2010).  In Tan’s words: 
 
[I locate] within popular film and television the ethnic stereotypes that implicitly 
inform multiracial policies and which are in turn reproduced by the coupling of 
commercial demands with the monomaniacal and rigid pursuit of national 
security.  In other words, stereotypes on film and television are supplied to 
audiences who demand an immediately gratifying means of helping them deal 
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with the perceived ethnic threats, more recently foregrounded by popular 
historical accounts of ethnic hostilities in Singapore.  These accounts have come 
to constitute a large part of the official material for “National Education” in 
schools and the wider public. (2009: 289)  
 
So while Singapore prides itself on its multicultural make-up, for many Singaporeans, 
encountering their ethnic Other is limited to film and television presentations rather than 
sustained face-to-face encounters (K.P. Tan 2009: 290).  Tan suggests that local cinema and 
television provide a space for encountering the ethnic Other but in a hypothetical happy place, 
so any anxiety over perceived ‘ethnic threats’ will be peacefully resolved.  As K.P. Tan 
eloquently puts it: ‘[P]eople would much prefer to deal with stereotypes that reduce 
complexity, devalue those who are different and therefore threatening, and glorify themselves 
and their own community’ (2009: 290).  An excellent example of the moving image providing 
a safe and happy space that depicts communal harmony is the film Army Daze.   
 
Serving as a metaphor for an imagined multicultural Singapore, Army Daze humorously 
follows a group of new recruits as they embark on the journey of national service together.  
Indian Krishnamoorthy, Malay Johari Salleh, Chinese Teo Ah Beng (Adrian Lim) and 
Malcolm Png (Edward Yong) together with Eurasian Kenny Pereira represent the different 
ethnic groups in Singapore who come together in a neutral space and shared Singaporean 
experience – national service.  National service in Singapore serves not only to create a 
citizenry who are both operationally trained and combat ready, but to foster nation building 
through a shared purpose – the defence of a nation.  Conscription in Singapore, in other words, 
serves as a tool for propagating community relations in a nation with ethnic diversity.   
 
The film highlights these five NSmen’s reliance on each other and the development of 
camaraderie within the group despite their ethnic differences. For example, this bond of 
interdependence is reflected when Krishnamoorthy leaves for a period of time because of an 
injury, which results in the group falling apart.  They also function like a makeshift family by 
mimicking the iconic final scene of the American family television series The Waltons by 
wishing each other goodnight at bedtime; and the recruits live as equals as they sleep in the 
same dormitory together.  The creation of camaraderie through national service has indeed met 
with success.  The national service experience is a life highlight in the lives of Singaporean 
men, with many forging long-running friendships with platoon mates.  Social media such as 
Facebook has become a platform for remembering the national service experience as a time of 
great camaraderie, with Singaporean men reuniting and sharing fond memories with their 
former platoon mates.  For instance, many Singaporean men have exhibitions of photographs 
documenting their time in national service.  Differences are put aside for homogeneity – their 
individuality is stamped out when they are fashioned to look like each other through hairstyle 
(crew cut) and dress (army fatigues), while community identity is developed through the 
common experience of basic military training.  
 
While the film paints a picture of multicultural harmony, there are pockets where this 
‘harmony’ is questioned.  For instance, when Mrs Png (Margaret Chan) finally catches up with 
her son, she comments about how ‘black’ he has become because of his time in the sun.  Later, 
Ah Beng introduces his sister Ah Huay (Eileen Wee) to Krishnamoorthy and his girlfriend 
Lathi.  Ah Huay looks visibly uncomfortable in their presence.  Moreover, disparity based on 
socio-economic backgrounds is also clearly put aside.  Class discrepancy is demonstrated by 
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the English-educated and wealthy yet naive Malcolm Png, the film’s narrator, and the crude 
Chinese-educated heartlander Teo Ah Beng.  The difference in the way Malcolm and Ah Beng 
speak become obvious signifiers of their class differences, with Malcolm speaking ‘Queen’s 
English’ while Ah Beng communicates in heavily accented Singlish.  The message conveyed is 
that national service is not only colour blind but also class blind.   
 
While ethnic stereotyping in the media is part of a bigger national strategy on communal 
harmony, could such stereotyping be an indicator of something less innocuous?  Could ethnic 
stereotyping in Singaporean comedies and the popularity of conventional portrayals of 
ethnicity instead be indicators of perhaps a lack of both communal interest and understanding 
between ethnicities in ‘multicultural’ Singapore?  As Tan observes, the film provides  
 
the opportunity to use popular culture as an engagingly ‘hypothetical’ medium 
to explore and learn about complex ethnic identities and relations in more 
sophisticated and problematic terms, that is to say, the real potential for social 
and cultural vibrancy, is wasted.  (K.P. Tan 2009: 290)  
 
While I agree with Tan that Singaporean comedies neglect to use the opportunity ‘to explore 
and learn about complex ethnic identities and relations in more sophisticated and problematic 
terms’, doing so provides an indication at how Singapore, although officially supporting a 
multicultural society, has trouble with ethnicity outside the Chinese-Malay-Indian nexus. 
Ethnic diversity and identity thus are over-simplified in One Leg Kicking’s use of a biracial 
actor –Gurmit Singh, whose father is Punjabi Indian and mother is Japanese-Chinese  to play 
ethnic Chinese protagonist, Taipo; and the over-the-top cringeworthy depiction of Eurasians in 
both One Leg Kicking and Army Daze.  Rather than allowing Singh to play a biracial character 
and thus explore, if not acknowledge another level of multiculturalism – people of mixed 
ethnicity – he is assigned to portray a Chinese person, something which he has made a career 
of.  Likewise, both films find it challenging to depict Eurasians in a sophisticated manner.  
Instead, Army Daze and One Leg Kicking resort to exaggeration and absurdity by portraying 
male Eurasians as hyper-feminine and/or ridiculously outlandish caricatures.  Behind the 
erasure of Singh’s biracial background and the bizarre representation of Eurasians lies the 
subliminal reflection of the paradoxical lack of ethnic comprehension in a nation that prides 
itself on its multicultural make-up. 
 
 
Hard to Categorize: The Ethnic Confusion of Gurmit Singh 
Gurmit Singh is one of Singapore’s best-known local celebrities.  Starting out in theatre when 
he was seventeen playing St Francis of Assisi in the locally written Catholic play Poverello (P. 
Goh 1986), Singh has since had a stellar career in both cinema and television (Lyndley 2006).  
Besides One Leg Kicking, he has played the lead in other locally made popular English-
language films such as Just Follow Law.  Singh often, if not always, plays the hard-working 
and responsible Singaporean-Chinese heartlander who is a loving father and a loyal friend.  In 
his silver screen personas, Singh is often a widower who works hard in order to make a better 
life for himself and his children.  He is never despondent, despite not being rich, and has a 
heart of gold.  Singh has also been compère on numerous high-profile variety shows for 
Singapore’s only free-to-air television broadcaster MediaCorp, such as Singapore Idol (2004, 
2006 and 2009) and government-sponsored national events such as the Singapore National Day 
Parade (1996-97, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2005-6).  However, it is the cringeworthy, Singlish-
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spewing, yellow-wellington-boots-wearing Phua Chu Kang with his permed hair and raisin for 
a mole that Singh is perhaps best known for.   
 
Phua Chu Kang is the lovable but crude building contractor in the multi-Asian Television 
Award winning television sitcom Phua Chu Kang Pte Ltd (PCK Ltd).  Phua Chu Kang has 
been a polarizing figure.  Some Singaporeans experience cultural cringe when confronted with 
his appearance and his Singlish, while others are fond of him for the very same reasons.5  
Despite this Phua Chu Kang was chosen to be the ‘symbol’ of Singapore in the internationally 
watched reality show The Amazing Race (US) in 2002.  He was also the light-hearted 
spokesperson for the government when SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) hit the 
nation in 2003, appearing in a music video instructing Singaporeans on best hygiene practices 
in order to contain the spread of the virus.  In 2010 Singh starred as the eponymous hero in 
Phua Chu Kang: The Movie (Boo 2010).  Since the first Singapore Day in 2007 – an event 
organized by the government’s Overseas Singaporean Unit that takes place in cities with high 
concentrations of expatriate Singaporeans in order to inform and entice them back to the 
homeland – Singh has donned his famous yellow boots and appeared together with the rest of 
the cast of PCK Pte Ltd, to the delight and pleasure of Singaporeans attending the event 
(Gomes 2009).   
 
Besides playing the Italian St Francis of Assisi and a Japanese sumo wrestler in the Malaysian 
comedy Sumolah/Let’s Sumo! (Shauki 2007), Singh’s Singapore-based acting roles have 
mostly been less ethnically diverse, since he almost always plays an ethnic Chinese.  Singh has 
also appeared in Chinese-language variety shows and has spoken Mandarin in public arenas, 
particularly when hosting major events that are telecast on nation-wide television.  While 
Chinese dialects are widely spoken in Singapore, they are never used in mainstream broadcast 
media, particularly in radio and television.  Rather it is Mandarin that is the vernacular chosen 
by the government that is heard on MediaCorp, the official radio and television broadcaster in 
Singapore. In 2009, for instance, Singh co-hosted the Chinese-language variety show City Beat 
with well-known Mandarin-speaking actors Bryan Wong and Kym Ng, together with bilingual 
actor Adrian Pang.  In his personal life, Singh’s wife is ethnic Chinese and Singh has been 
actively learning Mandarin.  His study of Mandarin has also made him the poster boy for 
Singapore’s Speak Mandarin Campaign.  An interview about his journey learning Mandarin 
appears on the Speak Mandarin Campaign website (Promote Mandarin Council 2010). 
 
On one level it is understandable that ethnic Chinese fictional protagonists in both film and 
television dominate, as this reflects Singapore demographics.  However, on another level the 
frequent casting of Singh in ethnic Chinese roles raises questions regarding the representation 
of non-ethnic figures outside of the dominant demographic group.  And Singh is not the only 
non-Chinese actor to play an ethnic Chinese on television.  Eurasian actress Vernetta Lopez 
became famous for playing Denise Tan, the daughter of patriarch Tan Ah Teck in the hugely 
popular and long-running English-language sitcom Under One Roof (Teo et al. 1995-2003). 
 
While Singh may be typecast within a certain ethnic framework, this has been done so that his 
characters are more identifiable and accessible to local audiences.  Chinese-Singaporeans make 
up more than three quarters of the population and are able to identify with ethnic Chinese 
characters in locally made film productions more so than they would with any other ethnic 
groups.  In cinema, it is the Chinese-language films that are the financial successes because of 
the ethnic make-up of the audience.  Local popular culture seems to have decided that if Singh 
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played anyone other than a Chinese character, audiences might become confused.  The local 
media has not seized the opportunity to present the richness of multiculturalism that go beyond 
static representations of the communal groups within the CMIO classification. Singh’s on-
screen Chinese persona and the erasure of his biracial identity could well be indicative of the 
ease local cinema has mimicking the demographic and cultural dominance of the ethnic 









Figure 2.1: Still of Gurmit Singh as the hardworking ethnic Chinese family man Tai Po in One 
Leg Kicking.  From the DVD version of the film (Zhao Wei Films, Singapore Film 
Commission, MediaCorp Studios and Raintree Pictures 2001). 
 
 
It is not difficult for Singaporeans to read Singapore as an essentially ‘Chinese society’, as the 
government has spent much time and effort in carving out a national history underscored by 
Chineseness (as represented by people, identity and culture).  The scripted history of The 
Singapore Story points to the role Chinese migrants played in Singapore’s development as an 
entrepôt trading centre.  The National Museum of Singapore, the Chinese Heritage Centre and 
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to a lesser extent the Asian Civilisations Museum, commemorate the economic, social and 
political contributions of the Chinese in colonial Singapore.  According to The Singapore Story 
it is the Chinese more than others who played significant roles as agents of trade during the 
colonial period.  Moreover, it is the Chinese who are now the key players in Singapore’s 
political and economic scenes, with Lee Kuan Yew as the primary mover of modern Singapore.  
The Singapore government readily refers to the qualities the Chinese possess as leaders of 
Singapore while casting doubt on the non-Chinese in this regard.  The question of whether the 
city state was ready for a non-Chinese prime minister came up in 2008 when the United States 
of America elected its first African-American president, Barack Obama.  At the time, the 
government reiterated that Singapore may not as yet be ready for a non-Chinese prime 
minister.   
 
The erasure of biracial identity on-screen in favour of the dominant Chinese ethnic and cultural 
national discourses is not the only disquieting aspect of Singapore cinema.  The humorous yet 
puzzling representation of Eurasians as generally effeminate gay men or silly buffoons also 
begs to be addressed. 
 
 
The Fashion Victim Lounge Singer and the Petite Bitchy Housewife: Singapore Cinema’s 
Humorous yet Troubling Portrayal of Eurasians 
The concept of ‘Eurasian’ as an ethnic group poses a challenge to Singaporean ethnic and 
cultural identity, principally amongst Singaporeans themselves.  The dominant racial and 
cultural group in Singapore is the Chinese, with 74.1 per cent of Singapore’s population 
identifying themselves as Chinese.  The next group are the Malays with 13.4 per cent, followed 
by then by the Indians with 9.2 per cent.  Eurasians make up only 0.014 per cent of Singapore’s 
resident population (US Centre for World Mission n.d.) and are a minority race under the 
umbrella term of ‘Others’.  So Eurasians are not just figuratively Otherized but are also 
classified as such.  However, Singapore Eurasians are dedicated to communal identity and 
community belonging in Singapore.  In 1994, they successfully campaigned for the Eurasian 
Association (EA) to become a community self-help group.  The EA has become the peak body 
representing Eurasian interests and the only official organization responsible for fostering 
community spirit and maintaining Eurasian culture. 
 
Eurasians in Singapore trace their lineage to the European colonisers that populated South East 
Asia from the fifteenth century, with the coming of the Portuguese and the Spaniards, to the 
height of British-Dutch-German imperial dominance of the region in the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries.  However, while Eurasian is a term coined by the British, circa 1849 
(Pereira 2007), to recognize and classify children of interracial couplings, the term became 
more than just a categorization but an ethnic and a (trans)cultural identity in itself.  Generations 
of descendants of the European (male) colonizers and the Asian (female) colonized collectively 
identified themselves as Eurasian in both Singapore and Malaysia with a distinguishable 
cultural identity based on Catholicism.   
 
The largest group of descendants of European-Asian couplings along these lines are the 
progeny of the Portuguese sailors who settled in Malacca during the height of Portuguese naval 
dominance in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.  These descendants are sometimes known as 
‘Kristang’.  Kristang is the Eurasian ethnic and cultural identity most familiar to Singaporeans 
and given the imprimatur as the official Eurasian culture by the government.  The EA helps to 
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promote and maintain Kristang culture through various programmes and schemes, one of 
which is the annual appearance of the popular Eurasian contingent, dressed in Kristang cultural 
dress, at the Singapore National Day Parade on 9 August.  Here the contingent performs the 
jingli nona, a folk dance commonly associated with Kristang Eurasians.  Eurasians in 
Singapore, however, are still a novelty precisely because they do not fall neatly in Singapore’s 
simplification of the ethnic categories, which are strongly linked to ethnic appearance and 
Singapore-centric behaviour that is linked to loyalty to nation.   
 
Sometimes it is hard to spot Eurasians in Singapore.  They do not look Chinese, Malay, Indian, 
or even Caucasian.  Eurasians as an ethnic collective thus may pose a challenge to fellow 
Singaporeans because the different versions of their mixed ethnic appearance do not easily fall 
into the recognisable Chinese-Malay-Indian nexus.6  Depending on their ethnic heritage, 
Eurasians may be fair skinned, olive skinned, dark skinned or some variation of these.  Not 
being able to be easily recognized and therefore blend into the CMI ethnic landscape can be 
unnerving.  Many Eurasians have struggled with blending into Singapore and have emigrated 
to Australia, particularly the city of Perth in Western Australia.7  Since Australia abandoned its 
White Australia Policy in 1973 there has been a steady stream of Eurasians emigrating to Perth 
because they felt they had no place in multicultural Singapore.8  Army Daze’s Kenny refers to 
the Eurasian exodus to Perth when he admits that his parents have emigrated there. 
 
This trepidation about an inability to recognize and classify people into the CMI categories is 
evident in the way the way that Eurasians – who are a rarity in Singapore cinema  are portrayed 
on the big screen. Unease about who or what Eurasians are is exemplified in One Leg Kicking, 
in particular in the character of Vernon  a popular name for Eurasians born in the years 
immediately before and after World War II.  In order to identify Eurasians, Singapore cinema 
often turns to using typically degrading local notions of this communal group.  Vernon, played 
by Arab-Singaporean Moe Alkaff, is overweight and looks like a fashion victim wearing 
colourful shirts and flared trousers reminiscent of the 1970s.  In one scene he dons Michael 
Jackson’s famous red drummer-boy outfit with the trademark single white glove.  It is easier, in 
other words, to portray Eurasians within humorous yet stereotypical frameworks, rather than 
unpack the complexity of this ethnic group.  Eurasians after all can be stereotyped as adopting 
over-the-top American-centric fashion such as cowboy outfits, inclusive of the loud shirts, 
knee-high boot, spurs and rodeo-inspired hat.    
 
In the film, Vernon has aspirations of being a professional singer.  He even has a band called 
Vernon and the Vibrations.  Here the film draws on conventional ideas of Eurasian 
occupations, as their involvement in musical entertainment was a common sight in both 
colonial and postcolonial Singapore.  Some of Singapore’s most famous veteran singers 
include 1960s heart-throb Vernon Cornelius, who was known as Singapore’s Cliff Richard, 
rock and rollers Mel and Joe Ferdinands, who have been in the music industry for more than 
forty years, and internationally renowned jazz musician Jeremy Monteiro.  One Leg Kicking’s 
Vernon, unfortunately, is a terrible singer whose performances on stage are cringeworthy.   
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Figure 2.2: Still of Moe Alkaff as lounge singer Vernon in One Leg Kicking.  From the DVD 
version of the film (Zhao Wei Films, Singapore Film Commission, MediaCorp Studios and 
Raintree Pictures 2001). 
 
 
While Vernon is constructed as a kind and loyal friend to Tai Po, he is also portrayed as an 
embarrassing and useless buffoon.  Vernon is seen walking into doors and is often the reason 
their football team loses matches.  His lack of prospects, talent, style and a real job seem to 
define his (Eurasian) character.  Vernon angrily responds to negative criticism of his singing by 
stating: ‘I am a professional singer, okay!  I get paid for this singing, you know or not.  I have 
never had a day job before in my entire life!’  Still Vernon is also chastized by his authoritative 
father (Mark Richmond) for being lazy and useless as he chases his pipe dream of becoming a 
successful singer.  At the end of the One Leg Kicking Vernon eventually finds success as a 
singer, but not in Singapore.  Vernon becomes a lounge singer in Las Vegas. 
 
Perhaps the most prominent home-grown Eurasian character to ever grace local cinema in 
Singapore is Army Daze’s new recruit Kenny Pereira, played with effeminate affectation by 
Kevin Mark Marghese.9  Kenny is the only Eurasian recruit in a multi-ethnic ensemble cast of 
characters representative of the major communal groups in Singapore.  The humour 
surrounding Kenny is in his effeminate mannerisms and his dream of becoming ‘a housewife in 
Hougang’ (Hougang is a HDB housing estate).  Kenny’s effeminate characteristics contrast 
starkly with displays of Asian heterosexual masculinity portrayed by the other characters.  
Kenny stands out from the crowd since he walks with exaggerated hip movements and with his 
limp wrist in the air.  ‘Limp wrist syndrome’ is a derogatory phrase in Singapore referring to 
homosexuality.   
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Kenny is an over-the-top presentation of the hyper-feminized homosexual, which audiences 
laugh at rather than laugh with.  He takes on hyperbolic female traits by being the most 
sensitive and emotional in the group of recruits.  He is also the bitchiest and the most 
concerned about his looks.  In one scene, he enters the parade ground with a cosmetic face 
mask, while in another scene he catwalks into the bathroom with his head wrapped in a towel, 
carrying a basketful of body cleansing and moisturising products.  While his effeminate nature 
is accepted with good humour by the rest of the platoon, Malcolm Png the English-educated 
well off Chinese recruit looks incredibly uncomfortable when Kenny mildly flirts with him.  




Figure 2.3: Still of effeminate Kenny posing in Army Daze.  From the DVD version of the film 
(Cathay Organisation and Warner Home Video n.y.) 
 
 
It is easier for Singapore cinema to make the Eurasian, rather than any other ethnic figure, gay.  
The effeminate gay after all presents sexual ambiguity that might confuse and challenge 
conformist ideals of manhood established by the cultural and religious teachings of other more 
dominant ethnic groups.  Portraying ethnic Malays as effeminate, for instance, may be too 
much of a political hotbed since Singapore is in the middle of the mostly Muslim Malay 
Archipelago.  Familiar media representations of ethnic Indians through the Bollywood film 
industry meanwhile portray its male heroes and villains as hyper-masculinized individuals.  
Analysis of Singaporean masculinity (Hudson 2006; Pugsley 2007) reveals that the ideal 
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Singapore man is based on the traits exhibited by Singapore’s elder statesman and founder Lee 
Kuan Yew.  Singaporean masculinity, in other words, is defined by the power, intelligence and 
determination exhibited by Lee.  In the characters of Kenny and Vernon the Eurasian ethnicity 
becomes the antithesis of the ideal Singaporean male, and thus an object of ridicule.10   
 
Caricatures of stereotypical Eurasians, both Kenny and Vernon are no doubt the most 
interesting figures, in their respective films, due in most part to Marghese’s and Alkaff’s 
exaggerated acting.  They are being absurd yet entertaining characters who find it difficult to 
make a place for themselves in Singapore.  Unlike the go-getting ideal Singaporean who is 
hardworking, industrious, ambitious, successful and of course, Chinese, Eurasians have 
become the epitome of the Singaporean who cannot succeed in fast-paced Singapore – so much 
so that they have to go overseas to make a life for themselves.  Kenny’s parents, and eventually 
Kenny, choose to live in the slower-paced Perth, while Vernon goes to the most kitsch and 
over-the-top American city – Vegas.  The dream of leaving Singapore for Perth as a mark of 
success is not only the Eurasian but the ultimate Singaporean dream according to Djinn’s Perth 
(2004).  While Singaporeans are generally loyal to Singapore, they are ambivalent about 
whether this loyalty means physically staying in Singapore. 
 
According to its government, Singapore equates loyalty to nation with the physical presence of 
its people.  Singaporeans who remain in the country are known as ‘stayers’, while those who 
leave to become permanent residents and citizens elsewhere are known as ‘quitters’.  In order 
to drum up nationalist sentiments, Singaporean leaders often refer to stayers and quitters in 
their National Day speeches (e.g. Goh 2002).  The reason for these labels stems from a fear that 
Singapore has of its qualified and professional citizens abandoning the country for greener 
pastures overseas.  Singapore has always framed itself as a nation dependent on its people as its 
only resource.  With an increasing ‘brain drain’ of university-educated professionals leaving 
Singapore for major destinations such as Australia, Canada, the US and the UK, the 
government has commended Singaporean stayers as loyal upholders of Singaporean values, 
while those who leave are nothing more than dissenters (Gomes 2009).  Such tactics are 
effective for the majority of Singaporeans who are incredibly loyal to country and proud of the 
city state’s global achievements.  Eurasians, on the other hand, have been considered as 
‘disloyal’ Singaporeans since they started emigrating out of Singapore as early as the mid-




On one level Singaporean comedies seem to have trouble exploring ethnicity honestly.  This is 
particularly significant since the nation-state very strongly identifies itself as multicultural and 
accepting of ethnic diversity.  Instead Singaporean comedies either sidestep the complexities of 
ethnicities outside the Chinese-Malay-Indian nexus or portray them reductively, or as comical 
over-the-top characters.  However, on another level while such presentations of ethnic 
minorities may assist in creating a mirage of happy ethnic harmony through unproblematic and 
humorous portrayals of ethnic minorities, they provide an insight into how multiculturalism in 
Singapore can only cope within specific ethnic parameters.  Anything outside the Chinese-
Malay-Indian ethnic framework is incredibly challenging to understand and identify. 
The ethnic and cultural landscape in Singapore is changing rapidly due to the increasing 
number of migrant workers from the region and beyond (Leong 2011), and Singaporean 
attitudes towards ethnicity have taken an interesting turn in response to the growing number of 
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foreigners living and working in the country which I explore in Chapters 4 through 6.  
Meanwhile in the following chapter I look at the Singapore Chinese and their use of active 
remembering to maintain cultural traditions and communal pride as mapped out by 






Tapping into Unofficial Memory and Reclaiming History: Chinese Culture, Politics and 
Nation in the Cinema of Tan Pin Pin 
 
The ethnic Chinese dominate the ethnographic landscape of the Singapore citizenry.  With 
three quarters of Singaporeans officially identifying themselves as ethnic Chinese, the 
majority of Singapore’s population, arguably, actively commemorate the cultural traditions of 
their communal group.  However while the ethnic Chinese are a dominant force in 
Singapore’s cultural discourse, they are increasingly finding it difficult to understand their 
Chinese identity due to acceptable government interpretations of Chineseness and to also 
practise their cultural traditions in this ever modernizing nation-state.  In this chapter I look at 
the cinema of this visionary film-maker whose poignant yet powerful documentaries dare to 
represent ethnic Chinese concerns of cultural erosion and question Singapore’s official 
scripted history. 
 
Tan is perhaps Singapore’s most well-known documentary film-maker.  Tan’s work has been 
screened locally and internationally with much critical acclaim.  While Tan’s work is not 
overtly political (Leow 2010), her work delves into a realm of Singapore’s relationship to 
memory not otherwise covered by the mainstream media.  Tan’s films are recognized for 
featuring Singaporeans living on the fringe of society who would otherwise be forgotten in 
official remembering.  Like another very well-known local independent film-maker Eric 
Khoo, Tan’s work is celebrated for its commentary on the social ills that quietly blanket 
Singapore by featuring marginalized Singaporeans.   
 
Tan is primarily known for her three films – Moving House (2001) which follows a family’s 
exhumation and re-housing of their loved ones’ remains, Singapore GaGa (2005) a film that 
pays homage to Singaporeans who live on the fringe of society and Invisible City (2007) 
which documents lost and forgotten memories. Tan’s work serves to revisit and reclaim 
Singapore’s past by sympathetically focusing on individuals who have contributed to the 
development of Singapore and its history, but who have done so outside, or in antagonism 
with, official remembering.  As I write, Tan’s latest film To Singapore, With Love (2013) 
about Singaporean political exiles is pushing both Tan and her work into popular imagination.  
This is because the Media Development Authority of Singapore which polices the media 
deemed the film a threat to national security and banned it from being screened locally.  The 
film, which features now elderly men and women who were once involved in communist 
activities in Singapore, tell their side of the story and their deep and unending love for their 
country, is being screened globally at various film festivals.   
 
Tan’s fascination with and passion for remembering in Singapore is understandable against a 
background of strong local interest in the past is perhaps aided by the government’s 
dedication to remembering.  The Singapore government makes use of official remembering as 
a tool for nation building and nationalism while encouraging Singaporeans to document their 
own memories in various memory projects such those organized by the National Heritage 
Board and the National Library Board.  Nostalgic recollections of a bygone Singapore seem 
to positively frame the act of remembering Singapore and its history as something personal 
and unofficial.  Moreover, Singaporeans are exceedingly proud of their respective cultural 
heritage as seen in the ways in which they enthusiastically celebrate their respective 
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communal festivals such as Chinese New Year, Hari Raya Puasa (first day after the end of the 
Muslim fasting month of Ramadan) and Deepavali (Hindu festival of lights).  Living in a 
multi-ethnic country has also led Singaporeans to value the cultural traditions of their 
respective ethnic communities.  To maintain their respective cultural heritage, Singaporeans 
practice cultural commemoration most religiously. 
 
Romancing the Past: Nostalgia in Singapore Television and Cinema 
Online platforms provide avenues for Singaporeans to reminisce about the past.  The advent 
of social media has seen a flurry of users on sites such as Facebook eagerly upload childhood 
photographs and then reminisce about them.  Moreover, online platforms have also become a 
medium for some more organized documenting of Singapore’s past, such as the 
comprehensive Remember Singapore blog (RemSG 2010).  Singaporeans also enjoy 
romanticizing bygone eras such as the rocking 50s, the rolling 60s and the disco-feverish 70s 
– even if they themselves have no personal experience of those times.   
 
The Japanese occupation of Singapore (1942-1945) is a traumatic era deeply embedded into 
the psyche of Singaporeans; many older Singaporeans can still recall life under the Japanese 
since they were born just before or during the occupation which is captured in stories 
recorded and housed at the Singapore National Archives.  Meanwhile, younger Singaporeans 
have been exposed to the events, people and stories surrounding the occupation via official 
state commemoration and active remembering through public education, as well as personal 
memories shared within families.  These include events such as the Sook Ching massacre that 
saw thousands of ethnic Chinese tortured and killed by the invaders and the stories of 
resilience of national heroes such as Elizabeth Choy.  The Occupation, however, presents a 
wealth of stories – whether real or imagined – that waits to be harvested by the entertainment 
media.  Local television and film producers have eagerly harnessed the attraction nostalgia 
holds for Singaporean audiences, resulting in some memorable and popular productions.   
 
Television shows such as the variety series Rolling Good Times (Anon 1990) and the 
melodrama Growing Up (Anon 1996-2001) – both screened in the 1990s to early 2000s on 
Singapore’s English-language television channel – and the Chinese-language 24 episode 
television drama Samsui Women (Anon 1986), were some of the earlier and very successful 
programmes to strike a favourable cord with local audiences.  Rolling Good Times featured 
American and British pop songs from the perennially nostalgic 1960s sung by local 
professional and amateur artists, while Growing Up narrated the story of the Tay family 
which played out against the background of Singapore’s development from the 1960s to the 
1980s.  More recently Singapore Chinese television has been featuring an epic historical 
television series dramatizing the exploits of a Peranakan (Straits-born Chinese) family told in 
34 episodes called The Little Nyonya (Anon 2008).  The serial takes place over an 80 year 
period beginning in 1930.   
 
Both Growing Up and The Little Nyonya have been immensely popular with local audiences 
who are not only attracted to the nostalgia and period setting but also to the tragic drama that 
unfolds in each episode.1  In Growing Up, popular protagonist Mrs Tay (Wee Soon Hui) – the 
matriarch of the family – is murdered in her neighbourhood.  The day after the episode was 
screened; flagship English language newspaper The Straits Times ran a front-page story on 
the reaction of Singaporean audiences to the demise of Mrs Tay.  In The Little Nyonya, long-
suffering protagonist Yueniang (Jeanette Aw), whose traumatic adventures through life 
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anchor the serial, dies in the final episode.  Yueniang succumbs to cancer just as she finds 
success and happiness in life.2   
 
Highlighting the family as the central feature, storylines for both serials are often moralistic 
with an emphasis on filial piety.  Good characters are portrayed as filial and dutiful while bad 
characters are portrayed as disloyal to the family.  In The Little Nyonya, for instance, 
Yueniang’s maternal family flees overseas to escape the Japanese occupation of Singapore 
and is portrayed upon returning to Singapore as selfish, cruel and physically abusive 
characters.  Only bad people abandon their family in time of need.   
 
Nostalgia also plays a significant role in the development and consumption of Singapore-
made films.3  Unlike television serials though, films tend not to be as moralistic.  Some of 
these films revisit familiar collective experiences of Singaporeans such as the comedy Army 
Daze (Ong 1996) – a film based on the experiences of author Michael Chiang and his 
adventures in the Singapore army as a conscript.  Others relive eras that were host to much 
loved yet now forgotten parts of Singapore’s past.  While Singapore may be a clean, green, 
wealthy and modern state, its past is not so glorious.  Colonial and newly independent 
Singapore was instead sordid, salacious and seedy.  Films such as Yao Jie Huang Hou/Bugis 
Street (Yonfan 1995) and Forever Fever (Goei 1998) paint Singapore’s past in contrasting 
hues to modern Singapore’s promotion of social morality and heterosexual normality through 
their strong transsexual narratives and storylines.  On one level, such films can obviously be 
read as a symbol of resistance to Singapore’s presentation of itself as an ordered society.  On 
another nuanced level, there seems to be an almost positive and nostalgic embrace of 
Singapore’s colourful past through cinema.  This past, however, is the antithesis of 
Singapore’s official version of history. 
 
Singapore after all actively remembers its past through official platforms such as museums, 
memorials and plaques that pepper the Singapore landscape (Gomes 2009).  These 
repositories and sites of memory present a sanitized version of local history filled with value-
stricken heroes and their unbridled contributions to Singapore’s progress.  In order of 
importance, these legends of Singapore history include: the architect of modern Singapore, 
Lee Kuan Yew; the founder of Singapore, Sir Stamford Raffles; and the most famous 
mainland Chinese in the twentieth century and father of Chinese nationalism, Sun Yat-sen.   
 
 
Remembering Singapore: An Official Pastime of Nationalist Proportions  
Most work in the area of memory focuses on the efforts of groups such as governments, 
organizations and individuals to commemorate the past (events and individuals) in the 
present.  A significant body of work here is dedicated to memory and trauma, with particular 
focus on the Jewish Holocaust (e.g., Huyssen, 2003; Olick, 2008).  A possible reason for the 
significance of the Jewish Holocaust in memory studies involves the settling of the Jewish 
diaspora after World War II. Despite being dispersed throughout Europe, America and 
Australia, the Jewish diaspora retained their memories of the Holocaust through personal 
testimonies, commemorative events, monuments, literary works, film and television.  The 
film Schindler's List (Spielberg 1993) and the television miniseries Holocaust (1978) captured 
international popular imagination.  Through these tools of remembering, both Jewish and 
non-Jewish people are kept familiar with the atrocities of the Holocaust and its powerful 
symbols such as the Auschwitz concentration camp.  Moreover, the artefacts of memory also 
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function as a powerful and an emotive tool that emphasises and actively maintains certain 
community perspectives. 
 
The literary classic Anne Frank: The Diary of a Young Girl by eponymous heroine and diary-
writer Anne Frank, first published posthumously in English in 1952, has been made into a 
theatrical play and a film and has appeared in other media forms as well. Likewise, there are 
works that specifically examine the way governments and powerful national figures 
manipulate remembering for the purpose of ideological advantage, political gain and 
nationalist advancement. Forest and Johnson (2002), in their work on the reinterpretation of 
Soviet monuments in the post-Soviet era (from 1991 to 1999), for example, argue that 
commemorative artefacts such as monuments are successfully manipulated by political elites 
for ideological control. Often such work involves the revisiting of traumatic and historical 
events for a particular effect in the present such as the monument at Poklonnaia Gora in 
Moscow that commemorates the Soviet defeat of Nazism. Certain events, in other words, are 
remembered over and above others, habitually as a result of ideological, political or 
nationalist reasons. 
 
Some scholars such as Jan Assmann (1995: 125) argue that cultural memory functions as a 
kind of nationalism that preserves both society and culture from forces that threaten – whether 
real or imagined – the collective as a whole.  Similarly, others such as Stefan Tanaka include 
the role played by art ‘in the formulation of belief in the nation’ (1994: 24).  Nation states, 
Tanaka explains, rewrite their histories in order to ground themselves in the waves of 
modernity.  The instruments of anchorage are their artefacts (such as fine art).  By using the 
example of the Meiji period in Japan, Tanaka suggests that fine art provides a certain space 
for the development of modern/contemporary ideas of history, as such artefacts link past to 
present without temporal or spatial limitations/constrictions (1994: 24).   
 
Memory is used as both a political and a social tool that keeps Singaporeans within a certain 
structured framework that does not encourage nor allow for dissent (popularly and officially 
known as The Singapore Story has been observed by commentators (Hong & Huang 2008; 
Gomes 2009 and 2010).  This is because official remembering in Singapore emphasizes that 
an authoritarian government is more favourable than dissent, since it leads to stability, 
prosperity and wealth for the nation; if there is dissent and the People’s Action Party’s (PAP) 
rule is challenged at the polls, Singapore will implode.4  Dissent, Singaporeans are told, is a 
slippery slope leading only to disintegration of the economy and the delicate social fabric of 
multicultural Singapore.  
 
Active remembering in Singapore is encouraged through official projects and schemes.  The 
National Heritage Board has traditionally taken on the responsibility of promoting 
Singapore’s past.  They operate various museums and sites of memory as well as curate an 
exciting ongoing collection of oral history through the National Archives of Singapore and 
the Yesterday.sg blog (National Heritage Board 2012) on Singapore heritage and history.  The 
National Library Board has recently become involved in active remembering through the 
aptly named Singapore Memory Project.  This scheme encourages Singaporeans to 
enthusiastically contribute to a database of nostalgic recollections of home and place.  
However, the underlining narrative that all Singaporean understand as chronicling their 
nation’s past comes in the form of an officially scripted account known as The Singapore 
Story.  The term and cultural concept of The Singapore Story is taken from the 1998 memoir 
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of elder statesman and arguably architect of modern Singapore Lee Kuan Yew titled The 
Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew and its 2000 sequel titled The Singapore Story: 
Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew, Vol. 2: From Third World to First: 1965-2000. 
 
Singapore actively and officially remembers its past through a scripted national discourse that 
highlights the key points of Singapore’s history from a colony of the British to the present day 
post-industrial position Singapore holds as a global city and economy.  The history of 
Singapore – which is popularly and officially known as The Singapore Story has been 
observed by commentators (Hong & Huang 2008) to be a one-sided narrative filled with 
carefully thought through themes and values that support a free-market economy.  Both the 
cultural concept and the book present Lee Kuan Yew and the ruling PAP as the heroes of the 
piece.  It is straightforward narrative, with the heroes bringing about peace and prosperity to 
Singapore, while the villains bent on creating anarchy and chaos work against Lee and the 
PAP.  It is also a narrative that highlights, not so subtly, Singaporean identity as a uniquely 
diasporic Singaporean-Chinese one, even though the nation state is a culturally diverse 
society made up of various ethnic groups other than the Chinese (Barr & Skrbiš 2008).  In 
addition, while Chinese cultures and identities are themselves diverse, the government 
nominates Confucian Chinese culture and identity as the umbrella cultural identity for all 
Singaporean-Chinese.   
 
Although Singapore’s official past has been articulated as The Singapore Story only 
comparatively recently, this really is the only history most Singaporeans, particularly those 
born after 1965, are familiar with or aware of.  From as early as primary school Singaporean 
children are indoctrinated with this version of Singapore’s past as part of the curriculum that 
follows them right up to university.  The Singapore national anthem is sung daily in all 
schools, while Singapore’s National Day Parade is the national event which encourages 
Singaporeans to feel even more connected to each other and to the nation.  Critics of the PAP 
often acknowledge that the ruling party has been very successful in creating a strong sense of 
nationalism amongst its citizens.  The telecast of the National Day Parade is the most 
popularly watched television programme of the year.   
 
The Singapore Story is inculcated into everyday life in Singapore and popular culture.  The 
local public television station MediaCorp, which is fully owned by the government, often 
produces and screens aspects of The Singapore Story in documentary or fictional series form, 
for instance the English-language A War Diary (2001) and the Chinese-language In Pursuit of 
Peace (2001).  Popular musicians record nationalist songs that are played repeatedly on 
television and on radio, particularly during the National Day season (about a month before 
and a few weeks after National Day on 9 August).  Patriotic songs are also sometimes played 
on Singapore television, particularly those that highlight emotional ties to Singapore such as 
the famous Dick Lee written and Kit Chan sung ‘Home’.  
 
The Singapore government has also instilled the importance of remembering as a way of 
maintaining communal harmony by commemorating days of ethnic, religious and cultural 
significance as public holidays, and has allowed traditional rituals to thrive through festivals 
and events significant to the broader Chinese, Malay and Indian communities. Singapore 
officially classifies its citizens broadly into four racial categories: Chinese, Malay, Indian and 
Others (CMIO).  The Others category includes any minor ethnic group outside the 
predominantly CMI framework, such as Eurasians, Arabs, Armenians, Japanese and 
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Europeans.  The Eurasians are considered the significant community within this grouping.  
The CMIO groupings exist regardless of the ethnic differences within each group.  The most 
dominant ethnicity is used as the recognition shell for communal classification.  So the 
Malayalees, Punjabis, Bengalis, Tamils, Sri Lankan Tamils and Sinhalese are all grouped as 
Indian.  All people from Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Bangladesh for are also classified as Indian.  
In the Indian group, Tamil is the officially sanctioned language and Hinduism is classified as 
the official religion – regardless of the multiple languages and multiple religions reflective of 
the South Asian diaspora.   
 
Writing on the significance of Chinese street opera in the 7 March 1998 edition of the 
Singapore Chinese-language daily Lianhe Zaobao, Lee Tong Soon (2002) cites then-Minister 
of Information George Yeo on the importance of such performances on collective memory 
and therefore on nationalist discourse: ‘Theatrical arts such as Chinese street opera are a form 
of our traditional culture that constitutes a kind of collective memory for us, linking the 
present generation to the previous generation, and thus worthy of preservation’ (T.S. Lee 
2002: 140).  Through government encouragement, Chinese opera in Singapore thus functions 
as a signifier for Chinese-Singaporeans to identify themselves with their culture and with 
each other.  I will revisit and explore traditional rituals in more detail later in this chapter. 
 
However, like the scripting of Singapore’s past, the Singapore government’s recognition of 
the significance of cultural commemoration is selective, as highlighted in the cinematic work 
of documentary film-maker Tan Pin Pin.  By using the platform of documentary films Tan not 
only gives her audiences a sense of realism but also a sense of authenticity.  Stories are not 
fictionalized or dramatized, but rather present ‘the real thing’.  Of course a degree of artistic 
freedom is applied to make the films more aesthetically palatable to audiences (de Bromhead 
1996).  Tan is able to foreground her subjects, map the richness of their stories and explore 
events while at the same time engaging the audience and subtly question the Singaporean 
authorities.  By questioning the government’s role in Chinese cultural preservation, inferring 




Remembering in the Cinema of Tan Pin Pin 
Tan Pin Pin became interested in visual images while reading law at Oxford University in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s.  An interest in photography soon became more than a hobby, with 
a short stint as photographer culminating in an exhibition of her work in Singapore in 1993.  
By then, Tan had begun to take her interest in the visual image to another level, the moving 
image.  Tan started out working as an assistant director with the state television broadcaster 
Television Corporation of Singapore (TCS), now renamed MediaCorp, on the popular 
English-language television series Triple Nine (Kwok 1995-1999).  Tan then went to 
Northwestern University on a S. Rajaratnam Scholarship to undertake a Masters in Fine Art 
in film (K.P. Tan 2011).  While at Northwestern, Tan began making avant-garde independent 
films such as Lurve Me Now (1999).   
 
However, Tan’s true passion lay in documentary films.  While still a student at Northwestern, 
Tan made the critically acclaimed and award-winning docu-film, Moving House.  This 
masterpiece was to be the first of three documentary films – Moving House, Singapore GaGa 
and Invisible City – that focus on everyday Singaporeans doing extraordinary things.  Her 
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films pay homage to the people that local audiences might see and hear on a daily basis but 
never acknowledge or take much notice of.  In particular, Tan taps into her subjects’ 
memories, getting them to tell their stories.  Memory in Tan’s cinema is not just a theme, but 
rather is her muse.5   
 
In Singapore GaGa memories of a simpler life in Singapore are displayed in the segments 
featuring avant-garde toy pianist Margaret Leng Tan and her composition incorporating the 
tok-tok man.  The tok-tok man, who by the late 1970s became all but extinct, was a mobile 
noodle seller who announced his presence by hitting a wooden block, which made a tok-tok 
sound.  Margaret Tan, a diasporic Singaporean artist who has faced her fair share of rejection 
from the Singaporean public, provides homage to her homeland through her memories of a 
bygone Singapore.  This Singapore is the country that older Singaporeans seem to remember 
not only as a simpler time, but also as a time when society was more interactive.  As Margaret 
Tan says, ‘the tok-tok man will come and his arrival announced with the sound of the tok-tok; 
people then interact with this tradesman’.  However, the films that really feature memory as 
the star are Moving House and Invisible City.   
 
Moving House documents a Singapore family’s exhumation of their ancestors’ remains to a 
new place of rest after a forced land reclamation due to a new housing development, while 
Invisible City explores the memories of Singaporeans who are passionate about the country 
they live in but in a way that is contrary to official government discourse.  In these films 
memory serves three purposes: as a device to sensitively and emotively tell stories of 
individuals whose voices would otherwise not be heard; as an effective avenue to approach 
and to rethink the remembering of Singapore’s past; and to fill in the gaps left by official 
Singapore history. 
 
Invisible City is an incredibly poignant film that focuses on documenting memory by paying 
homage to those responsible for collecting and respecting memories over the past half century 
such as filmmakers and photographers.  The film honours the people and their memories that 
have not been captured by official remembering.  In doing so, Invisible City provides a subtle 
alternative voice to official remembering.  For instance, Invisible City features British-born 
BBC cinematographer and medical doctor Ivan Polunin and his extensive work documenting 
Singapore.  Polunin successfully captured a Singapore in the 1950s and 1960s that many 
Singaporeans today are unfamiliar with.  Also an expert on tropical medicine, Polunin as part 
of his medical work filmed a Singapore that was people-centred.  Invisible City highlights 
some of this footage, which features hawkers at markets and Orang Asli (indigenous of 
Peninsular Malaysia) communities who inhabited the once forested areas of Johor and 
Singapore.  These are people not remembered as part of official remembering, since they are 
not part of the progress-through-industrialization narrative Singaporeans are more familiar 
with.  Likewise, many of the places that Polunin documented exist now only in his footage.   
 
The effectiveness of Tan’s treatment of memory, in terms of her contribution to remembering 
in Singapore, is well recognized by commentators of Singapore culture and cinema (Harvey 
2006).  For instance, Goh, Lim and Tang (2005) note that Tan effectively conveys the sense 
of lost history Singaporeans are grappling with in her films.  Meanwhile Leow (2010) 
observes that Tan and other contemporary Singaporean artists such as Alfian Sa’at reclaim 
and imagine Singapore’s past both sensitively and poignantly through their work.  They do 
this by providing a voice to those who have been shunned by Singapore’s official reworking 
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of Singaporean history and memory.  Their reclamation and imagination of Singapore’s past 
through the memories of the subjects, as Leow suggests, is made even more significant since 
Tan and Sa’at deal with a history that they have not lived through but thoroughly respect.  
Leow observes that Tan’s  
attempt to uncover new stories, alternate histories and forgotten voices can be 
seen as a way to fill in the gaps and present a more complete story of 
Singapore’s past … [and that her] … efforts can be seen as an effort to write a 
history of an invisible Singapore, a subterranean layer of the palimpsest of its 
history, as a de Certeau-like ‘tactic’ that uses personal memory as an 
intervention in the grand ‘strategy’ of Singapore’s official history. (2010: 
121)6   
 
Additionally, Tan’s work provides a subtle tool for questioning the government’s recording of 
its past.  A quote from Cinéma du Réel on the DVD cover of Invisible City praises the film as 
‘[a] witty, challenging essay on history and memory as tools of civil resistance’.  While this is 
specific to Invisible City’s documentation of a Singapore history from alternative sources 
outside the official discourse, it also aptly describes Moving House and Singapore GaGa.  
Tan after all is able to use remembering as one of the ‘tools of civil resistance’, and thus 
circumvents Singapore’s strict media censorship laws.  A favourite and effective platform of 
hers in this regard is the Singaporean-Chinese community. 
 
 
People, Identity, Culture: ‘Chineseness’ as a Platform for Civil Resistance 
Tan uses the term ‘Chineseness’ in terms of a people, identity and culture in order to 
highlight, question and provide alternative perspectives of Singapore’s past.  While Tan has 
been sometimes criticized for heavily featuring the Chinese in her work (Hong 2008), doing 
so enables a clear platform to address the state of remembering in Singapore.  Tan is able to 
directly address official remembering in Singapore since the diasporic ethnic Chinese and 
Confucian Chinese cultures are the key players in The Singapore Story.   
 
In their excellent analysis of the cultural construct The Singapore Story, Hong and Huang 
(2008) paint a daringly honest picture of a nation whose government has never been shy of 
expressing their admiration for the hard-working Chinese migrants of colonial Singapore and 
the nationalist diasporic Chinese.  They (unsurprisingly) assert that Singapore’s history is 
‘scripted’, that the past is distilled to highlight only specific heroes in the story of Singapore.  
Besides Lee Kuan Yew and the PAP – whose exploits contributed to freeing Singapore from 
the clutches of communism and racial unrest, and then led the nation to enjoy the fruits of 
capitalism in a nation blessed by racial harmony – the other hero of The Singapore Story is 
the superhero of the overseas (diasporic) Chinese community, Sun Yat-sen.  What Hong and 
Huang strongly imply is that The Singapore Story, while uncomplicated in its choice of 
national heroes, is ultimately a contrived one that underpins and supports the national values 
of the state with a strongly ethnic Chinese hue.  The choice of non-Singaporean Sun Yat-sen 
as an elevated hero in Singapore supports the strong diasporic Confucian Chinese value 
system, which Singapore has adopted and adapted for itself.  This value system becomes the 
very tool with which the government controls Singaporean society and dictates national 
allegiance to both the state and ruling party.  Here the value system of the diasporic Chinese 
is highlighted as the ideal and necessary framework for the past, present and future economic 
successes of Singapore, as well as a platform for creating stability.  However, there is irony in 
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a nation priding itself on multiculturalism while strongly displaying its favouritism and 
admiration of the Chinese in Singapore above all others.   
 
While Singapore may be dominated demographically by the ethnic Chinese, and with its 
official history and value system deeply entrenched in a carefully scripted past, all is not well 
for the everyday Singaporean-Chinese themselves, many of whom are Chinese-educated 
unlike the English-educated elite, many of who inhabit the ranks of the PAP.  Tan’s cinema 
reveals that some Singaporean-Chinese are struggling with what they see as Chinese cultural 
erosion as their traditions adapt to the unstoppable Singaporean road of modernity, while 
others struggle with their forgotten place in Singapore’s official remembering of its past.   
 
 
Figure 3.1: Remembering the early Chinese people and their cultural practices are highlighted 
in the National Museum of Singapore.  Singapore Living Galleries – Photography, National 
Museum of Singapore.  Photo taken when author visited the gallery in 2008. 
 
 
Tan’s featuring of Chineseness is not surprising, since her work honestly portrays 
Singaporean society as rooted in various aspects of Chinese culture.  Singapore may be 
officially a multiracial and multicultural society but it is its Chineseness that influences and 
provides a baseline for Singaporean society in terms of the country’s official values.  Tan uses 
Chinese culture as her platform and taps into the Chinese community for her exploration into 
what Singaporean-Chinese feel are important issues to them.  In doing so she reveals a deep 
sense of discontent for not only the government, but also the speed at which Singapore is 
progressing at the expense of ethnic cultural traditions.  Her films reveal a political 
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undercurrent of reclaiming memories of events that contradict official discourse, while 
providing everyday Singaporeans with a voice to tell their version of events. 
 
While the Chinese are demographically the most dominant group in Singapore, they, like the 
minority groups  namely the Malays, the Indians and the Eurasians – do feel a sense of 
cultural erosion.  While a separate discussion is needed for the kinds of cultural erosion the 
non-Chinese groups experience, Tan’s cinema tells us that there are ethnic Chinese who 
themselves feel displaced in Singapore’s version of Chinese culture and identity.  They 
experience displacement for a variety of reasons, some being, broadly: the rise of the English-
educated elites and their domination of the government; the dissolution of various Chinese 
languages through the Speak Mandarin Campaign; and the perceived threat posed by the 
entry of a new mainland Chinese workforce.   
 
The Chinese-educated in Singapore have long held the belief that there is a rising tide of 
English-educated elites controlling Singapore (Barr & Skrbiš 2008; Chua 2009).  These 
English-educated elites are ethnic Singaporean-Chinese who have studied at top Western 
universities overseas, often on government scholarship.  Sooner or later the English-educated 
elites fill both high-level civil service positions and political positions as Members of 
Parliament under the PAP banner.  This notion of the elite English-educated PAP MP has 
created a schism in Singapore, where working-class Singaporeans – regardless of ethnic 
grouping – believe strongly that the PAP has lost touch with everyday Singaporeans because 
of the strong elitist culture prevalent in the government. 
 
However, many other Singaporean-Chinese, particularly the Chinese-educated and those who 
are more comfortable conversing with friends and family in Chinese dialects, have often felt 
their culture is being eroded because of government policies (Heng & Devan 1995).  
Singaporean-Chinese are primarily Han Chinese who arrived from different regions in 
southern China and spoke mainly the Chinese dialects of Hokkien, Teochew and Cantonese.  
However, in order to create a sense of homogeneity amongst Singaporean-Chinese, the PAP 
instigated language policies that promoted Mandarin, through the Speak Mandarin Campaign, 
and strongly encouraged dissolution of the provincial dialects.7  Mandarin is not the 
vernacular of the Chinese migrants who flocked to Singapore during the nation’s time as a 
British colony.8  Singaporean-Chinese thus have been feeling their culture(s) eroding since 
language is an obvious signifier and transporter of culture.  To add insult to injury, the 
government made it mandatory for school-aged children with Chinese dialect names to 
officially change their names to Mandarin when it came to Romanised spelling and 
pronunciation.  So a student with the surname Tan is officially transformed into a Chen.  Not 
only were the cultural identities of Chinese-Singaporeans at stake, but also their clan and 
family identities.  While the Speak Mandarin Campaign was launched in 1979 and is ongoing, 
the changing of student names in the official school register proved so unpopular that it was 
done away with ten years after the start of the campaign. 
 
While many Singaporeans can trace their lineage to mainland China, they do not, however, 
consider themselves emotionally connected to that homeland or for that matter to the 
mainland Chinese.  Perhaps a reason for this phenomenon can be attributed to the inability of 
Singaporean-Chinese to recognize modern-day China as the same homeland of their ancestors 
due to changes in political ideology.  China’s adoption of communism – the political ideology 
the Singapore government is perpetually at war with  has caused tension between the two 
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nations despite the cultural overlap.  The resulting Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) 
completely severed any link Singaporean-Chinese had with their ancestral home, since all that 
was culturally recognizable by the diasporic ethnic Chinese was purged. 
 
 
Cultural Traditions Matter 
Organized community remembering in the modern era is complicated.  Modernity creates 
certain challenges to the stability of the nation state, conceptually and in practice.  Arjun 
Appadurai (1996) observes that a symptom of modernity is the global cultural flow of people, 
media, technology, finance and ideas.  These transnational exchanges have resulted in the 
creation of imagined communities outside of their geographical, national and ethnographic 
boundaries.  The idea of nation becomes complicated when conventional physical barriers 
collapse.  In his work on nationalism, Benedict Anderson (1983) explains that his 
understanding of the nation is complex, as it departs from ideas of colonial struggles into 
something else in this modern era.  He further explains that ideas of nation (nationalism, 
nation-ness) are still informed and complicated by events in history, geography, regional 
politics (political proximity), migration and demographics (historical events and geography).  
He notes, however, that because of globalization, nations are now not limited to physically 
confined spaces but instead can be entities of imagined political communities that are ‘both 
inherently limited and sovereign’. (1991: 224) 
 
While memory in Singapore is played out in the public domain and navigated by government 
policies, projects and programmes, it also exists outside this realm and plays a significant role 
unifying both Singaporeans of different ethnicities with each other and within their own 
community groups.  Singaporeans place emphasis on remembering ethnic cultural and 
religious heritage for a plethora of reasons that include the importance placed on preserving 
tradition, the maintaining of communal homogeneity in multi-cultural/ethnic/lingual/religious 
Singapore and the stability which rituals bring when nations modernize.  Georg Simmel 
(1979), for instance, explains that a society draws on tradition (religion, cultural ideology) in 
order to provide stability in an unstable situation created by economic change due to 
modernity.  In Singapore, ethnic cultural heritage is very much intertwined with religious 




Tradition and Progress 
Singapore, as mentioned earlier, is a nation that thrives on rituals cultivated by the 
government for the purpose of nationalism.  Yet practised rituals in this city state are inherited 
through religious traditions with strong interconnected ethnic and cultural communalism.  
Singapore is host to the major religions of Asia: Hinduism, Islam, Buddhism, Taoism and 
Christianity.  Religion plays a fundamental role in the lives of Singaporeans, with the vast 
majority of the population describing themselves as connected to a religious group that is 
often connected to the racial cultures.  The exception to the rule is Christianity, which is 
represented in all cultural-ethnic groups, with the exception of the Malay Muslim community.   
 
Tan Pin Pin’s Moving House functions as a critical essay that links the importance of tradition 
to the Singaporean-Chinese.  Through the depiction of a Taoist family’s exhumation of their 
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loved ones, the film demonstrates the subtle anger and disappointment Singaporean-Chinese 
have with the country’s rapid progress at the expense of cultural traditions.  According to the 
latest Singapore Department of Statistics (2010: ix), 14.4 per cent of Singaporean-Chinese 
consider themselves practising Taoists.  However 57.4 per cent of Singapore Chinese 
consider themselves Buddhist/Taoist and who observe both Buddhist and Taoist traditions 
and rituals.  The film eloquently and sensitively documents the relocation of the Chew 
family’s ancestors (the parents of the older generation featured) from their resting place of 
almost three decades on a hill to a newly built high-rise columbarium not dissimilar from the 
high-rise Housing & Development Board (HDB) flats most Singaporeans live in.  The 
exhumation is a necessary part of Singapore’s quest for modernity since the land was needed 
for development by the Singapore government.  The Chews however, are not alone in the 
exhumation and relocation of their dead.  We are told by the narrator of Moving House, 
Remesh Panicker, that 55,000 families will conduct a similar exercise because the ‘Singapore 
government requires this land for further national development.  The Chew’s parents have to 
move’.  Implying that progress is conducted at the expense of cultural tradition, the narrator 
solemnly continues: ‘For Singaporeans, moving, rebuilding and resettling – whether 
voluntary or involuntary  is a way of life.  And the dead are not exempt.’  The film 
emphasizes the place tradition holds in people’s lives in terms of heritage and filial piety 
through the practice and performance of religious rituals of everyday Singaporeans.  
Religious rituals are practised out of sincerity and not because of government dictates. 
 
 
Brought together by Death 
On one level, this film is about the significance of cultural tradition, which is performed in the 
film by the Chews through the rituals they practise as part of filial piety and reverence to their 
dead relatives.  Traditional culture through ancestor worship allows for a sense of community 
and belonging that links family – alive and dead – with each other.  The reclamation of the 
parents’ graves allows different generations of this family to feel a connection to each other, 
their ancestors, their community and their culture.  These connections are strengthened 
through religious ritualistic practice.  It is religion that allows for a wider net to be cast in 
terms of belonging through communal and cross-communal ties.  As one of the family 
members, Mr ‘A’ Chew, comments (in Mandarin with English subtitles):  ‘Personally, I don’t 
agree with the exhumation exercise because when our ancestors die, they are buried in an 
auspicious location so their spirits can absorb the good feng shui elements from that location 
to transmit the good feng shui to the future generations in our family.’   
 
Singaporeans are generally incredibly religious and express their beliefs through superstition.  
Taoists for instance, believe that there are direct connections between the peace their 
ancestors find in death with the well-being of their living relatives.9 Taoists place great 
importance on ancestral worship as they believe that looking after their ancestors – by visiting 
their resting places and taking care of them by burning incense and bringing them food – has 
a direct impact on the welfare of the surviving relatives.   
 
Taoist beliefs about ancestral worship work well alongside the Christian Catholic practice of 
respecting the dead on All Souls’ Day on 2 November.  Here Catholics pray for the 
deliverance of the dead into Heaven rather than praying to the dead for success of the living.  
Catholics also visit the graves and columbarium niches of their departed loved ones.  While 
All Souls’ Day is set aside for honouring the dead, Catholics are also permitted to offer mass 
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to their loved ones or visit their final resting places throughout the year.  While there are 
obvious differences between the ways in which the Taoists and Christians treat and think of 
their dead, there is a respectful understanding between these major religions and their 
followers of the significance of those who have passed on. 
 
Death in Singapore is a festive and communal event, albeit a sad one, regardless of ethnic 
cultural and religious affiliations.  Death brings together friends, relatives, co-workers and 
acquaintances of the deceased during mourning rituals, which last anywhere from a day (for 
Muslims who try to bury their dead within 24 hours) to four days before burial.  Generally 
Singaporeans adopt Chinese superstitions in the number of days put aside for a wake, as even 
numbers rather than odd numbers are considered more auspicious and appropriate.  The 
afterlife is also big business in Singapore, with the housing and commemoration of the dead a 
thriving enterprise in itself.  Columbariums pepper the island because of the scarcity of land 
and can be astonishingly elaborate places with chandeliers, piped music and air 
conditioning.10   
 
 
Against the Odds: Cultural Adaptation  
Moving House functions as a form of criticism of Singapore’s rapid progress and subtly 
questions the decisions made by the ruling PAP government.  This is quite clearly 
emphasized through the interviews with two of the Chew sons.  One son, Mr ‘B’ Chew is 
resigned to his dead parents’ situation but is also concerned about the use of land in 
Singapore.  On the drive to Mandai Crematorium where his parents are to be interned in 
niches, he laments:  
 
They have been resting down there for 20 or so years.  All of a sudden, we 
disturb them.  Sad!  Most unfortunate, our country’s area is small.  Why 
should they have so many golf course? [sic] A waste of land too.  Why can’t 
they provide this land for a permanent cemetery so that the traditions can be 
maintained? 
 
In not so subtle terms, Mr ‘B’ Chew questions the wisdom of the government in its 
(re)development of land in land-scarce Singapore.  His comments on the priority of building 
golf courses over and above the building of a cemetery reveal a not-so-subtle criticism of the 
government’s ‘forgetting’ of cultural traditions for the sake of progress.  In land-scarce 
Singapore and on its satellite holiday island Sentosa; there are seventeen golf courses and 
eighteen golf driving ranges (Poon 2009).  At the same time, there is also a questioning of the 
welfare of everyday (living) Singaporeans who have to live – like the re-housed dead  in 
crowded flats while golf courses – a symbol of play and business for the wealthy few – 
pepper the Singapore landscape.  As Mr ‘B’ Chew notes: ‘In this type of area, if the whole 
family comes to pay their respects, see how crowded, no standing space.’  He continues later 
in the film: ‘When I offer my prayer, I told my late parents, we have no choice but to exhume 
you, because our government requires the land, we hope you will keep protecting and 
blessing us’. 
 
Moreover, the sense of community through the cultural practice of worshiping the dead is 
sacrificed.  As the other son, Mr ‘C’ Chew states: ‘Without the cemetery, I think the 
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atmosphere and tradition will die off.  As a matter of fact, I have decided, after putting my 
parents in the crematorium I won’t go during the Qingming Festival, I will only go there on 
their death anniversary.’  While Mr ‘B’ Chew states: ‘In the past, we would bring all kinds of 
home cooked food, we’d buy a big watermelon to cut it up there to share with everyone.  
Now, there can be no more such gatherings’.   
 
Moving House does acknowledge, however, that Singapore has had no choice but to 
modernize by reclaiming and redeveloping burial sites for residential and commercial use.  
Moving House also functions as a celebration of the ways in which Singaporeans are able to 
adapt their cultural traditions to rapidly modernizing Singapore.  As with the exhumation and 
reburial of the Chew family ancestors, Singapore GaGa presents the various ways in which 
some sectors of the Singaporean-Chinese community attempt to maintain their cultural 
traditions in the face of what they consider to be cultural erosion.  Maintaining cultural 
tradition against government-sanctioned cultural erosion encourages certain Singaporeans to 
stand up to their government. 
 
 
Defying the Government: Cultural Maintenance and Reclaiming the Past 
Maintenance of culture by Singaporean-Chinese sometimes takes place by actively defying 
and countering Singapore government directives to homogenize Chinese culture.  Singapore 
GaGa features a segment on a radio station featuring different Chinese dialects.  The radio 
station exists in order to provide a service to Singaporean-Chinese unable to speak Mandarin 
or English.  Doing so means that the station also helps maintain the richness of Chinese 
languages other than government-approved Mandarin on the airwaves.  Likewise, a segment 
featuring musician Yew Hong Chow, a harmonica expert, is critical of the Singapore 
government’s policy on music education in schools.  Yew notes that the choice of instruments 
that primary and secondary children learn in schools such as the recorder – a European 
instrument  is an example of one way in which the government has forgotten traditional 
Chinese culture.  After all, it is the harmonica that is symbolic of Chinese culture and not the 
recorder. The harmonica, or sheng, is a traditional Chinese instrument.  To add credence to 
this, Singapore GaGa features well-respected musician and music educationist Alex 
Abisheganaden who also criticizes the use of the recorder.  In addition, he states that the 
recorder as the instrument of choice shows a lack of foresight on the part of the government, 
since it is an incredibly difficult instrument to master.  Rather than look to the local ethnic 
cultures of Singapore such as China, Abisheganaden reasons that the decision to place 
emphasis on the recorder was based on the experiences of the Singaporean leaders who were 
schooled in Europe.   
 
Tan Pin Pin’s presentation of Singapore-Chinese concerns about their culture perhaps reflects 
the ways in which they see Singapore: as a country that has abandoned rather than embraces 
the richness and diversity of Chinese culture.  Tan’s cinema however does not merely focus 
on cultural commemoration.  Her work also takes issue with the sacred cow of Singapore 
history.  The Singapore government relies on the demographically dominant Chinese people 
to create a specific national identity that has become the cornerstone of Singaporean 
nationalism as expressed in the cultural concept of The Singapore Story.  However, while The 
Singapore Story depends on Chinese culture as its national framework, it also demonizes the 
local Chinese communists, representing them as the villains of the piece; Tan urges us to 
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reconsider this narrative by providing us with their side of the tale, which she chronicles in 
both Singapore GaGa and Invisible City. 
 
As I briefly mentioned earlier, the communists in Singapore had strong links to communist 
China and consisted almost solely of local ethnic Chinese members.  While they played a role 
in fighting the Japanese through guerrilla activities during the Japanese occupation of 
Singapore and many of its members supported the People’s Action Party during the quest for 
self-government from the British in the post-war years, they soon fell out of favour with the 
British and the PAP when many communists resorted to terrorist activities to derail the 
colonial government.  A number of communist-led riots in Singapore took place prior to 
independence in 1965. 
 
Communism was in the spotlight again in 1987, but this time because of the PAP’s 
controversial capture and detention of 22 young Catholic workers, social activists and 
professionals for conspiring to overthrow the PAP government and turn Singapore into a 
Marxist state.  The Singapore Story presents communism as a destructive force that looms as 
a threat to the healthy social fabric of Singaporean society.  This representation of instability 
is strongly evoked through the National Museum of Singapore’s extensive exhibition 
dedicated to the communist threat. It features artefacts such as radio broadcasts, education 
documentation, newspaper headlines and reports, and dramatic photographs of the devastation 
caused by the Chinese communists at the time.  Today, Singapore still uses the threat of 
communism as a tool for nation building, as seen in recent educational productions by the 
Ministry of Information, Communications and the Arts, such as the documentary Riding the 
Tiger: The Chronicle of a Nation’s Battle Against Communism (2001).  Singapore GaGa and 
Invisible City attempt to circumvent the national narrative that demonizes communism and 
present stories of patriotism from ageing former communists. 
 
Singapore GaGa is a moving film that features Singaporeans living on the fringe, those who 
are seen by many yet ignored and eventually forgotten.  One of the most poignant stories 
featured is of elderly Guo Ren Huey and his wife, both of whom used to be part of Malayan 
Communist Party in Singapore and were particularly active in fighting off the Japanese 
during the occupation of Singapore.  They are a loving couple and now in their old age he 
looks after her since, according to him, she has ‘forgotten many things...everything is 
forgotten’.  To help her remember, he sings to her the songs of their youth.  The songs, while 
helpful for his wife, also play a role in helping audiences understand more about Singapore 
history.  This is because the songs are tunes they used to sing while in the underground 
communist party in the 1940s and 1950s.  The songs thus function as precious artefacts, 
which have otherwise been erased because of the Singapore government’s outlawing of 
communism.  The segment becomes a thinly veiled criticism of Singapore’s selective history 
played against a backdrop of a country which actively encourages remembering of its past, 
albeit a past peppered with specific heroes and themes scripted for nation building, and 





Figure 3.2: Still of Guo Ren Huey singing with his wife in the background.  From the DVD 
version of Invisible City (Objectifs 2007).   
 
 
Tan respects and very openly addresses the role that is played by personal memories as 
providing a perspective that either contextualises or provides a comparative analysis of 
official history.  Here Tan links the notion of personal memories to the broader context of 
Singapore’s own official memory concerning the local ethnic Chinese communists.  While 
official remembering of communism in Singapore paints a picture of communists as demonic 
figures bent on creating upset and chaos in the city state, Tan’s tapping into the personal 
memories of Guo Ren Huey provides another perspective of communism’s history in 
Singapore.  The former communists are presented not as rabble-rousers out to create terror 
and discord, but rather as fervent nationalists whose vivid memories of the violence they 
encountered at the hands of the Japanese bear testament to their patriotism.   
 
Invisible City’s vindication of the patriotism of the Chinese communists continues in the 
presentation of former journalist Han Tan Juan as he relates the experience of violence at the 
hands of police in colonial Singapore during the 1956 Chung Cheng High School incident.  
The Singapore government remembers this incident as part of the Chinese middle school 
student riots.  These students, according to the government, were communists and therefore 
dedicated to disruption and chaos in fragile Singapore.  Han Tan Juan, a student activist 
fighting for independence from the colonial government at the time, recalls the incident 
through a series of personal photographs he reveals in Invisible City.  It is difficult to not feel 
sympathy for Han Tan Juan, because it seems that official history has not acknowledged him 
as a Singaporean patriot, since it condemns him as a traitor and a dissenter due to his 
communist beliefs and affiliations during his activist days.  Invisible City provides him with a 
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platform to tell his version of the story and express his feelings about the event and his role in 
it.   
 
Invisible City ends on a poignant and subtly alarming note about modern young 
Singaporeans’ lack of interest Singapore’s history.  The film concludes with Han Tan Juan 
talking about his experiences with a group of ethnic Chinese high school students at a seminar 
organized by civil society group The Tangent at the National Library.  Han Tan Juan is able 
to publicly discuss his experiences because of the Singapore government’s realization that it 
has had to acknowledge the parts played by these Singapore-Chinese as part of its 
‘valorization of ‘Chinese culture’’ (Hong 2008).  While the Singapore government still 
strongly demonizes communism as a threat to the nation’s stability, it does choose heroes 
amongst the scoundrels for the purpose of valorizing choice aspects of Chinese culture.  As 
Hong points out: ‘Han Tan Juan is a 2007 recipient of the Public Administration medal 
(bronze) for his work as director, North East Community Division, People’s Association; Guo 
Ren Huey has a 29-minute tape recording in the Oral History Centre under the rubric 
“Political Development in Singapore, 1945-1965.”’ (2008: 4)  His testimony about 
unknowingly enlisting into the Malayan Communist Party to fight the Japanese and not 
realizing that its chief Lai Teck was a double agent forms the basis of the first part of the 
DVD Riding the Tiger (Ministry of Information, Communication and the Arts 2001). 
 
Rather than being interested in what he has to say about the Chinese communists as part of 
Singapore-Chinese heritage however, the students looked bored and indifferent.  While their 
apathy may be merely a symptom of their youth, this next generation of leaders might well 
echo the observations made by Japanese journalist Izumi Ogura earlier in the film.  Here she 
expresses concern about government leaders and their acknowledgement of the past when she 
observes that there are members of the Japanese Diet who are unaware of the atrocities 




The Singaporean-Chinese indeed dominate Singapore primarily as a consequence of 
demographics.  The government no doubt favours the ethnic Chinese by adopting and 
valorizing Chinese culture as part of its nation-building efforts.  However, while Chineseness 
prevails overwhelmingly in Singapore, there are local Chinese who themselves struggle with 
Singaporean-Chinese culture.  This is because the PAP government selects certain aspects of 
Chinese culture – while erasing others  which they believe appropriate and useful for nation 
building and ultimately supportive of their mandate to rule Singapore.  The cinema of Tan Pin 
Pin sensitively and provocatively peels away layers of memory to reveal the issues that 
occupy sectors of the ethnic Chinese community.   
 
The next chapter takes a look at a different kind of anxiety towards ethnic community but still 
within the vein of Chinese ethnicity.  Rather than Singaporean-Chinese being the subject of 
study, the focus instead is on mainland Chinese migrants while the film I use is Shier Lou/12 
Storeys by well-known film-maker Eric Khoo.  I do this against a background that looks at 
and analyzes the ways in which Singaporeans have taken to online platforms as a response to 
new migrants on the whole.  Singaporeans feel threatened with the great number of the 
migrants arriving into Singapore particularly from mainland China, South Asia, the 
Philippines and Indonesia to take up professional and unskilled positions   These anxieties 
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take place even though the majority of Singaporeans trace their lineage back to mainland 
China and to India while Indonesia and the Philippines are neighbouring South East Asian 
nations.  Moreover, Chapters 4 to 6 allude to the notion that the presence of new migrants has 







Migrant Loathing: Understanding Anxiety over Chinese Mainlanders in Eric Khoo’s 
Shier Lou/12 Storey 
 
  
In 1997, up and coming Singapore film maker Eric Khoo released a film called Shier Lou/12 
Storeys on the back of his critically successful dark film Mee Pok Man (1995)1.  Khoo, who is 
today widely acknowledged as the godfather of contemporary independent filmmaking in the 
city-state and whose films are favorites at local and international film festivals, also subtly 
captures the tensions between Singaporeans and new migrants as they enter into the country 
before Singaporeans began to take their grievances about new migrants online in the mid to 
late 2000s.  In particular, Khoo’s 12 Storeys puts the relationship between Singaporeans and 
mainlander Chinese under the microscope by featuring the unhappy and loveless marriage 
between Singaporean Ah Gu (Jack Neo) and Lily (Chuan Yi Fong) his China- born wife 
whom, the film implies, met through a matchmaking agency catering for Singapore men to 
find wives from China.  Even though Lily is not a worker migrant, the tensions between the 
couple expressed in 12 Storeys was an early indication of how the presence of new migrants – 
many of whom share the same ancestral homes as Singapore-born citizens, cause unease, 
paranoia and suspicion.  This chapter takes a look at the relationship between Ah Gu and Lily 
as a metaphor for exploring the tensions between Singaporeans and mainland Chinese 
migrants and locates it within Khoo’s storytelling techniques.  It considers some possible 
reasons as to why these tensions exist particularly since the majority of Singaporeans, who 
themselves are ethnic Chinese; all trace their ancestry to China.  This chapter then takes 
advantage of the discussion on Chinese mainlander migrants in to look at current Singaporean 
attitudes toward new (permanent and professional) migrants by analyzing xenophobic online 
comments directed at these new settlers who are commonly known as ‘foreign talent’.   
 
 
The Cinema of Eric Khoo and 12 Storeys 
In their survey of the Singapore film industry a number of commentators mention that the 
contemporary Singapore film-making scene is defined by two main players: Jack Neo and 
Eric Khoo (Tan, Lee & Aw 2003; Chua & Yeo 2003).  While Jack Neo is associated with 
Singapore mainstream films exploring Singaporean society and culture, Eric Khoo is 
internationally and locally renowned as an independent film-maker of credibility and merit.  
While Khoo has been involved in both independent and commercial films as a producer, 
writer and director for most of his career, he is primarily known for making four independent 
films through his production company Zhao Wei Films: Mee Pok Man (1995), 12 Storeys 
(1997), Be With Me (2005) and My Magic (2008).  It is however Mee Pok Man and 12 Storeys 
that have had the most impact on Singapore film culture, the latter of which this chapter will 
engage more fully with in relation to Singaporean attitudes towards foreign migrants, and in 
particular, Chinese mainlanders.   
 
12 Storeys has been an international film festival favourite and the subject of enthusiastic 
critical interest by both local and international film studies experts.  Chris Berry and Mary 
Farquhar (2006) write that Eric Khoo’s 12 Storeys is a significant film in the wider Chinese 
diasporic film industry.  Tan, Lee and Aw (2006), meanwhile, paint Khoo’s 12 Storeys as 
distinctive and worthy examples of contemporary film-making in Singapore.  
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With his characteristic dark narratives, Khoo fits quite well into Helen Stoddart’s (1995: 40) 
definition of the auteur, where a ‘true auteur’ is ‘distinguished by the presence in each film, 
above and beyond generic variations, of a distinctive personality, expressed as a world-view 
or vision, which would thereby constitute a trace or ‘personal stamp’ of the director’s 
presence in the film and therefore within their oeuvre’. 
 
12 Storeys contains dark and pessimistic narratives by featuring three stories set in a 
particular block of flats.  The first story follows San San (Lucilla Teoh), a grown woman who 
is constantly verbally abused by the spirit of her dead adopted mother.  She is finally able to 
find peace for both herself and the nefarious spirit after she presents a gift to a rich woman 
who her adopted mother was once a nanny to.  The adopted mother is not the only spirit that 
is associated with San San; since she is watched over by the ghost of a young man she 
witnessed commit suicide on the twelfth storey of her block of flats.  The second story 
features a family of three siblings who have been left to their own devices by their absent 
parents.  The oldest sibling, Meng (Koh Boon Pin), has been left in charge of the household 
and takes his job as temporary guardian of his younger teenage siblings seriously.  However, 
Meng is also a repressed graduate high school teacher who is sexually attracted to his 
promiscuous younger sister Mei, also known as Trixie (Lum May Yee).  Meng makes his 
sexual fantasies of his sister a reality and rapes her, only to severely regret it.  The film ends 
with Meng being picked up by police while in a state of violent intoxication after the rape.  
The final story centres on newlyweds Ah Gu, a buck-toothed soya bean seller and his 
Chinese-born wife Lily.  Ah Gu appears to be hen-pecked by his promiscuous and vain wife 
who is plainly unhappy with their marriage – she left her true love in China to marry the 
Singaporean Ah Gu.  Her anger and attitude towards Ah Gu stems from his fooling her into 
thinking that he was a wealthy Singaporean businessman.  
 
The gritty darkness of Khoo’s films has been interpreted by some scholars such as Gina 
Marchetti (2005a) and Tan See-Kam (2009) as representing the social realism of a seedier 
side of Singapore that defies both popular local and international imagination.  Marchetti, for 
instance, believes that 12 Storeys reveals the social realities of the underclass in cosmopolitan 
and wealthy Singapore.  Khoo’s protagonists after all are the underclass, and his narratives 
unashamedly feature the deplorable conditions accorded to those who live below the poverty 
line in affluent Singapore.  Khoo’s fascination with and presentation of the social issues 
affecting the underclass have indeed defined him as a distinctive film-maker in Singapore.   
 
To explore this generally unseen side of Singapore, Khoo’s cinema grounds its narratives 
through exploration of the Singaporean-Chinese community.  With the exception of My 
Magic, which has largely an ethnic Indian cast and is filmed in the Tamil language, Khoo’s 
films prominently feature ethnic Chinese-Singaporeans speaking Mandarin and the various 
Chinese dialects.  12 Storeys is not exceptional in their presentation of the Chinese face in 
Singapore cinema, as they accurately present ethnic Chinese demographics – an issue which I 
have already addressed in this book – but they portray a different class of Chinese-
Singaporeans.  English-educated Khoo’s affinity towards the underclass is made all the more 
intriguing since he is the scion of one of the wealthiest families in Singapore.  Khoo’s family, 
amongst other things, owns the luxurious five-star Singapore heritage listed Goodwood Park 
Hotel.   
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While commentators of Khoo’s cinema state that his work provides a glimpse of the social 
realities of the underclass in cosmopolitan and affluent Singapore by featuring the seedier 
side of the city state, there is more to Khoo’s darkness.  This aspect of 12 Storeys does not 
serve as a mere foil to Singaporean society, but also functions as a platform that explores the 
issues and concerns that confront Singapore society at large.  Khoo’s films may portray the 
underclass and their environment, but the issues his protagonists face are perennial issues that 
challenge many Singaporeans.  While there are various issues that are played out in 12 
Storeys such as loneliness, sexual frustration and boredom, the fear of mainland Chinese 
migrants is a subtle yet concrete presence in the film.  To understand how 12 Storeys is able 
to reveal the subtext of the everyday issues that confront ordinary Singaporeans living in a 
nation that essentially is a residential cityscape, it is necessary to look at independent cinema 
in Singapore and the presence of the Everyman in Khoo’s provocative work. 
 
 
Understanding Independent Cinema  
Holmlund (2005: 2) notes that while the term ‘independent film’ is hotly debated and not very 
well-defined, the term ‘suggests social engagement and/or aesthetic experimentation – a 
distinctive visual look, an unusual narrative pattern, a self-reflective style’.  Quoting from an 
article in Filmmaker entitled ‘25 New Faces of Indie Film 2003’, Holmlund notes that 
independent films provide ‘alternative points of view, whether they be expressed in 
experimental approaches or through crowd-pleasing comedies’ (2005: 2).  He argues that 
independent films travel from ‘margins to mainstream’ in terms of distribution and audience.  
The same can perhaps be said about the content of these films, since they are becoming more 
popular and accessible to mass audiences.  Here Holmlund suggests that ‘[h]istorically, 
independent films have offered a “safe haven” for those ignored or neglected by the major 
studios, among them ethnic, racial, sexual, and political minorities’ (2005: 13). 
 
In her paper on independent films of the Chinese diaspora in the United States, Gina 
Marchetti (2005b: 222-23) suggests that films such as The Wedding Banquet (A. Lee 1993), 
Double Happiness (Shum 1994) and Shopping for Fangs (Lee & Lin 1997) while 
‘situate[ing] themselves as American’ really deal with the complexities of identity that 
confront the Chinese diaspora, who identify themselves as belonging to both America and 
China.  Marchetti reads America as being represented in these films by ‘issues of concern 
within North American society, ranging from immigration, labor, class inequities, racism, 
ethnic exclusionism, sexism, and homophobia’ while China, the traditional homeland is 
represented by ‘“Chinese-ness” as racial difference, questionable national loyalties, economic 
expectations, as well as prescribed gender roles, familial obligations, and sexual restrictions’ 
(Marchetti 2005b: 222).  She suggests that the content of these films allows Chinese-
Americans to both embrace or reject the America and/or China they see being represented in 
these films, since they are caught within this nexus where ‘the nation (China/America) 
becomes inextricably linked with the body (its gender, its age, its color, its desires) and torn 
asunder by the strains of the social, the economic, and the political, as well as the personal, 
vicissitudes of a global culture’ (Marchetti 2005b: 223).  
 
In her examination of independent cinema, E. Deidre Pribram (2002) notes that it is 
influenced by different kinds of film-making practices that include mainstream, avant-garde 
and experimental.  She suggests that while independent cinema attempts to represent ‘the 
world’, this realism is problematic.  She states that ‘[p]articular forms of realism are presented 
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in such a way that they conceal their representative qualities so that they can more 
convincingly stand in for “the truth” or reality’ (2002: 42).  So what is perceived as realistic is 
perhaps mere hyperbole.  In the case of Singapore independent cinema, this hyperbole (social 
issues concerning the poor) becomes instead a tool for the examination of mainstream issues 
affecting everyday Singaporeans. 
 
Since a notable trait of independent cinema is its freedom and ability to explore narratives 
which are otherwise untouched by or dictated by studio (or government) funded projects, 
independent Singapore films more than rise to the occasion in this context.2  A case in point is 
the disturbing film 15 (2003) directed by Khoo’s protégé Royston Tan.3 The film was funded 
by Khoo’s Zhao Wei Films with no obvious financial contribution from any commercial 
studio or from the government.  15 caused quite a sensation when it was about to be released 
as it drew the ire of the Singapore Board of Film Censors for its unbridled narration of a gang 
of underprivileged teenage boys who turned to petty crime and male prostitution to sustain 
themselves.  The film also won critical acclaim from the local film industry and from the 
film-going (art-house) public for using real people, that is, non-professional actors who 
present their lives much like a documentary, to drive the narrative.   
 
While 15 is arguably a ‘reality’ piece, the camera following the boys in their daily activities, 
the film inadvertently became even more poignant and marketable when the film-maker was 
unable to find the stars shortly after its release.  The boys had ‘disappeared’ with an eerie fear 
that they fell victim to ill fate.  At the time of writing the boys who would be in their mid to 
late twenties, have not been found.  
 
Another controversial film of note is Martyn See’s Singapore Rebel (2004), a documentary 
film about Singaporean politician and activist Dr Chee Soon Juan.  The Singapore 
government banned the film and threatened to charge See under the Films Act for violating 
Section 2(3)(e) due to the political content of the work.  Resubmitting his film in 2009 for 
consideration to the Singapore Board of Censors led to a rethink of what makes political 
content in films.  The eventual result was a number of amendments made to the Films Act 
itself (Palay 2010; See 2009; Cheney 2009).  When Martyn See submitted Singapore Rebel 
for consideration again, he did so on the back of a locally made television show on the ruling 
People’s Action Party Members of Parliament, produced by the state owned broadcaster 
MediaCorp.  The Singapore government ruled that the MediaCorp television programme was 
not political but current affairs.  This led to industry practitioners seeking clear guidelines 
regarding what is considered political content.  The amendments made to the Films Act that 
eased restrictions on the promotion of politicians and political parties actually strengthened 
restrictions on dramatized political productions.    
 
The continued critical successes achieved and inroads made on behalf of the film industry by 
independent film-makers such as Royston Tan, Martyn See, Eric Khoo and others have no 
doubt contributed to independent cinema flourishing in Singapore today.  Independent film 
production is indeed alive and well in Singapore.  This film industry is organized, with a 
particularly active online presence in the Singapore film scene.  The industry keeps fans, 
followers and independent film-makers informed through websites such as Sinema.sg (2012), 
started by Nicholas Chee and Randy Ang on 5 October 2006, who describe themselves as ‘the 
dynamic duo’ behind Originasian Pictures’ Becoming Royston.  The website was initiated in 
order to provide ‘a greater voice to all Singapore filmmakers to showcase their work’.  In 
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January 2008, a blog called SINdie: Singapore Independent Films Only (2012) dedicated to 
Singapore independent films was started by Jeremy Sing.  Originally called 
Actually.Basically.Honestly, the blog’s aim, according to its Facebook page 
(https://www.facebook.com/SINdieOnly/info), is to ‘give a voice to the numerous 
independent films made in Singapore to get them talked about and remembered’ (SINdie 
2008).   
 
While independent cinema in Singapore may have a healthy existence because of cutting-
edge productions and a loyal fan base appreciative of what this genre of films has to offer, 
credit needs to be accorded to Eric Khoo, who really was the first film-maker to successfully 
make waves with local cinema by going public with his signature works that narrate – with 
artistic licence – the dark and disturbing underbelly of the Singaporean underclass.  Khoo’s 
films have attracted the art-house and intellectual audiences in Singapore who, 
unsurprisingly, are predominantly the English-educated Singaporeans from the middle and 
upper classes.  His films appeal to the silent spectator who is able to both identify with his 
characters while gazing voyeuristically and from a safe distance into their lives onscreen.  
The audiences are thus able to objectify the characters and their tragic lives in the narrative 
while at the same time identifying with the content of his films. 
 
 
The Darkness of Eric Khoo’s Cinema: The Hopeless Everyman and Sleazy Sex  
As I have pointed out in Chapter 1, Singapore cinema’s hero has historically been the 
Everyman champion with his everyday challenges.4  Singaporean audiences perhaps find 
more comfort than escapism in being the silent voyeurs to the trials, the tribulations and the 
triumphs of the Singaporean Everyman.  Actor P. Ramlee, for instance, built a career on 
playing the Everyman.  He is popularly remembered by audiences familiar with his work, as 
well as by film historians, as playing the common man who breaks out into song and dance 
while negotiating life in a kampong of yesteryear.  The rush of films that have been emerging 
since the ‘renaissance’ of the local film industry in the early 1990s has been marked by the 
presence of the Everyman, whose heroism is expressed in the ways in which he navigates 
through life in Singapore.  The Everyman is never wealthy, holds no significant standing in 
Singapore society, usually does not have much education and holds no authoritative or 
professional position in the workforce.  The Everyman does not have grand ambitions that 
take him above his station, but rather has personal aspirations, such as: fulfilling the 
prerequisites of Singaporean material success through the acquisition of ‘the five Cs’ (condo, 
cash, car, credit card and country club membership) in Qián Bùgòu Yòng/Money No Enough 
(Neo 1998); winning a local football match in One Leg Kicking (Koh 2001); surviving basic 
military training in Army Daze (Ong 1996); or falling in love with the right girl in Forever 
Fever (Goei 1998).  The Everyman is a figure that is ever-present in Singaporean films, 
whether they are box office or critical successes.   
 
Generally the Everyman in contemporary Singapore films is the ‘heartlander’ – a colloquial 
term describing Singaporeans who live in the heartlands, high-rise public housing estates built 
by the government’s Housing & Development Board (HDB).  The HDB runs an owner-lease 
scheme where Singaporeans purchase a 99-year lease for their flats.  Flats are then returned to 
the HDB as landlord.  Since they are public housing, HDB estates tend to support different 
levels of low and middle-class Singaporeans.  Using the HDB landscape as the less than 
salubrious setting for his films, Khoo takes the Everyman to the depths of bleakness within 
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the class hierarchy and explores the seedier side of life in Singapore (Sa’at 2012, 45-47).  
Pathos, in other words, is king. 
 
Khoo’s protagonists work within a tortured and hopeless paradigm that they are unable to 
crawl out of.  In Khoo’s films, the Everyman has no prospects, is miserable and is confronted 
with tragedy, sadness, hopelessness and immorality.  While Khoo’s Everyman attempts to 
make the best out of life, he really can’t, since the cards are often stacked against him due to 
his sad circumstances.  For instance, he may have ill health, such as a terminal illness or a 
handicap, be suicidal, have no education, have financial and familial burdens, be sexually 
repressed or just plain unlucky in life.  To emphasize the dark hopelessness of his Everyman 
heroes even further, Khoo injects the themes of sordid and illicit sex as uncomfortable yet 
necessary devices to drive the narratives of his films. 
 
The narrative of 12 Storeys is strongly driven by the sexual content of the film.5  While there 
is some visualization of sexual acts, sex in the films is usually implied, assumed or discussed.  
Moreover, sex is often presented in an exaggerated manner, with sexual repression, sexual 
frustration, prostitution and sexuality featured prominently in the narratives of the film.6  In 
12 Storeys, Meng is sexually repressed but attracted to his promiscuous sister Mei.  He seems 
to revel in discussing sex with her as he relentlessly nags her about how her life will be ruined 
if she has premarital sex.  He makes her promise that she will remain a virgin till she gets 
married, and he also enjoys playing with a condom he confiscates from her and eventually 
rapes her towards the end of the film.  Meanwhile Ah Gu is sexually frustrated because his 
Chinese-born wife Lily withholds sex from him.   
 
It seems that sex in Khoo’s films acts as much as a force for evil as a force for good.  Sexual 
repression in some characters, for instance, has catastrophic effects for both themselves and 
for others around them.  Meng’s repression finally explodes when he rapes his sister Mei.  
Sex however, is not all diabolical but is also a source of mateship and female empowerment.  
The frequent talk of sex between the middle-aged men in 12 Storeys allows them to form 
bonds through fraternity, while the sexual activities of Mei facilitates her independence as she 
rebels against her brother Meng’s autocratic rule.  Withholding sex gives Ah Gu’s wife Lily 
power over her husband who married her under false pretenses.   
 
On the one hand, the sexual content in Khoo’s cinema serves as an obvious anchor for 
discussions of the social realities of the underclass in Singapore.  Seedy and over-the-top 
representations of sex became automatically associated with ‘dirtiness’ and the underbelly of 
society.  Such presentation of sex functions as a stark contrast to the way Singapore imagines 
itself – a clean and modern environment that supports a strong middle class with conventional 
family values.  On the other hand, the exaggerated nature of the sexual content of the films 
also serves as a platform to ease the audience into an allegorical analysis of Singapore as a 
nation, rather than focusing solely on the plight of the poor.  The sex allows a point of entry 
to challenge the ways in which Singapore – and in particular, the government – has 
(erroneously) imagined its society to be.  
 
Meng from 12 Storeys, for instance, can be read as an analogy for the People’s Action Party 
(PAP) government.  Meng is young, thinks of the family, and wants to see his siblings 
succeed in life.  He nags at his siblings endlessly while their silent protest is to not listen to 
him.  He is concerned about Mei’s virtue and their brother’s knowledge of Singapore’s 
80 
history.  Meng’s siblings have a discussion about how his autocratic control of them is worse 
than their mother’s nagging.  As the younger brother notes: ‘at least Ma stops nagging’.  From 
this meta-narrative perspective, the government thinks of the nation (family) and wants to see 
its citizens (siblings) succeed.  It is concerned about the virtue of its citizens, hence the 
government’s interference in the moral corruption and procreation of its citizens.  By moral 
corruption I refer to the government’s insistence that Singaporeans lead lives that promote the 
existence of the nuclear family where procreation is only allowed within the institution of 
marriage.  The government is also interested in instilling a sense of Singaporean history 
amongst its people and hence resorts to using the formal education system and official public 







Figure 4.1: Still of sexually repressed Meng chastising his sister Mei for being a loose woman 
just before he rapes her in 12 Storeys.  From DVD version of the film (Zhao Wei Films and 
Scorpio East Entertainment 2005) 
 
 
The presentation of the hopeless Everyman and the hyperbole of sex 12 Storeys present robust 
scaffolding that allows for a meta-critical insight into the everyday anxieties of ordinary 
Singaporeans.  The dark pessimism in these films draws attention to the loathing many have 
for the mainland Chinese migrants, the ethnic cousins of the Singaporean-Chinese majority.   
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Migrant Loathing:  The Mainland Chinese Dilemma 
Ah Gu’s relationship with his mainland Chinese wife, Lily, depicts a widespread phenomenon 
regarding Singaporean attitudes towards mainlanders.  Singaporeans appear to loathe 
mainlanders, even though Singaporean-Chinese make up three quarters of the local 
population and Singapore officially celebrates its Chinese migrant history and validates 
Chinese culture.  The depiction of the unhappy marital union between Ah Gu and Lily, and 
the presentation of Lily as a vindictively selfish and incredibly sad person highlights a certain 
dilemma taking place in Singapore.  This dilemma sees Singaporeans – including the ethnic 
Singaporean-Chinese – practise a kind of loathing towards more recent mainland Chinese 
migrants who reside in the city. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Still of Ah Gu and Lily in a scene from 12 Storeys.  From DVD version of the 
film (Zhao Wei Films and Scorpio East Entertainment 2005). 
 
 
Ah Gu and Lily are in a loveless and unhappy marriage.  They often have fights with each 
other and it is implied that she is seeing other men.  This is because both Ah Gu and Lily got 
married under false pretences.  Before the events in 12 Storeys, we learn that Ah Gu went to 
China specifically to find his perfect bride, only to discover her later to be materialistic, 
disrespectful, unfaithful, rude, insolent and vain.  It is no coincidence that these are some of 
the adjectives Singaporeans heap onto Chinese-born brides.  At the same time, Ah Gu’s wife 
admits that she only married him because he fooled her into thinking that he was a wealthy 
businessman.  She feels cheated that he lied to her and that their life together is not really 
what she had expected.  Meanwhile Ah Gu’s friends tell him that his wife, like other women 
from other regional nations who marry Singaporean men, is only interested in permanent 
residence.  Even when Ah Gu and his wife seem to patch things up, his friends are convinced 
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that once she gains permanent residence she will leave him.  Ah Gu’s wife, in other words, is 
the film’s femme fatal. 
 
The femme fatale in film is characterized as motivated by money and power on the surface 
while maintaining a heart of pure evil (Mordden 1988).  While we can read Lily as being a 
kind femme fatale, she is perhaps not that diabolical.  Lily may have only married Ah Gu for 
his perceived wealth but this was in order to make a better life for herself.  The femme fatale 
is also theorized as an ‘implacable maneater’ who brings ruin not only to the lives of her 
lovers but to their dependents as well (Mordden 1988: 7).  In 12 Storeys, Ah Gu suffers at the 
hands of his wife through her relentless nagging and promiscuity.  She also withholds sex 
from him and denies him what he wants most – children.  In order to make her happy, he 
gives into her demands, such as getting rid of his parents by sending them to an old age home 
so that she does not have to deal with them.  Representing the female mainlander as a woman 
who feeds off all that Singapore has to offer is a narrative which Singaporean audiences can 
relate to.  
 
There is local anxiety about mainland Chinese people migrating to Singapore for various 
reasons such as for work, study and marriage.  Even though most Singaporeans are ethnic 
Chinese or of ethnic Chinese descent, they seem to be suspicious of Chinese people.  
Singaporeans, regardless of racial or ethnic background, express views both privately and 
publicly (such as on online blogs, through social media and in forum pages in news dailies) to 
the effect that mainlanders are not only vulgar, but are pariahs who cause social and economic 
chaos in Singapore society.7  
 
Singaporeans cannot seem to identify with mainlanders, often viewing them with suspicion 
and paranoia.  Mainland Chinese migrants started prominently entering Singapore in the 
1990s as ‘mail-order brides’, unskilled labourers and increasingly as skilled workers.  Chinese 
women particularly have been perceived as gold-diggers with the intent of preying on 
vulnerable and lonely Singapore men (Seah 2006).  Mainland Chinese women are viewed as 
‘black widows’ who entrap Singaporean men for their money and property, running away or 
murdering them once grabbing hold of their newfound fortunes.  The perception that 
Singaporean men act foolishly and are being brought to ruin by their Chinese-born brides is 
quite blatantly depicted in the Ah Gu-Lily relationship in 12 Storeys.  
 
Everyday Singaporeans also complain that the mainlanders are not consciously integrating 
into Singapore society; interestingly because of language.  Singaporeans are concerned that 
mainlanders are refusing to speak English, the common language amongst Chinese, Malay, 
Indian and Eurasian Singaporeans, if posts and comments in political Facebook pages such as 
‘The Temasek Review’ (https://www.facebook.com/pages/The-Temasek-
Review/190806675782) are anything to go by.  For instance in a dialogue between young 
Singaporeans and the government in reaction to the Prime Minister’s 2010 National Day 
Rally speech, grievances about mainlanders took precedence.  Young Singaporeans 
complained about the issue of migrant integration while encouraging government 
representatives (ministers involved with youth and community development) to reassure them 
that Singaporeans come first and foremost over these new migrants who are commonly 
referred to as ‘foreigners’.   
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Singaporeans also accuse the mainland Chinese of taking away jobs from Singaporeans, even 
though they are primarily employed as bar hostesses in the case of women and as construction 
labourers in the case of men.  This dislike of Chinese people is part of a general fear and 
suspicion Singaporeans have of both skilled and unskilled migrant workers (Velayutham 
2009) – issues which I will discuss in the following chapters.  Singapore government leaders, 
however, have attempted to quell the tensions between Singaporeans and foreign workers, 
particularly those who are granted permanent residence (C.T. Goh 2008).   
 
With China’s burgeoning industrial revolution an increasing number of individuals have 
become millionaires almost overnight.  Entering Singapore with their new money, these 
nouveau-riche mainlanders have been buying up property and injecting Chinese money into 
the Singapore economy (Property Wire 2011).  However, Singaporeans have expressed 
discontent online where they consider their presence and money, particularly in the property 
scene, as unwelcome due to the resultant increase in house prices which makes home 
ownership for Singaporeans an even more expensive activity.  The Singapore government, 
however, considers the rich or educated mainlanders as ‘foreign talent’ who contribute 
positively to the Singaporean economy by frequently telling Singaporeans through ministerial 
speeches and interviews of their significance and importance in the nation-state.  Foreign 
talent individuals also take up professional positions in Singapore, which again angers 
Singaporeans who believe they are being denied this employment themselves.  A private 
organization called Transitioning.Org (www.transitioning.org) was formed by Singaporean 
Gilbert Goh in 2011 to specifically help unemployed Singaporeans who lost their jobs to 
foreigners.  Anecdotally, Singaporeans view the government’s motives with suspicion and 
resentment.  Singaporeans strongly suspect that the ruling PAP is creating a ‘new’ electorate 
of mainlanders who will replace the disgruntled Singaporean public and continue voting the 
PAP into power. 
 
While mainlanders are increasingly taking up citizenship, many Singaporeans do not consider 
them fellow citizens even though there have been some high-profile new mainlander 
permanent residents and citizens.  Internationally renowned actress Gong Li and popular 
Hollywood-Hong Kong action star Jet Li are now Singapore citizens.  The government also 
fast-tracked the permanent resident applications of a number of Chinese table tennis stars so 
that they could represent Singapore at the 2008 Beijing Olympics.  The plan paid off, with 
Feng Tianwei, Li Jiawei and Wang Yuegu winning the silver as part of the women’s table 
tennis team.  However, rather than being proud of Singapore’s accomplishment – since this 
was Singapore’s first medal after Tan Howe Liang won the silver for weightlifting in 1960 – 
many Singaporeans were highly critical of the Chinese players, as they felt they were not 
‘true’ Singaporeans and that the Singapore government ‘paid’ for the medals.  Singaporeans 
also expressed in online forums such as ‘The Temasek Review’ Facebook Page, the flaw in 
the plan: the players did not win the gold (e.g. https://www.facebook.com/pages/The-
Temasek-Review/190806675782).  Similar dissonance was reflected by some Singaporeans 
online during the 2012 London Olympics when Feng won a bronze for women’s table tennis 
(individual) while Feng, Li and Wang won the bronze for the women’s table tennis team 
event.  
 
It is not only the presence of mainland Chinese migrants that aggravates the locals.  
Singaporeans currently use online platforms to air their grievances about the influx of new 
migrants coming into the country as skilled workers.  Often becoming permanent residents – 
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a status which precisely seems to annoy Singaporeans – these new migrants have become the 
subject of online xenophobic comments. 
  
 
Xenophobia Online: Local Dislike for Foreign Talent 
Everyday Singaporeans, who heavily utilise online technology and identify themselves as 
netizens (Singaporeans who take to the internet to make commentary), make use of online 
forums to air their grievances with doing it non-anonymously.  The forums in online sites 
such as the news site Asiaone.Com (http://www.asiaone.com/A1Home/A1Home.html) and 
popular political sites The Online Citizen: A Community of Singaporeans 
(http://theonlinecitizen.com/), Sam’s Alfresco Haven: Celebrating Singapore’s Golden 
Period! (www.sammyboy.com) and TR Emeritus: The Voice of Singaporeans for Singapore 
(http://www.tremeritus.com/) formerly known as The Temasek Review are well used by 
contributors and readers alike.  Singaporeans use online platforms to express their discomfort 
with the rapid transformations they see happening around them, much of which is attributed 
to Singapore’s status as a global-city state.  These transformations include physical 
amendments in the landscape, ethnographic shifts in the population and an explosion of 
‘foreign’ cultural practices.   
 
Appendix 1, which I will be referring to in this chapter, provides a small sample of the anger, 
tension and disillusionment Singaporeans express online in response to opinion pieces, 
commentaries and reports that directly refer to foreign talent migrants in terms of the 
ethnographic/societal/cultural changes Singapore encounters as a direct result of their 
presence in the country and their loyalty to their adopted country as well as to the economic 
situation of Singaporeans.  The posts are responses to opinion pieces taken from The TR 
Emeritus and The Online Citizen.  The article in The TR Emeritus written by ‘Grey Hippo’ is 
titled ‘400000 expats in Singapore living the best of both worlds’ appeared on 29 May 2011 
while Jen writes a piece called ‘Love Singapore, Our Home’ which appeared on 2 May 2012.   
 
Two themes are overtly present in the sample of comments: they are xenophobic and incite 
hatred towards foreign talent migrants, and they express seething rage and disappointment at 
a government Singaporeans believe has abandoned them in favour of these new émigrés.  
 
 
Xenophobia Online and Everyday Racisms 
Clearly, the posts in Appendix 1 are highly xenophobic with netizens using derogatory terms 
to describe foreign talent migrants such as ‘foreign trash’( e.g. Nation of Idiots, May 20, 2011 
and polishapple, 3 May 2012) while accusing them of polluting the environment and of 
practicing bad hygiene (e.g. ‘They stink and smell’ by Nation of Idiots, May 20, ‘The pungent 
smell of North India is pervading in Singapore’ by Belinda Goh,, May 29, 2011 and ‘You 
people are very filthy and very unhygenic. You bastards shit and urinate every where and any 
where you like’ by Raymond Tan, May 20, 2011).   
 
The comments also incite hatred through a fear of self-livelihood.  Singaporeans here blame 
foreign talent migrants of destroying the country by bringing about ‘economic genocide’ and 
that ‘citizens have no work and will go hungry!!!’ (Delay Tactic, May 20, 2011).  They 
further accuse new migrants of not being loyal to Singapore and predict that they will 
abandon the country once they become wealthy and successful.  As fair fare 3 May 2012 
laments: ‘i loathe to say this but i do not wish to see our country which we all,true 
lions,love,become filled with ft/pr/new citizesn whose only true love for this dearly beloed 
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country we all help to build is only the MONEY they could harness for themselves at our 
expense’. 
 
Singaporeans make such xenophobic comments despite the very strict laws in Singapore 
regarding racial vilification.  This is perhaps because Singaporeans do not consider the 
foreign talent migrants as fellow residents even though they may take up permanent residency 
or citizenship.  Singaporeans instead consider ‘True Singaporeans’ – a term commonly used 
by netizens online – describes those who can trace their lineage to migrants who came to 
Singapore when it was still a colony of the British (1819-1963).8   
 
While Singapore has strict laws to prevent open communal conflict from taking place, this 
has not stopped Singaporeans from taking to the internet to air their frustrations; something 
which the government has allowed to take place without penalty.  Moreover, Singaporean 
internet laws do not converge with the penal code.  Minister for Information, Communication 
and the Arts Dr Yaacob Ibrahim has asked parliament to consider the need for tighter laws 
regarding racial vilification online.  For now, however, Dr Yaacob has requested netizens use 
common sense when discussing and criticising people from different ethnicities, whether they 
are Singaporean or not (Chew 2008).  In lieu of laws governing racial vilification online, the 
government has instead elected to educate Singaporeans of the importance of integration with 
new migrants through the Civics and Moral Education program – a curriculum that runs from 
primary school to post-secondary education.  Singaporean Ministers have also been 
communicating the significance of foreign talent migrants to the local economy through 
official speeches.  Such speeches, though, have not been well received by Singaporeans who 
have unsurprisingly taken to online platforms to disagree with their government leaders.  An 
example of this can be seen in Howard Lee’s (2010) opinion piece in The Online Citizen on 
Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s 2010 National Day Rally and the resultant 75 responses to 
it.  The strong ethnic tensions Singaporeans feel towards the new migrants however, are 
surprising.  Anxiety over the ‘ethnic other’, in other words, has been in existence in Singapore 
long before the presence of new foreign talent migrants. 
 
Singapore considers itself a multicultural nation as it is made up primarily of Indian, Malay 
and Chinese diasporic communities together with other minority ethnic communities such as 
the Eurasians, Arabs and Armenians.  Multiculturalism in Singapore, as Barr & Zkrbiš (2008) 
and Velayutham (2009, 255-273) argue however, is steeped in racism primarily rooted in the 
dominance of the ethnic Chinese in politics, economy, culture and society.  Barr & Zkrbiš, for 
example, suggest that Singapore has a well-defined hierarchical society that is created not on 
meritocracy, as claimed by the Singapore government, but through a well-oiled education 
system that favours and maintains an English-educated but ethnic Chinese elite over and 
above other racial groups.  However, they also point out that while there may be some tension 
and minor resistance over the status of the elite in Singapore, particularly by ethnic Malays 
who are indigenous to the region, Singaporeans generally accept and support the maintenance 
of this hierarchical situation as they do the government.  Velayutham’s critique suggests that 
in Singapore’s multicultural society, racism is practiced on a daily basis right at the grassroots 
level. While his case study is primarily focused on everyday racism towards ethnic Indians in 
Singapore, Velayutham also points out that racism is not solely directed from ethnic Chinese 
to the ethnic minorities (Malays and Indians, for example) but also takes  place between the 





Government at Fault 
Singaporeans have been criticising the PAP government in the private space amongst friends, 
family members, colleagues and neighbours for decade with discussions often revolving 
around unpopular PAP policies which many feel have contributed to the rising costs of living 
and rapid changes in the urban and ethnographic landscape.  Ironically these policies mostly 
are in aid of Singapore’s accomplished quest for global-city status.  Singaporeans in recent 
years have taken to social media as a new platform to express their frustrations, anxieties and 
hurt at the PAP government.  Singaporeans who once hid under the covers of self-censorship 
in the public space by not openly critiquing the PAP for fear of arrest and detention under the 
Internal Security Act for questioning Singaporean leadership, are now expressing their 
displeasure for the government openly online and through social media.  There is thus 
arguably a culture of complaint in Singapore, most of the time directed towards the 
government, its ministers and its policies as Singapore develops further as a modern global 
city.   
 
Singaporeans, while living in a free market capitalist economy, are now questioning the 
government in terms of what they consider is the unequal distribution of wealth.  They 
believe that years of hard work and self-sacrifice dictated by the Singapore Shared Values 
(see Appendix 2) has not resulted in the fruits of their labour.  Anecdotally they suspect that 
this wealth has been held not by industrialists or private business operators but by the PAP 
government leaders (Members of Parliament and Cabinet Ministers) because of their 
exceptionally high salaries.  The Prime Minister’s salary in 2007, for example, was SGD $3.1 
million which was about five times more than the annual salary of the President of the United 
States of America (Ho 2007).  While the PAP has often justified the high salaries of its 
leaders as a form of anti-corruption and the carrot to attract high caliber people into politics 
and government, Singaporeans feel that meritocracy in the political realm does not exist.  
Instead, Singaporeans explicitly state online and anecdotally that the PAP often appoint and 
anoint future elected Members of Parliament who are pro-PAP and have little to do with 
ordinary Singaporeans.   
 
Much of the recent Singaporean angst for the government, as this chapter puts forward, is 
expressed through xenophobic sentiments towards the presence of foreign migrants.  
Singaporeans fear the perceived impact the migrant presence has on the financial status and 
quality of life of natural born ‘True Singaporean’ citizens.  The new migrants, in other words, 
have become an emotive and nationalist proxy for Singaporeans to express their dislike and 
distaste for the government and its policies. 
 
Singaporeans convincingly express feelings of abandonment (see posts under ‘Loyalty to 
Nation’ in particular) and distance from Singapore.  Even though they are ‘native’ Singapore 
citizens (e.g. F.T.govt, May 29, 2011), they feel ‘mistreated in our own ‘home’’ (Lions 2 May 
2012) by both the government as well as the country.  As I will explain later in this chapter, 
Singaporeans have learnt to associate the PAP with Singapore in most part because of 
government initiated projects meant to instill nationalism in citizens.  Singaporeans also 
complain that they are unable to recognise or identify with Singapore (e.g. Homeless, 3 May, 
2012).  The increasing numbers of foreign talent migrants have also led Singaporeans to 
question the government’s loyalty to its citizens.  Here the posts unashamedly accuse the 
government of favouring foreign migrants over locals since the PAP ‘has sold our children's 
future away to foreigners’ (Homeless, 3 May, 2012).  Whether real or imagined, tensions 
between Singapore-born citizens and foreign talent migrants are brimming.   
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Singaporeans make use of the foreign talent presence to blame the government for the 
economic issues they face.  For instance, writing on 29 May 2011, Dealay Tactic directly 
links the presence of foreign talent migrants with the economic issues concerning 
Singaporeans when they state: ‘The employment, housing, healthcare and even ministerial 
pay issues have the FTs as a major factor for their existence.  For example, FTs drive up the 
GDP artificially, increasing ministerial bonus but not benefitting the ordinary Singaporean’.  
Likewise for Libran who takes the economic issues affecting Singaporeans one step further 
when they note that the foreign talent presence affects not only Singaporeans today but 
Singaporeans of tomorrow.  Writing on 2 May 2012 Libran observes:  
 
Singaporeans may not realise it now, but the PAP govt. has sold our children's 
future away to foreigners. All the ‘prosperity’ we thought we had were bought 
by 1) selling a large chunk of Singapore to foreigners, 2) by enslaving our 
young with 30-year mortgage loans, and 3) by flooding the small country with 
millions of foreigners. In a small country where we have to jostle with 
foreigners for everthing from publuc housing to transportation to health care to 
education to jobs, what pride can we feel? While our PAP politicians enrich 
themselves with millions while we slave for peanuts? 
 
The cause of the Singaporean woes, in other words, seems to be the government and its 
policies.  The xenophobia Singaporeans express has become the issue which Singaporeans 
latch on to communicate their frustration with the PAP and the decisions it has made that 




This chapter begins the discussion of Singaporean anxieties towards new migrants by 
featuring Eric Khoo’s 12 Storeys’ depiction of the unhappy marriage between a Singaporean 
and his China-born bride.  By analyzing the relationship between these two characters as a 
metaphor for possible reasons as to the Singaporean angst towards Chinese mainlander 
migrants, this chapter provides an illustration of how film is able to capture the dissatisfaction 
brewing in Singapore with the entry of new migrants.  Even though 12 Storeys was released 
in 1997, the film effectively foretells current anxieties Singaporeans have not only with 
Chinese mainlanders but other new migrants who enter Singapore particularly as skilled 
workers known as foreign talent. 
 
Before the entry of foreign talent migrants and sometime in the early 1980s, Singapore 
became host to indentured unskilled workers who hold positions as foreign domestic workers 
and as labourers on construction sites.  Since the 1990s and rapidly through the 2000s, there 
have also been growing numbers of migrant professionals living and working in Singapore 
that have created anxiety amongst Singaporeans; known as ‘foreign talent’ these white-collar 
migrant workers are either on working visas or are permanent residents.  Predominantly from 
India, mainland China and the Philippines, with others coming from Australia, the UK and 
the US, these two groups of migrants have become the unlikely glue that has bound 
Singapore-born Singaporeans together.  Where there was once a lack of communal 
integration amongst Singaporeans, this has been put aside in favour of unity through open 
displeasure towards guest workers and new permanent professional migrants – expressed in 
the public space in online forums. Such ethnographic transformations and societal responses 
pose new challenges for Singapore cinema, and in some ways it has been responding to these 
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changes.  The new and changing ethnographic landscape seems to be a far more comfortable 
subject for Singapore cinema to deal with than the subject of more established Singapore-






Maid in Singapore: Representing and Consuming Foreign Domestic Workers in 
Singaporean Cinema ∗ 
 
In 2005, a Singapore horror film narrating the alienation, confusion and fear faced by 
foreign domestic workers (FDWs) in the island state was released to a more than 
favourable local reception.  The Maid, by Kelvin Tong – filmed in the English, Teochew, 
Mandarin and Tagalog languages – became a local box office success, earning 
SGD$700,000 in its opening weekend.  Made on a shoestring budget of just SGD$1.5 
million, The Maid also won the Asian Award at the 2006 European Fantastic Films 
Festival Federation for genre and storyline, with the jury also noting that The Maid 
provided ‘a social comment on the issue of foreign labour’ (Tong 2008).1  However, 
critics of the English-language newsprint dailies and popular entertainment magazines in 
Singapore chose not to respond to the film’s social commentary on the difficult 
conditions faced by thousands of FDWs in Singapore.  Instead, they wrote extensively on 
the horror genre and the need for more Singapore-made films for a hungry local audience.  
These reviewers included film writers contributing to Singapore’s flagship English-
language daily The Straits Times (e.g. Loh 2005a: n.p. and 2005b: n.p.), tabloids The New 
Paper (Anon 2005:17) and TODAY (Tan 2005: n.p.), and weekly entertainment magazine 
8 DAYS (Wee 2005: n.p.).  The lack of engagement with the FDW character and the 
issues surrounding her employment and well-being could be read to reveal prejudicial 
attitudes around ethnicity and class that in turn exemplify the attitudes of Singaporean 
employers and the Singapore government.   
 
As I have mentioned frequently in this book, Singapore art often functions as an allegory 
for the nation.  Singapore cinema often looks at the social issues stemming from 
Singapore’s transnational position between Western economy and Eastern traditions 
(Marchetti 2005a).  It is this transitional position that creates a bipolar effect where there 
is economic progress on the one hand, yet disenfranchisement of the disadvantaged, such 
as the poor and aged, on the other hand.  Films by Eric Khoo – Shier Lou/12 Storeys 
(1997) – and Tan Pin Pin’s trilogy of documentaries in particular highlight the plight of 
disenfranchised Singaporeans.  The disenfranchised foreigner is also a figure highlighted 
in the Singapore art scene (Marchetti 2005a: 330).   
 
The Tales of Three Marias – which made its debut in a Filipino restaurant in Singapore 
in 2007 – is a groundbreaking play based on the real-life experiences of Filipino FDWs, 
told in a three-part monologue in Tagalog.  In June 2008, the play was staged at a 
theatre with proceeds going to the Filipino social justice charity Gawad Kalinga.  
Written, directed and produced by Singapore-based Filipino actor Jay Españo, after 
extensive interviews with FDWs in Singapore, the play featured real Filipino domestic 
workers in the roles, which included Maria Soledad Padua (Doreen Dangca) an abused 
maid who kills her employer, veteran maid and single mother Maria Dolores Dimarucut 
(Nenite de Torres) who questions her ethnic and national identities as she wonders if she 
is a Filipino or an adopted Singaporean, and Maria Corazon Parungao (Rosa Sarador) 
who aspires to migrate to the United States.  Through the three Marias, the play reflects 
on the complex issues of transient migration in Singapore, such as cross-cultural 
miscommunication, class hierarchy, racism, human rights violations, victimization, 
91 
identities of self complicated by space and place, displacement and globalization. 
Singapore itself is featured as the unseen yet omnipresent specter that affects the women 
profoundly, both professionally and personally.   
 
While The Tales of Three Marias documents experiences of a community which is not 
racially, ethnically and culturally similar to any of the other major groups in multiracial 
Singapore, some of the play’s themes run parallel to the experiences early transients and 
settlers faced at the hands of colonists in Singapore, such as racism and class hierarchy.  
Likewise, other themes connected to identity are similar to those experienced by 
Singaporean citizens; Singaporeans are themselves mostly descendants of settlers from 
the region or themselves first-generation migrants who settled prior to Singapore’s 
independence in 1965.  The Singaporean arts scene, the media and online communities 
often attempt to make sense of national and cultural identities.   
 
The play is perhaps an authentic representation of the Filipino domestic worker since it 
documents the cross-cultural experiences of real maids in Singapore. However, its 
accessibility was limited by its language-barrier and a limited number of performances.  
Although the play was well received critically and within the Filipino community in 
Singapore, with plans to take it to the Philippines, to date it has only had two public 
performances.   
 
Not limited to local theatre, FDWs are also present in Singapore films such as Gone 
Shopping (L. L. Wee 2007) and Mei Man Ren Sheng/Singapore Dreaming (Goh & Woo 
2006).  Unlike the Filipino-centred and community-authored maid experiences depicted 
in The Tales of Three Marias, FDWs in many of these films are minor fringe characters 
who support the principal characters.  In Gone Shopping, the domestic worker is a 
young Indonesian FDW in the employment of a wealthy and unpleasant woman (Selena 
Tan), whose privileged position is enhanced by her maid’s presence.  However, in 
Singapore Dreaming the domestic worker Pinky (Mariel Reyes), although a minor 
character, does have a stronger presence in the film.  She is a pleasant and obedient 
Filipino maid who loses her temper when accused of theft by Mrs Mei Teo (Yeo Yann 
Yann), the principal character in the film.  Defending herself, Pinky shows her disgust at 
her employer Mrs Teo and spits at her after being vindicated of the crime.  Pinky’s 
reaction plays a pivotal role in the film, leading Mrs Teo on a journey of self-discovery 
and self-frustration.  Both these films portray foreign maids as minor characters, thus 
successfully replicating the secondary position of FDWs in Singapore society.  They 
also reveal that FDWs are an accessible commodity for the wealthy (Gone Shopping) 
and even the lower working classes (Singapore Dreaming).  The Maid, however, is the 
first and only locally made production to date to feature a domestic worker as its 
protagonist.   
 
The Maid narrates the story of Rosa Dimaano (Alessandra de Rosi), an 18-year-old 
Filipino girl who enters Singapore for the first time as a domestic worker in the service 
of Mr and Mrs Teo, a local middle-aged couple (Chen Shucheng and Hong Hui Fang) 
and their autistic adult son Ah Soon (Benny Soh).  The day that she arrives marks the 
first day of the Yu Lan Festival, popularly known as the Hungry Ghost Festival and the 
Chinese Seventh Month Festival.  The Hungry Ghost Festival is a month-long Chinese 
pagan festival dedicated to the worship of the dead.  It is during this yearly festival that 
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the gates of hell are believed to be flung open and the dead walk amongst the living.  To 
appease the dead and therefore discourage them from harming the living, and thus 
provide the assurance of peace and prosperity, believers nourish the ghosts by leaving 
food for them on the street, giving them offerings by regularly burning fake notes in 
barrels and entertaining them by staging open-air live Chinese opera shows.2  Mr and 
Mrs Teo are heavily involved in the Hungry Ghost Festival festivities as they are 
Chinese street opera performers.  They are everyday Singaporeans (the Everyman) who 
place traditional practices of culture, particularly worshiping the dead, as priority – not 
unlike the people featured in Tan Pin Pin’s work discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
Rosa initially gets along well with the Teos.  They treat her well and Rosa develops a 
genuine affection for Ah Soon.  However, Rosa is continually haunted by the presence 
of a multitude of ghosts after breaking several taboos relating to the Hungry Ghost 
Festival.  These include verbalizing the word ‘ghost’, sweeping away the ash from burnt 
offerings and sitting in the front row of a Chinese street opera performance, normally 
reserved for supernatural audiences.  One of the ghosts whom Rosa encounters is the 
Teos’ former Filipino maid Esther Santos.  Esther was killed exactly a year earlier by 
Mr and Mrs Teo to prevent her from reporting her rape at the hands of Ah Soon.  In a 
dramatic twist towards the end of the film, Rosa discovers that Ah Soon killed himself 
soon after finding out about Esther’s death.  Ah Soon is an apparition that only appears 
to Rosa and the Teos.  The Teos attempt to kill Rosa in order for her to marry Ah Soon 
in death.  It is Ah Soon’s ghost who saves Rosa and this results in the deaths of Mr and 
Mrs Teo.  In the film’s final moments, Rosa is dropped off at the airport where she is 
about to leave for the Philippines, coincidentally on the final day of the Hungry Ghost 
Festival.  She takes with her Esther’s remains, which she discovered earlier stuffed in a 
barrel at the Teos.  The film ends with the Rosa entering the airport and the reflection of 
the ghosts of the dead Teos on the sliding glass doors.   
 
Film-maker Kelvin Tong states in interviews (e.g. in Wee 25 August 2004: n.p.) that the 
purpose of the narrative in The Maid is to represent the plight of domestic workers in 
Singapore.  His use of the horror genre can be interpreted as representing the ‘horror’ of 
alienation and unexpected dangers faced by FDWs upon entering an unfamiliar country 
with unfamiliar languages, and a seemingly macabre culture that publicly worships the 
dead.  As a signifier of FDWs in Singapore, Rosa is an Other, as her foreignness is 
emphasized through nationality, ethnicity, culture and language.  As a FDW, a foreign Other, her residential status and rights are limited.  The only way she is offered to 
blend in with the cultural landscape is through a combined process of a ritualistic (and 
illegal) marriage and (unlawful) death.  Marriage to FDWs in Singapore, as I point out 
later in this chapter, is illegal.  With marriage, her Filipino identity would be erased, as 
she will have to take on the family name of her husband.  In death, her foreign identity 
would be completely erased, as she would not be a living reminder of her Filipino 
heritage.  Perhaps this could explain why at the end of the film Rosa returns to the 
Philippines with the remains of the murdered Esther.  Perhaps death alone does not 
make the transformation from foreign to local complete.  
 
On one level, The Maid can be read as tempering the FDW experience in Singapore 
when compared to the play The Tales of Three Marias.  While her employers turn out to 
be the villains, their actions are not based on typical master-servant hierarchies.  
Throughout the film, the Teos treat Rosa as they would their own daughter.  While 
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macabre, they see her as the ideal candidate to make their son happy in death, while 
fulfilling their own desire to see him married.  Rosa, however, is not the victim of overt 
racial or class prejudices.  The Maid’s presentation of Rosa’s domestic worker status in 
Singapore, in other words, does not parallel the experiences of FDWs in Singapore, 
although the horror element can function as a metaphor for these experiences.  On 
another level, The Maid can well be read as a metaphor for FDWs.  Here the Teos’ 
attempt to simply take over Rosa's will and marry her can be seen as representative of 
the experiences of FDWs in terms of their employers using their existence to their own 
ends, without consideration for their desires 
 
Although Tong highlighted the plight of domestic workers in Singapore, the critical 
audience all but ignored the subject of foreign domestic service.  Instead, reviewers in 
the local press chose to comment on the production quality of The Maid, Tong’s film 
credentials and the popularity of local cinema amongst Singaporean audiences.  Sherwin 
Loh (2005a and 2005b) and Ong Sor Fern (2005) of The Straits Times both commented 
on the contributions made by The Maid as a product of the home-grown entertainment 
industry in their reviews of the film.  Jeanine Tan (2005) of TODAY examined The 
Maid’s potential as a Hollywood remake and the promotion of Singapore’s film industry 
to the international market in her report entitled ‘Brad Pitt Eyes The Maid’.  The local 
film industry also commented on Tong’s film-making career, in articles in The New 
Paper (2005) and by Tommy Wee of 8 Days (2005).  The central theme explored by all 
these writers, however, was limited to their discussion of the Hungry Ghost Festival as 
the driving force of the film’s horror element.   
 
Like the wider audience, the film writer recognizes signs and symbols, codes and 
conventions in a film.  However, the critic’s job is to make social comment on films in 
the public domain.  Martin Barker and Thomas Austin (2000) write that a film critic is a 
person ‘who can place a film in a tradition for you, who will tell you about the director, 
the cinematography, the special effects’.  Besides analyzing films, the film critic, they 
continue, ‘will point you to continuities, and offer a sense of the significance of a 
particular film’ (Barker & Austin 2000: 1).  Dugald Williamson (1989) further defines 
the critic as a person who ‘performs a certain kind of work on the text, spelling out 
thematic, narrative, characterological or stylistic patterns, and then treats these as 
manifestations of some prior creative purpose’ (1989: 46).  Williamson also notes that 
the ‘effects of meaning produced by using particular techniques of reading and writing 
are retroactively attributed to an individual origin: this is how author criticism generates 
textual evidence for the idea of individual vision’ (1989: 46).  In his interpretation of the 
relationship between critic and text, he goes on to explain that the critic’s role is to ‘tell 
a secret about the artwork, to tease out what the latter does not say for itself, yet to 
preserve and pore over the precise form of the original words or images which is seen as 
fraught with meaning’ (1989: 47).  Williamson points out that the critic can also say 
something new about the work. 
 
Critics thus are attracted to the film’s place in Singapore’s burgeoning film industry, and 
the possible reason for local reviewers’ interest in examining The Maid within the 
context of the Singapore film industry lies in the growing popularity of credible local 
productions that depict familiar aspects of Singapore culture and identity as well as the 
darker side of Singapore society which includes the (mis)treatment of migrant workers.  
Singaporean film-makers thus make use of local audience’s desire for local flavour in 
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their cinema.  In The Maid, the devices that allow local audiences to recognize and 
identify Singapore culture and identity take the form of the Hungry Ghost Festival and 
the street opera.   
 
In his extensive study on Chinese street opera, for example, Lee Tong Soon (2002) 
argues strongly that this form of performance contributes to Singapore’s national 
identity.  Chinese opera is a traditional form of entertainment whose importance in 
Chinese culture is traced back to the third century AD, and it is often performed 
amongst the Chinese diaspora in Mandarin or Cantonese.  Chinese opera heavily 
influenced the development of Chinese cinema in the early twentieth century but 
underwent a purging during the Cultural Revolution.   
 
While displays of culture were once considered either private or community concerns in 
the post-independence era, the 1980s witnessed the state beginning to place more 
emphasis on cultural heritage (T.S. Lee 2002: 150).  Explaining the state’s change of 
approach to community heritage, treating it now as a tenet of Singapore nationalism, Lee 
states: 
 
[T]he process of cultural nationalism intensified, which evoked issues of 
ethnic lineage, linguistic uniqueness, religious beliefs and fold traditions 
among other social practices to affirm a collective national identity.  Such 
a form of nationalism was deemed necessary to counter the perceived 
negative effects of Westernisation and rapid economic success that had 
characterised Singapore’s growth, such as materialistic orientation, 
consumerism, political liberalism and individualism, to name a few.  Art 
and cultural programs were instituted to salvage, invent and reinvent 
local cultures, reaffirm local values, construct a Singaporean and pan-
Asian identities, and to align Singapore with the ongoing processes of 
modernisation and globalisation.  In this way, Chinese street opera 
became an appropriate symbol for the cultural ideal of possessing a 
strong heritage in a rapidly modernising social space because it embodied 
the imagery of a rural, simple and rustic local tradition. (2002: 150)   
 
The Chinese street opera thus is a social phenomenon which ‘is probably the most 
representative local heritage in Singapore’ (T.S. Lee 2002: 141).  Chinese opera 
performances present more than just ‘artistic achievement but an indication of the state 
of cultural anxiety that has confronted (and continues to challenge) Singapore since its 
independence in 1965’ (T.S. Lee 2002: 140).  This ‘aesthetic framework’, Lee clarifies, 
‘structures the meanings and values of a Singaporean form of cultural nationalism in its 
pursuit of national and cosmopolitan identities’ (2002: 140).   
 
The local media’s lack of critical engagement with the film’s social commentary is 
representative of Singaporean attitudes towards FDWs.  While the FDW’s concerns are 
‘invisible’ to the Singaporean critical audience who watched the film, she is, ironically, 
a very visible demographic entity in Singapore.3  This is perhaps linked to her treatment 
by both Singaporean employers and the Singapore government.  Such treatment reveals 
certain prejudicial attitudes based on ethnicity and class that Singaporean society holds 
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The Foreign Domestic Worker in Singapore: Employer Dissatisfaction and 
Government Policies  
Singapore is a transnational and transitional space which attracts many temporary or 
transient migrants, particularly unskilled labourers and domestic servants.  The entrance 
of recent migrants, predominantly from other Asian nations, has been a cause for 
concern amongst Singaporean citizens who either settled in pre-independence Singapore 
or who trace their lineage back to settlers who arrived when the nation was still a British 
colony.  Discussions in online forums such as those on Asiaone.com (Small Press 
Holdings 2012) and entries in personal weblogs often raise the issue of foreigners in 
Singapore.  Towards the latter half of 2008, for example, the issuing of Singapore 
permanent residence to Chinese nationals who took part in the Beijing Olympics and the 
government’s plan to create dormitories for unskilled foreign labourers in an upper-
middle class neighbourhood became hot topics amongst netizens.  Many who aired their 
opinions on the issuing of permanent residence to the Chinese-born athletes took an anti-
foreign stance while crusading for a ‘pure’ Singapore society.  Those who commented 
on the housing of unskilled foreign workers debated the civil action the residents of the 
neighbourhood took to prevent this government initiative and the broader question of 
Singapore’s reliance on both unskilled and skilled foreign labour.  Post-independence 
migrants pose a kind of trauma for the citizenry, perhaps caused by Singapore’s uneven 
immigration policy trends which limited both temporary and migrant intake between 
1965 to the late 1970s.   
 
FDWs started entering Singapore in the early 1980s when the nation state turned to its 
regional neighbours for a steady supply of maids to take over the household duties of 
local women who were joining the workforce in increasing numbers.  These transient 
female migrants often came from developing Asian nations such as the Philippines and 
Indonesia, with growing numbers coming from Sri Lanka, Myanmar and elsewhere.  
Today, FDWs have become a common feature in Singaporean households, with one in 
eight families employing a migrant domestic worker (Ong 2006).  Current employment 
practices of FDWs in Singapore reveal certain social tensions between local employers 
and transient migrant workers (Ong 2006; Yeoh, Huang & Gonzalez 1999; Rahman 
2005; Kaur 2007; Ford & Piper 2006).  Often these social tensions are expressed 
through patronizing and negative comments by local employers.  Employers often 
engage in informal verbal discussions with each other airing their ‘problematic’ 
encounters with domestic help, or provide generalized observations on FDW work 
practices.  These comments reveal that the employment practices of FDWs at the hands 
of their employers are akin to neo-slavery, with scholarship in the area of transient 
migrant female workers supporting this observation (Ong 2006).   
 
Some Singaporeans have turned to virtual public forums and databases, forming online 
employer communities to air their grievances about FDWs, or to seek or provide advice 
on employment practices.  Often the Singaporean employers name the country of origin 
of the FDWs, therefore implying alleged links between perceived bad work practices 
and nationality.  Internet websites dedicated to employer concerns such as Maidlibrary 
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(n.d.) and Bad Maid Database (n.d.) unveil a disturbing yet consistent trend of disdain 
towards FDWs, highlighting tension in the employment practices of FDWs.4 Such 
practices draw attention to the curtailment of individual freedoms of FDWs, particularly 
highlighted through the surveillance of FDWs by employers and the practice of not 
according them local civil rights.  Posts on Maidlibrary and Bad Maid Database reveal 
that employers expect FDWs to be in constant service during waking hours, as breaks 
are interpreted negatively as laziness.  In addition, contributors to these forum sites 
require FDWs to behave within a certain master-servant framework, emphasizing 
subservience and obedience to employers.  Any deviation from this framework appears 
to enrage employers.  The contempt many Singaporean employers express for their 
FDWs occurs even as the Singapore government engages in an education campaign on 
the fair treatment of FDWs.  For example, the Ministry of Manpower publishes literature 
(print and online copies) for employers on the fair treatment of FDWs, such as the Your 
Guide for Employing a Foreign Domestic Worker (n.d.), in English, Mandarin, Malay 
and Tamil.   
 
 
Maidlibrary and Bad Maid Database 
Maidlibrary describes itself as a ‘business dedicated to maid and home-help related 
services … [which] seek[s] to provide a convenient channel for employers to browse 
and select maid biodata’ in its ‘about us’ section (http://www.maidlibrary.com.sg/).  
The website seems to have a dual purpose: functioning as an online search engine for 
FDWs and as a virtual community of Singaporean employers to air their grievances 
about their migrant domestic helpers under the heading ‘Community’.  The table below 
shows a breakdown of the threads and posts of each forum in ‘Community’.  The 
description of each subdivision is from the website, reproduced verbatim. 
 
 List of Forums Threads 
 
Posts Last Posts 
as of Jun 19 
2008 8:38 
am 
 ASSOCIATION    
A United Employers Voice 
This forum seeks to address pertinent issues 
in the interests of a united voice for maid 
employers in Singapore. 
45 398 Sept 21 2007 
1:45 pm 
B Employers, maids & M.O.M (Ministry of 
Manpower) 
What goes beyond fair domestic duties. 
Views to air with MOM on maid issues, 
levies and miscellaneous queries. Do post 
them here. 
44 428 Apr 4 2008 
7:17 am 
C Maid Agencies – Could be better  
A fully-moderated forum: posts would be 
assessed and may be edited for public 
display suitability.  
Your posts help the Association chart a 
future course of action in encouraging better 
maid agency practices whether by 
2 12 Apr 3 2006 
10:54 pm 
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mediation, or by making your feedback 
known to the agencies or other employers. 
We also welcome private posts meant for 
our filing and action instead of publishing. 
 GENERAL DISCUSSION    
D Latest Contributions 
Share anything. The good and the bad. Note: 
No posts requesting or recommending maid 
agencies are allowed. 
384 3617 Jun 14 2008 
11:50 am 
E Starting off, choosing a maid   
The basics and a touch of the finances 
involved. Broad categories in maid 
selection. 
84 828 Apr 4 2008 
9:29 pm 
F Baby & child  
Many start employing maids from this time. 
28 357 Jun 18 2008 
2:48 pm 
G Life with maid – adjustments, concerns, 
problems 
Undeniably most life-consuming, day-in and 
day-out. Realities to get acquainted with. 
63 807 Jun 16 2008 
11:12 am 
H Be fair to your maid but still in control  
What is fair to bestow to your maid? How 
much control should you rein? Calibrate it 
here with other employers. 
48 724 Apr 4 2008 
09:39  
I Wayward at home and out  
It takes two whether at home or not. 
19 319 Mar 30 2007 
01:04 pm 
J Blacklisted Maids 87 1158 Jun 13 2008 
1:40 pm 
Figure 5.1: List of forums under ‘Community’ on Maidlibrary 
(http://www.maidlibrary.com.sg/). 
 
The above table provides some insight into the discussion activities of users of 
Maidlibrary.  The list of forums is categorized into two groups: ‘association’ and 
‘general discussion’.  The association section deals with issues pertaining to — although 
not limited to — organizations in Singapore handling FDWs such as the Ministry of 
Manpower (MOM).  MOM is the government department that regulates FDW 
employment in Singapore and maid agencies.  While employment practices of FDWs 
are discussed under the general discussion section, such issues are also brought up under 
the association section.  The ‘Community’ has a variety of forums on specific aspects of 
FDW employment practices; with some of the initial posts taking place as early as 2000 
(B, D, E, F and H).  While some of the forums have been dormant at the time this 
chapter was written (A, C and I), others are still active (B, D, E, F, G, H and J).  Some of 
the forums experience more traffic (for example D, E and J) than others (for example C).  
As of 19 June 2008, there were 1787 registered users of the forums on Maidlibrary.  
Users who contribute to the forums have their identities concealed by pseudonyms.  
There are a few users, however, who seem to use their real names, but there is no way of 
verifying this.  All users in these forums appear mainly to be employers or potential 
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employers with a very limited number who claim to be potential FDWs looking for 
employment. 
 
The primary purpose of this forum seems to serve as a database for blacklisting maid 
agencies and maids.  Maidlibrary collects this data from the input of its registered users.  
The criteria for the listing of ‘bad’ maid agencies are: a) the recommendation of ‘bad’ 
maids and b) maid agencies’ refusal to exchange or provide refunds for ‘bad’ maids.  
Often, ‘bad’ maids in this forum are defined as ‘lazy workers’ who do not do as they are 
told by employers.  There are a few posts in ‘United Employers Voice’ within the site 
that advocate for an association of employers that protects the rights of employers 
against ‘bad’ maids and ‘bad’ maid agencies.   
 
Maidlibrary community forums also allow for discussions on migrant workers who 
behave well.  However, good behaviour primarily means quietly obeying their 
employers’ instructions to the letter.  Any resistance is punished through verbal 
reprimands or the withdrawal of certain privileges, often related to the use of mobile 
phones.  In other words, only when maids adhere to a master-servant hierarchy, will they 
then be considered ‘good’.  Most of the posts in the forum discuss employer difficulties 
with their FDWs, with some recurring themes.  These include accusations of FDWs 
allegedly lying to their employers, theft, laziness, gluttony, lack of personal hygiene and 
unkempt appearance, running away, child abuse, possessing mobile phones, socializing 
with other FDWs in the neighbourhood and clandestine relationships with (often migrant 
worker) men.  Some topics in these forums include: 
 
‘Tips on training a new maid’ 
‘Body Odour?’ 
‘Superstitions / Black Magic’ 
‘employer's woe’ 
‘stubborn or dont [sic] understand?’ 
‘Maid who tell lies’ 
‘Maid too forgetful or otherwise dont [sic] understand’ 
‘Maid using water heater’ 
‘Attitude maid’ 
‘maid sleeping topless’ 
 
Unless blacklisting their maids, employers using Maidlibrary as a forum do not refer to 
their FDWs by name.  Instead, they ‘otherise’ their employees often by referring to them 
as ‘girl’.  More of a concern in forum discussions, however, is the open practice and 
encouragement of the idea of FDWs as slaves without civil rights, to be constantly 
monitored by their employers.  The posts expose a desperate need to control the FDWs 
both professionally and personally, as employers complain about aspects of the personal 
lives of maids as affecting their professional service.   
 
FDWs have encountered tension with their host country’s citizens.  In her work on 
Filipino FDWs in 1990s Hong Kong, Nicole Constable (1997) points out that there were 
feelings of dislike for Filipino maids by Hong Kong inhabitants, particularly with regard 
99 
to their use of public space.  Constable provides the example of the weekly Sunday 
closures of Chater Road by the Hong Kong authorities so as to enable Filipinos to gather 
and enjoy their day off.  This act has generated widespread feelings of discontent among 
Hong Kong people, as they feel FDWs are accorded more rights than Hong Kong people 
themselves.  Feelings of dislike for FDWs in Singapore, however, can be interpreted as 
directly rather than indirectly aided by the government.  The Singapore government has 
very strict policies in place when it comes to managing its FDWs.   
 
FDWs are considered transient migrants in Singapore whose employment is determined 
by a special work permit visa, which is subject to renewal biannually by the Ministry of 
Manpower.  Work permit holders are not eligible for permanent residence.  They usually 
have their activities curtailed and are under surveillance.  For instance, FDWs have to 
undergo biannual sexual health and pregnancy checks.  Failing a sexual health check or 
testing positive for pregnancy, a , maid’s work permit is cancelled and they are 
repatriated within seven days.  FDWs are not allowed to marry Singapore citizens or 
permanent residents unless granted permission by the Controller of Work Passes.  
According to the First Schedule, Conditions of Work Permit, Part IV, in the 
Employment of Foreign Manpower Act (Chapter 91A), FDWs are also forbidden by law 
to ‘be involved in any illegal, immoral or undesirable activities, including breaking up 
families in Singapore’ (Ministry of Manpower 2008).  The Singapore government’s 
strict policies surrounding FDWs in many ways may serve to promote distrust of these 




When the Singapore film The Maid was released locally, the production generated a 
favourable response with audiences and reviewers who wrote for the English-language 
dailies.  While the film touched on the plight of FDWs in Singapore, the critical 
audience chooses to ignore the social issues surrounding domestic workers in Singapore.  
The lack of commentary in the Singapore media, however, can be read as revealing 
certain attitudes Singaporeans have towards FDWs, which are displayed openly in 
online forums patronized by Singaporean employers and which are confirmed by the 
government’s strict policies governing foreign domestic service.  The professional 
relationship between local employers in Singapore and their FDWs is a master-servant 
relationship which exposes the active existence of a complex class hierarchy with 
nationalist and racist overtones.  While Singapore is a multiracial society, the 
government has successfully put into place policies that unify its people under a 
nationalist umbrella which promotes allegiance to the state and national pride.  The 
government relies on imagining Singapore society and its government-sponsored 
achievements in a favourable light when compared to other nations and their 
achievements.  The result is a situation where transient migrants outside this racial and 
historical template are interpreted as posing a threat to Singapore’s present multiracial 
palate.  The openly expressed tensions that ostracize the FDW within ethnic and class-
based frameworks may well signify an overt form of local nationalism that imagines 
Singapore above its poorer Asian neighbours in capitalist lifestyle and development.   
 
The following and final chapter rounds up the discussion on ethnic difference and 
immigrant angst in Singapore by examining the power of the local vernacular Singapore 
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English (Singlish) as a form of resistance against an authoritarian government and its 
ability to unite people in this multicultural, multilingual and multiethnic society while at 






Singapore English, Singaporean Identity: Unity, Resistance and Empowerment  
 
When I worked in government service in Singapore, a colleague came up to me and 
asked: ‘Eh, why your England so powderful [sic], one?  Why you want to speak like 
dat?  I don’t understand your England, lah!’ My colleague was chastizing me for 
speaking in what he considered to be Queen’s English rather than Singlish (Singapore 
English).  Although my colleague and I got along well, he viewed speaking in ‘good 
English’ as putting on airs and thus not being part of everyday Singapore society.  
Moreover, he could not understand how my ‘England was so powderful’ since I am 
Singaporean born and bred.  My colleague was using language not only to find 
commonality with me but also to feel comfortable with me.  Singlish bound my 
colleague and myself together through a common language particularly since my 
colleague is an ethnic Chinese Singaporean who often conversed with her family, 
friends and other colleagues either in the Chinese dialect Hokkien or in Mandarin and I 
am a Singaporean Eurasian who was raised in an English-speaking household while 
studying Bahasa Malaysia (Malay language) at school.   
 
I have pointed out in earlier chapters that although Singapore takes pride in its brand of 
multiculturalism which primarily supports tolerance amongst the key ethnic (Chinese, 
Malay and Indian) groups in this nation-state, there are still tensions and anxieties that 
exist.  This of course is compounded by the presence of new skilled and unskilled 
migrants, the majority of whom hail from the countries Singaporeans trace their 
ancestral homes to such as China.  This chapter explores the power of Singlish to not 
only unite an ethnically disparate population together but also to empower them against 
this latest threat Singapore society understands it is facing.  By looking at the use of 
Singlish in Singapore films – a vernacular that dominates almost all productions 
considered to be in the English-language – this chapter analyses the significance and 
power of this vernacular in Singapore.   
 
Although the Singapore film industry is young compared to other prominent Asian 
cinemas in Hong Kong, India and China it has generated some very passionate 
scholarship.  Uhde & Uhde (2010) have done a fascinating and comprehensive study of 
the Singapore film industry with their encyclopedic volume on this cinema, while others 
such as Chua Beng Huat and Wei-Wei Yeo (2003), Olivia Khoo (2005), Kenneth Paul 
Tan (2008a, 2010, 2011), Tan See-Kam (2009) and Gina Marchetti (2005a, 2006) have 
recognized that Singaporean films should be read as significant artefacts that address 
and attempt to understand Singaporean identity.  At the same time, Singapore films also 
contribute to an understanding of the everyday culture in Singapore.  By recognizing the 
use of Singlish in locally made films, I acknowledge the significance of Singapore films 
as an accessible and vibrant document of collective cultural identity in Singapore 
society. 
 
There are not too many English-language films for mass distribution in Singapore 
theatres.1  Those that are, however, are not really in the English language – or at least, 
not in American or British English – but rather in the local dialect of Singlish.2  Singlish 
is the widely if not exclusively spoken form of English used by Singaporeans.  It is 
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perhaps the most identifiable Singaporean characteristic, which encourages and fosters 
an unofficial nationalist spirit and creates a sense of unity amongst disparate 
Singaporeans of across ethnic cultures.  This is because Singlish plays a significant part 
in Singaporean cultural identity and national solidarity (Chua & Yeo 2003; Lin & 
Martin 2005).  Singapore-made films tap into the powerful phenomenon that is Singlish.   
 
Local productions such as Army Daze (Ong 1996), Forever Fever (Goei 1998), One Leg 
Kicking (Koh 2001) and Talking Cock: The Movie (C. Goh 2002) rely heavily on 
Singlish to drive the humour in their narratives in order to become comedic 
masterpieces.  Serious dramas such as Mei Man Ren Sheng/Singapore Dreaming (Goh 
& Woo 2006) and Gone Shopping (L. L. Wee 2007), both of which portray an unhappy 
consumer-driven Singapore society, rely on Singlish as a hook for audiences to relate to 
the narrative and the characters.  Singlish makes believable the themes these films 
present.  The unbridled use of Singlish in Singapore films are not only welcomed but 
expected, since it mirrors local culture.  Singlish in cinematic productions serves to 
openly provide a public space to not only validate, but also enjoy an aspect of 
Singaporean identity that the authorities have unsuccessfully attempted to snuff out.  It 
is against this background of linguistic familiarity that this chapter unpacks some of the 
real or imagined anxieties Singaporeans are confronted with concerning the presence of 
new migrants by using Singapore films’ employment of Singlish as a springboard to 
discuss not merely the impact this version of English plays as part of Singaporean 
identity but to also take a look at the complicated relationship the Singaporean people 
have with the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) government.   
 
Singlish, arguably, functions as a unifying agent for Singaporeans who come from 
different ethnic and cultural walks of life.  It allows Singaporeans to identify with each 
other and to identify themselves as Singaporean.  Singlish however is more than just a 
tool for unity.  Rather it also serves as a form of resistance against an autocratic 
government since it is a powerful yet non-confrontational devise employed by the 
masses that has led to unique developments in Singaporean identity.  Singlish as I 
suggest in this chapter, has become a force that Singaporeans generally have used to 
cope with the unpopular government policy of allowing increasing numbers of new 
migrants to enter the nation-state because they are perceived to threaten Singapore 
society and its culture.  In particular, Singlish has been drawn upon to combat the 
perceived threat to lifestyle and job security brought about by increasingly large 
numbers of new permanent and temporary migrants (Chua 2003b:70).  Singlish thus 
provides Singaporeans with stability in transient Singapore while serving to express a 
communal identity independent of government.   
 
 
‘We Are All Sin-Gah-Pour-Reans’: Unity through Singlish 
English, Mandarin, Malay and Tamil are the official languages of Singapore although 
Chinese dialects such as Teowchew, Cantonese and Hainanese, and Indian languages 
such as Malayalam and Punjabi are also spoken.  It is perhaps the only Asian country 
where most of its citizens are able to converse at some level in English.  English is the 
language of choice in government and in the education system.  Since English is such a 
widely spoken language, many Singaporeans are arguably considered English educated.3  
In practice, Singaporeans who communicate in English really do so in Singlish.  Singlish 
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enables people to communicate and identify with each other through a common 
identifying code of practice.   
 
Singlish is a creolisation of the English language. Using British English as its base, 
Singlish is built around the various languages (e.g. Malay, Tamil and Bengali) and 
Chinese dialects (e.g. Hokkien, Teochew and Cantonese) of Singapore’s multi-ethnic 
population.4  The development of Singlish is not merely the borrowing of vocabulary 
but also of intonation.  Singlish is forever absorbing and evolving, particularly with the 
global influence of American English, and to a certain degree Australian English, 
through the importation of media products such as films, television shows and radio 
programmes.  In his entertaining work on the development of the English language in 
the aptly titled The Adventure of English: The Biography of a Language, Melvyn Bragg 
provides a brief history, summary and prognosis of Singlish as a force for unity, if not 
disruption, amongst citizens when he writes:   
 
English was used in Singapore for a hundred and fifty years and when it 
went independent in 1958 [sic 1959]. Singapore made it the official 
language of business and government, partly because English united the 
diverse population of Chinese, Malays and Indians and partly because of 
its commercial and financial importance.  But alongside official English 
you also hear Singlish, which grows and develops despite the efforts of 
the government to root it out.  Some scholars believe that Singlish 
indicates the way in which future Englishes will develop.  In so many 
ways it fits the tongues and the traditions and the vocal rhythms of the 
people of Singapore much better than official English and could threaten 
to replace it. (Bragg 2003: 191-92) 
 
Describing Singlish, Bragg continues: 
 
Some words come recognisably from English: ‘go stun’ – to reverse 
(maritime ‘go to stern’), and ‘blur’ (confused).  But others come from 
Malay and Hokkun [sic Hokkien].  Words such as ‘habis’ (finished), 
‘makan’ (to eat, meal), ‘cheem’ (difficult), ‘ang mo’ (redhead in Hokkun 
and hence white person), ‘kiasu’ (very keen, especially of a student).  
Some of these words are now being used as part of Singapore Standard 
English and they will change it greatly.  Marking plurals and past tenses 
is a matter of choice and so you get phrases such as ‘What happen 
yesterday?’, ‘You go where?’, ‘Got so many car!’, ‘The house sell 
already.’ The verb ‘to be’ can be optional.  ‘She so pretty’, ‘That one like 
us’, ‘Why you so stupid?’  These phrases are easily comprehensible to 
more traditional English users, often full of bite and wit and energy. 
(Bragg 2003: 192)    
 
Singlish allows Singaporeans of different ethnic, language and even religious 
backgrounds, who otherwise would have little in common with each other, connect on a 
common cultural and nationalist platform.  It is used in both spoken as well as written 
communication mediums such as email, Internet forums and social media.  The ability 
for Singlish to incorporate common words from the different communal and dialect 
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groups is something Singaporeans take incredible pride in.5  So popular is Singlish that 
it has invaded into local entertainment.  One of the more popular home-grown songs to 
capture Singaporeans hearts is the 1991 song ‘Why you so like dat?’ by Kopi Kat Klan 
and Siva Choy.6  ‘Why you so like dat?’ is a local expression which means one or all of 
the following: ‘What is wrong with you?’, ‘Why are you behaving the way that you do?’ 
and ‘What is your problem?’ Two Singaporean best-seller Singlish books are Eh, 
Goondu!/Hey Stupid! (1982) and Lagi Goondu!/More Stupid (1986) by humour writer 




Singlish in Singapore Films 
Singaporean audiences generally enjoy and appreciate entertainment productions with a 
strong local flavour.  Although locally flavoured performances such as vaudeville and 
stand-up comedic acts – by such luminaries as cross-dressing comedian Kumar, and 
Gurmit Singh’s famous alter ego Phua Chu Kang  use crude humour (Kumar) and 
stereotypical Singapore-specific ideas of the over-the-top behavior of the nouveau riche 
(Phua Chu Kang) to generate laughter, such gestures are appreciated by Singaporean 
audiences across class, racial, education and economic divides.  While Kumar and Phua 
Chu Kang are very different kinds of popular comedic acts, the common element is 
familiarity through local knowledge and, of course, Singlish.7  Likewise, Singapore-
made films are also in demand for the very same reasons.  Needless to say, Singapore 
films are generously doused with Singlish and always spoken by everyday Singaporeans 
or as I call them, the Singapore Everyman (see discussion in Chapter 1) as the following 
examples shows.  While not exhaustive, the films Wo Zai Zheng Fu Bu Men De Ri 
Zi/Just Follow Law (Neo 2007), Xiaohai Bu Ben/I Not Stupid (Neo 2002), Army Daze 
and Forever Fever are indicative of Singlish usage in Singapore films in terms of 




Just Follow Law 
Just Follow Law is a comedy-drama set in a government department.  The title is a pun 
on the Singlish ‘just follow lor’ which Singaporeans understand as ‘obey instructions 
without question or argument’.  In this scene, protagonist Ah Zui (Gurmit Singh) who is 
also known as Teng Zui, asks his friend Bamboo (Suhaimi Yusof) for money for piano 
lessons for his daughter. 
 
Ah Zui: Eh.  Afterwards you don’t mind uh?  Can you lend me some money or 
not?  Have to settle my daughter’s course fees, hor. 
Bamboo: Eh Zui.  You go and send your daughter for so many courses for what? 
Ah Zui: Eh friend, these courses important one you know.  For life one okay.  
Not like our courses one.  Stupid one from the company.  
 
In the following voice-over, narrator Jack Neo describes how the decisions made 




Narrator: For VIP visit, upstairs guideline very simple.  Those can’t show, please 
hide.  Those can’t hide, please throw.  Those can’t throw and can’t hide 
temporarily put outside.  And this is how Ah Zui kena sai. [And that is the way 
in which Ah Zui got into deep shit]. 
 
 
I Not Stupid 
I Not Stupid is a Mandarin-Hokkien-English comedy about a group of primary school 
children coping with the education system in Singapore.  In this scene, Mrs Khoo, a 
well-to-do Singaporean mother – is a thinly veiled caricature of the PAP government – 
angrily questions her children about their behaviour.  Played with much enthusiasm by 
comedian Selena Khoo, Mrs Khoo yells at her children at the top of her voice while 
waving a rotan (thin bamboo cane used for beating wrongdoers and naughty children).  
Mrs Khoo confronts her daughter Selena who smells of cigarette smoke, while her son 
Terry was caught by her in a previous scene working as a server/waiter at the stall of his 
less well-to-do friend’s family hawker centre stall.   
 
Mrs Khoo: How come I can smell smoke on you?! 
Selena: I never smoke.  My friends blew it on me. 
Mrs Khoo: Hmph.  And you!  How many times I told you not to kapo [be a 
busybody] other people’s business?!  Why you go and care about other people 




Army Daze is a humorous look at new army recruits as they cope with basic military 
training.  The following scene takes place at a new recruit reporting centre when 
protagonists Kevin and Ah Beng first meet.  Ah Beng is also a colloquial term used to 
describe young ethnic Chinese men who are uncouth.  Often, they are caricatured as 
sporting lightly coloured hair, driving souped-up Honda Sedans and conversing in 
Hokkien. 
 
Ah Beng: Sian uh.  Si buah sian. [I am so bored.] 
Kevin: Hi.  Are you reporting this morning? 
Ah Beng: Si. [Yes.] 
Kevin: Is this the queue? 
Ah Beng: Si. Si. Si.  
Kevin: Erm.  You also came alone uh?  My family’s gone to err...to Penang.  So 
I had to take a taxi here myself.  Anyway, I’m Kenny. 
Ah Beng: My name Ah Beng. 
Kevin: Ah Beng?!  Oh come on.  You joking. 
Ah Beng: Chua simek? [What’s wrong with that?] 
Kevin: Really?  Your name is really Ah Beng? 
Ah Beng: Ah den? [What’s it to you?] 
Kevin: Oh my god.  I’m sorry. 
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Forever Fever (released in the United States as That’s the Way I Like It) is a nostalgic 
comedy set in 1970s Singapore.  In the following exchange, Ah Hock (Adrian Pang) is 
having dinner with his family which includes his younger sister Mui (Pamela Oei) and 
older brother Leslie (Caleb Goh).  Ah Hock and his siblings discuss the newly released 
Hollywood film Saturday Night Fever (Badham 1977) 
 
Ah Hock: Eh Mui.  I saw that new Fever show.  Wah damn shiok man. [That 
was a very enjoyable show.] 
Mui: I want to see.  Chee Kor have you seen it yet? [Elder Brother, have you 
seen the film yet?] 
Leslie: Seen what? 
Ah Hock: New Fever show. 
Leslie: No.  I’m too busy.  Haven’t seen a film in years. 
Ah Hock: Wah.  Damn stylo man. [It is a very good film.] 
 
These films did relatively well at the box office.  Army Daze was the most financially 
successful Singapore film of its time, earning $1.6m, while I Not Stupid earned $3.8m.  I 
Not Stupid also was the fourth highest grossing film for 2002 (Uhde & Uhde 2010: 321-
22).  Forever Fever was the first Singaporean film to garner international success after it 
was screened in Australia, New Zealand, the United States, Canada and Great Britain 
(Uhde & Uhde 2010: 98).  Just Follow Law earned $2.8m at the box office even though 
it was made on a budget of $1.05m (IMDB n.d.).  The film was also nominated for 
awards at the 2007 Taipei Golden Horse Film Festival and distributed to Malaysia and 
Brunei (The Straits Times 2007). 
 
The success of these films can no doubt be attributed to the strong local content with 
language playing a significant part in their Singapore reception.  Singlish captures the 
uniqueness of being Singaporean which locals happily identify with and are immensely 
proud of despite ethnic and cultural differences. Even though Singlish is a slowly 
evolving language, it is the vernacular that provides the Singaporean majority with a 
form of stability in a nation undergoing transition. 
 
 
Singapore: A Nation in Transition 
In their reading of nationalism in Singapore cinema, Tan See-Kam and Jeremy Fernando 
(2006: 75) ask two interesting questions: ‘What makes Singapore Singapore?’ and 
‘What makes its cinema distinctively Singaporean?’  They rightly note that these are 
queries that are not easily answered, primarily because Singapore is a nation in 
transition.  While Tan and Fernando note that this transition is made possible by the 
East-West divide, I suggest that Singapore is divided in other ways connected to its rise 




Singapore is indeed a nation in transition.  Singaporeans grapple with an ever-changing 
Singapore as the city state stampedes into prominence as a global post-industrial nation.  
It’s status as a pragmatic and wealthy global city has left the country frequently 
transforming itself in the most visible ways.  The Singaporean urban landscape has been 
in frequent transformation in order to accommodate the visions the country has for itself 
as it rides the wave of globalization.9  While Singaporeans are able to deal with the 
physical changes in their urban environment and applaud the achievements that their 
nation state has accomplished on the world stage, they are antagonistic to the impact this 
has had on the ethnographic landscape and the subsequent effects of an increasing 
population due to a strong presence of foreigners working in the country as professionals 
and unskilled labourers as constantly expressed in online posts in The Online Citizen and 
TR Emeritus, for instance.   
 
A couple of notable consequences of Singapore’s progress though are the ever-
increasing class and income distinctions.  While the Singapore government has been 
successful in creating a strong middle class, there are also various levels of distinctions 
within this group.  Moreover, Singapore’s road to modernity has resulted in a widening 
income gap among Singaporeans.  The Singaporean people thus are generally imagined 
as divided into two broad and vastly different groups: the urban English-educated 
‘cosmopolitans’ and the ‘heartlander’ which are terms first introduced by then-Prime 
Minister Goh Chok Tong (1999).  The cosmopolitans are often university educated 
middle and upper-class professionals or the nouveau riche who are both well-travelled 
and well groomed.  They often live in landed property or condominium complexes.  
Heartlanders, on the other hand, are the nominally educated, often non-English-speaking 
middle to lower classes.  They live in what is considered the Singapore heartlands  
public housing estates run by the Housing & Development Board (HDB) – and make up 
the vast majority of Singaporeans (Sa’at 2012, 42-43).  However, the heartlands are 
themselves changing due to an increasing number of English-educated and well-
travelled professional Singaporeans moving into upgraded HDB estates due to land 
shortage and the high prices of landed properties.  HDB estates house about 85 per cent 
of Singapore’s population (Expat Singapore 2011).   
 
Class and income distinctions are not the only differences amongst Singaporeans.  As I 
have mentioned, Singapore is a multicultural, multiethnic, multilingual and multifaith 
nation.  With globalization, the population of Singapore is itself in transition.  Many 
Singaporeans themselves are transnationals, with increasing numbers leaving the 
homeland temporarily and permanently (Gomes 2009), while the city state is home to 
rising numbers of both guest workers and permanent migrants.  Singapore in flux, 
however, has led its citizens to hold on tightly to cultural traits such as Singlish that 
express their unique local identity.  Singlish is the language that is the dominant subtext 
of the collective present in all local English-language media productions. 
 
Singaporean communication through a unique home-grown language is not the result of 
obvious directives of the government.  While rebellion in post-independence Singapore 
does not use violence or threatening tactics, it occurs in everyday culture through 
Singlish.  This is seen in the everyday use of Singlish which the PAP deems cringe 
worthy and unsophisticated as Singapore takes its place in a globalized world.  
Singaporean ‘civil disobedience’ against the government is not directly political, but has 
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developed through cultural identifiers which have then transformed into strong signifiers 
of what it is to be Singaporean.   
 
 
‘The Pappy Gahmen’ which is Singlish for ‘The PAP Government’: Resistance 
Through Singlish 
Although superficially Singapore seems like a successful government initiative with a 
well-ordered society, it is a country of people struggling to express their individual, 
communal and national identities outside of government prescripts.  Since the 
widespread use of the Internet and through the active use of social media, Singaporean 
society has seemingly been increasingly freeing itself from the self-imposed censorship 
of public critique of the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP), which has been nurtured 
through years of strong-arm tactics by the PAP and community fears of repercussions 
for individuals critical of the Party, its leaders and its policies.  The PAP, after all, have 
a reputation for successfully suing individuals and publications for defamation  with 
well-known critics of the ruling party such as J.B. Jeyaretnam made bankrupt  and 
banning or reducing circulation of political magazines such as the Far Eastern 
Economic Review.   
 
Unlike other democracies, Singapore has been ruled by a single party since self-
government in 1959 and independence in 1965.  It is only after the 2011 General 
Elections that the opposition took up 6 out of the 87 parliamentary seats available – the 
highest number of opposition Members of Parliament in the history of Singapore.  The 
PAP is the only government Singaporeans have ever experienced.  It is thus a society 
facing growing pains as it confronts its national identity that is inextricably linked to the 
PAP government. Nationalism that was once defined not only as loyalty to nation but 
also as loyalty to the PAP government is now being questioned, openly and prolifically.   
 
Singapore’s leaders however are not enthusiastic about the popularity of Singlish and 
has criticized those who use and promote its usage (Chua 2003b: 73).  Since the late 
1990s the government has taken active steps to stamp out Singlish, which the prime 
ministers of Singapore, no less, have labeled as crude and vulgar (Deterding 2007; Au 
2007).  Moreover, they believe that Singlish is not a language worthy of a First World 
nation that holds its own on the global stage, nor an integral part of official Singaporean 
identity (Au 2007).  As part of its strategy to dissuade and actively limit the use of 
Singlish in the public arena, the government launched the Speak Good English 
Movement (SGEM) in 2000 to promote the active use of Standard Singapore English.  
According to its website, SGEM is run by a steering committee comprised of academics 
and professionals, and with the aim of ‘encourage[ing] Singaporeans to speak 
grammatically correct English that is universally understood, the Speak Good English 
Movement works closely with its partners to run events and programmes and develop 
learning content’ (SGEM 2012).   
 
Taking aim at the media, the government has challenged the use of Singlish in popular 
locally made English-language television shows.  In particular, the government focused 
on the use of Singlish by the much loved television character Phua Chu Kang from the 
eponymous television series.  During the height of the sitcom’s popularity in the late 
1990s and early 2000s, the extensive use of Singlish in Phua Chu Kang Pte Ltd (Teo 
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and Liang 1996-2007) led to national discussions on the use of Singlish.  The Singlish 
debate centred on both the appropriateness and legitimacy of Singlish usage (Kramer-
Dahl 2003; Hoon 2003; L. Wee 2005; Bokhorst-Heng 2005).  While the government, 
educators and some others consider Singlish worthy of cultural cringe, it is still a 
language that is embraced and widely used by the Singaporean majority.  The official 
concern regarding Singlish is not in sync with the reality of most Singaporeans (Hoon 
2003).  While Singlish is banned in official communiqué and in classrooms, it is the 
language that Singaporeans use to communicate with each other at home and in the 
workplace.  The use of Singlish is not limited to verbal communication.  Singlish usage 
has also become popular as a written form of communication in mobile texting, online 
and on social media platforms.  Singlish has thus developed into a soft and non-
confrontational form of rebellion that the people use against their government – a 
government which they also believe has lost touch with the people.   
 
The PAP government has at various times been accused by the general public of being 
elitist and having very little in common with the voting public.  PAP Members of 
Parliament are highly qualified professionals with university qualifications attained from 
English-speaking Western countries and converse in good English, however they 
struggle to communicate with their constituents in languages and dialects other than 
English or Mandarin.  The PAP has been in power since pre-independence as it was 
elected by the people as its representative when the British declared Singapore self-
governing in 1959.  It continued to represent Singapore when the island became part of 
the Federation of Malaya and has been the absolute power in Singapore since 
independence in 1965.  While Singaporeans routinely vote the PAP into government, 
they are attracted to opposition candidates who are able to converse in popularly spoken 
dialects.10  The 1991 general elections, for instance, witnessed the entry of opposition 
candidate lawyer Low Thia Khiang into Parliament, and he has continued to hold that 
position.11  Low’s appeal is his ability to reach out to, bond and identify with everyday 
Singaporeans.  While Low is genuinely concerned with members of his constituency and 
known to visit families at the wakes of their loved ones, Low uses language to appeal to 
his electorate.  Low’s first constituency was in the precinct of Hougang, which has a 
high concentration of Singaporeans who identify as Teochews.  Many in this electorate 
also communicate with family and friends in the Teochew dialect, something which 
Low used to his advantage when he spoke at election rallies.  In a way, the (continuous) 
election and popularity of Low could well indicate a Singapore society that – while 
practical about supporting the PAP at election time – is attempting to express its own 
unique Singaporean identity(s) divorced from direct government maneuvering or 
intervention.   
 
One aspect of the collective Singaporean identity that the PAP has long invested time 
and energy into is loyalty to the state.  To be Singaporean, as constructed by the 
government, is to openly show love and loyalty to country.12  The Singapore 
government – ruled by the PAP – has been incredibly successful in creating a unified 
national identity amongst its multi-ethnic citizens through diverse official schemes.  The 
campaign to encourage a deep sense of loyalty to Singapore, however, does not stop at 
country but extends to the government itself (Barr and Skrbiš 2008).  The government’s 
efforts have successfully resulted in the creation of a unique national cultural trait where 
the Singaporean collective identity is a nationalist one linked not only to country but 
arguably to government as well.  This is because as I have mentioned in various parts of 
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this book, the PAP is the only political party and government Singaporeans have ever 
experienced.  It is the only government behind modern Singapore and the only part 
which features positively and almost exclusively in Singapore’s official history.  
However, Singaporeans seem dissatisfied with the PAP as witnessed in the outcome of 
the 2011 General Elections.  Ironically this disaffection stems from unpopular policies 
that have contributed to making Singapore the wealthy global city it is today, in 
particular, the opening up of Singapore to an increasing number of new temporary and 
permanent migrants.  
 
 
A Government Project: Forging a National Collective Identity    
The PAP government is the only ruling party Singaporeans really know. Singaporeans 
generally have unconditional respect and admiration for the PAP government and its 
titular head Lee Kuan Yew whom many attribute as the creators of modern Singapore 
not only in the interrelated obvious and practical sense of economy, infrastructure and 
quality of life, but in other ways that intimately affect local social and cultural identity.  
The PAP has spent time and effort in cultivating a strong sense of nationalism in its 
disparate population.  Nation building has been a priority for the PAP government since 
Singapore became an independent nation in 1965, with the idea of creating a loyal 
citizenry connected to Singapore.  The PAP has done this through various schemes that 
include the scripting of a national past that highlights the PAP and Lee as the heroes of 
Singapore history, the creation of a list of Shared Values (see Appendix 2) with 
emphasis on hard work and sacrifice for the good of the nation, and the active 
engagement of young people into various national projects. 
  
Singaporeans are all too familiar with the official narrative of the nation known as The 
Singapore Story, which traces Singapore from its colonial to postcolonial narrative 
(Hong & Huang 2008).  This familiarity is because the narrative is embedded in the 
education curriculum, their National Day (Singapore’s day of independence 
commemorated yearly on 9 August) and in public education sites such as museums.  The 
Singapore Story tells the continuing tale of Singapore from its arguable origins as a 
Malay fishing village acquired by Sir Stamford Raffles of the British East India 
Company in 1819 to its current status as a financial and industrial powerhouse and 
global city state.  While the British are credited with Singapore’s evolution from a mere 
trading port to a significantly strategic acquisition in the Empire, the PAP and Lee Kuan 
Yew are portrayed as the most significant contributors to Singapore’s unstoppable road 
to modernity (Hong & Huang 2008; Gomes 2009).  It is not surprising that the PAP and 
Lee Kuan Yew are the heroes of The Singapore Story since both narrative and slogan 
were first introduced to Singaporeans through Lee since he titled his bestselling 1998 
memoir as The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew.  This was followed by a 
2000 sequel titled The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew, Vol. 2: From Third 
World to First: 1965-2000.  As a cultural construct, The Singapore Story is a term that is 
purposefully and exclusively linked to Lee’s book.  The Singapore Story also 
complements and continues the government’s earlier launched education projects aimed 
at instilling a sense of nationalism through a certain scripted lens which describes 
Singapore’s history as the history of the ruling People’s Action Party.  These include 
teaching Singapore history as part of the Social Studies program in secondary schools 
and through the National Education public campaigns.  When first launched in 1997, the 
National Education campaign involved making civil service employees and students 
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visit specially constructed exhibitions highlighting the official government interpretation 
of Singapore’s past. 
 
The Singapore government has created a loyal and unstoppable workforce cultivated 
through the promotion of hard work and self-sacrifice for nation, as enshrined in the 
Singapore Shared Values doctrine.  This doctrine serves as the official ethos of 
Singapore society.  Its success arises out of the government’s adoption of selected tenets 
of Confucian Chinese culture which other ethnic groups are also able to identify with, 
namely the importance of respecting the family and upholding family values.  While 
Confucian Chinese culture highlights obedience to the family hierarchy, Singapore’s 
interpretation replaces family with nation and government (Gomes 2009).  Non-Chinese 
ethnicities in Singapore would not find extending the paradigms of family much of a 
stretch, since community relations are emphasized strongly in other ethnic groups such 






Figure  6.1: Commemorative art work depicting Singapore’s colonial history with 
emphasis on racial harmony and the hardwork of pioneering migrants features 
prominently in the Central Business District.  The scuptures above are found along the 
Singapore River – the centre of trade in the 19th and early 20th centuries of colonial 
Singapore and the first area to be developed as a township in the first few decades after 
Sir Stamford Raffles acquired Singapore for the British in 1819.  Photos courtesy of the 
author, 2008.  
 
 
Although the Singapore government actively engages in selective aspects of Confucian 
Chinese culture as a model for its official value system, there are other aspects which it 
adapts accordingly.  While Confucian Chinese culture gives reverence to the elderly, 
Singapore places great emphasis on the young, who the government calls ‘the next 
generation’ which has become part of Singapore’s everyday discourse.  To inculcate a 
strong sense of nationalism in young Singaporeans, the government has embarked on 
projects that make new generations of Singaporeans believe they are responsible for the 
future of the country.  This is because Singapore leaders have long believed that 
Singapore’s s only resource is its people. 
 
Singaporeans are indoctrinated with The Singapore Story through the formal education 
system (e.g. the Social Studies program taught in all secondary schools) and public 
education (e.g. memorials, museums and commemorative exhibitions and events).  
Singaporeans born after 1965 have not known any other ruling party, so the government 
has found it easier to engage young people in its nationalist pro-government projects.  
These include recruiting young people, usually under the age of 35, to actively 
participate in government sponsored activities, mentoring young university graduates 
who enter the civil service, and encouraging young people to respond positively to 
various government policies for the good of Singapore, such as procreation to increase 




The government also targets teenagers in their campaigns to cultivate allegiance to state 
and administration.  The youth are strongly encouraged to take on responsibilities that 
emphasize loyalty to the nation, even in their leisure time.  These activities include 
volunteering to take on the role of enthusiastic spectators in the 2010 Youth Olympic 
Games.  The Ministry of Community Development, Youth & Sports (MCYS) – the 
parent ministry that oversaw Singapore’s successful bid for the first Summer Youth 
Olympic Games and its organization and implementation through the Singapore Youth 
Olympic Games Organising Committee (SYOGOC) – attempted to drum up nationalist 
support, enthusiasm and momentum for the games by promoting the Singapore games 
ethos to secondary students through various modes, including the Wikipedia entry ‘2010 
Summer Youth Olympics’ (Wikipedia 2012).  
 
The Singapore government, aware that there are a number of Singaporeans who live, 
work and study overseas, is always adept at creating schemes and events to entice 
Singaporean expatriates back to the homeland.  The aim of enticing Singaporeans back 
to their homeland is to have them build and work on the various modernization projects 
the nation engages in.  In order to encourage young expatriates with who have weak ties 
to Singapore, the Singapore National Youth Council (NYC) has devised a grant to 
attract these Singaporeans back to the homeland through its ‘Young ChangeMakers’ 
programme.  According to the NYC website (http://ycm.nyc.sg/young-changemakers-
ycm-grant/os-ycm-grant), the grant 
 
aims to provide seed funding for short term community projects that will engage our 
Overseas Singaporean Diaspora and encourage them to actively reach out and connect 
with their peers (living abroad and/or in Singapore), contribute to the local communities 
they live in, and help promote Singapore as a great city to live, work and play in. (NYC 
2010) 
 
The grant is worth $3000 to cover direct costs for the project.  However, the NYC will 
provide resources and support from a pool of mentors.  Projects that are funded will 
‘benefit the Overseas Singaporean community and/or the local community in the host 
country’ and ‘the core activities of the project should be carried out overseas’.  The 
Young ChangeMakers programme thus is another way in which to instill a strong sense 
of loyalty to Singapore and the Singapore government amongst young overseas 
Singaporeans.  Overseas Singaporeans who are eligible to apply must be between 13 and 
25 years in age and can apply as individuals, youth groups or organizations.  When 
Singaporeans become working adults, the government has other schemes to aid their 
national allegiance. 
 
The public service is Singapore’s largest employer, employing around 127,000 officers 
across fifteen ministries and in more than fifty statutory boards (Prime Minister’s Office 
2007).  As Singapore’s largest employer, it actively recruits fresh university graduates 
who receive their degrees from both local and overseas tertiary institutions.  Once 
recruited these fresh graduates are mentored by more senior members of the government 
department they work in, where loyalty to Singapore and to the government are 
emphasized.  Standout young employees who are identified as complying with the 
department’s organizational goals are sometimes given opportunities such as 
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scholarships for approved postgraduate courses.  While these scholarships ensure they 
are bonded to the parent ministry or statutory board, their accelerated promotion through 
the public service ensures the continuation of the loyalty cycle. 
 
For the past three decades, the Singapore government has been strongly encouraging 
young university-educated Singaporeans to marry and procreate through various 
methods that include setting up a national matchmaking agency, tax incentives, housing 
schemes and, of course, strongly worded government messages that emphasize national 
duty through procreation.14  The Singapore government has often reminded 
Singaporeans that since the city state’s only resource is its people, Singaporeans have a 
national duty to procreate in order to make sure that there is a continuous supply of 
workers to feed the economic needs of the nation.  The latest reminder took place just 
after Singapore’s National Day in 2012 by Lee Kwan Yue himself (Ramesh 2012).  The 
projected number of people the government aims Singapore to reach is 6.9 million by 
2013.  Singapore is almost reaching that figure.  As of June 2014, the island supports 
5.47 million people (Tham 2014).   
 
While matchmaking Singaporeans with each other has been reasonably successful, the 
projected goal of procreation through such unions has not.  Singapore has been 
incredibly anxious about this and has attempted to meet population shortfalls by opening 
its borders to temporary and permanent blue-collar and white-collar migrant workers 
from the region (the Philippines, mainland China and South Asia for instance) and 
beyond.  Blue-collar workers, or transitional migrants, are usually unskilled labourers 
known as guest workers, foreign workers and work permit holders.  White-collar 
workers are professionals often in management positions and hold university degrees, 
colloquially known as ‘foreign talent’ as mentioned in Chapter 1.15  Foreign talent 
migrants usually become permanent residents.  Out of the 5.47 million people in 
Singapore, 3.87 million are Singaporean and permanent residents, while 1.6 million are 
non-resident migrants (Tham 2014).  Unfortunately the move to allow these new white-
collar migrants to enter Singapore has caused huge dissatisfaction with the government 
amongst its citizens as seen by the huge amounts of online criticism towards the 
government regarding this particular issue. 
 
 
Standing up to the Paternalistic PAP Government – Unity because of New 
Migrants 
While the PAP government has been proactive in creating a Singaporean identity that is 
nationalist in terms of loyalty to state as well as to government, this success has been 
mixed.  The Singapore public generally acknowledges that the PAP gave Singapore 
economic prosperity, created jobs for Singaporeans, allowed Singaporeans to own their 
own homes through the Housing & Development Board (HDB) lease-ownership 
scheme, gave young Singaporeans compulsory education and created an effective health 
system.  In 2010, Boston Consulting Group listed Singapore as number one in the 
millionaire household club, with 11.4 per cent of its 4.7 million population at this time 
in this category (Hutheesing 2010).  In 2011, The Straits Times reported that the number 
of millionaires in Singapore are expected to grow from 183,000 to 408,000 by 2016 (Ng 
2011).  Credit to which is largely given to the PAP.  While appreciative of the 
government’s success in fast-tracking Singapore into the twenty-first century, many 
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Singaporeans feel this has come at a price.  As suggested in previous chapters, many 
resent the government for unpopular policies that have led to an ever increasing influx 
of new migrants which they consider disadvantageous towards Singaporeans.  Even 
though Singaporeans are mostly loyal to the PAP, as seen through the population’s 
continuous voting in of the party at the general elections, Singaporeans are also 
incredibly critical of the government and its policies and have developed a unique 
national culture that thrives on rebelling against what they consider the elitist and 
authoritarian PAP.   
 
 
Empowerment through Singlish  
Singapore, like any developed country whose borders have become porous due to 
globalization, has had an increase in the number of transitional and permanent migrants 
working and living within its geographical boundaries.  Unskilled or semi-skilled 
foreign workers often take up positions such as the lower end of the hospitality industry, 
the cleaning industry and the transport industry (bus drivers and taxi drivers).  However, 
these workers are not allowed permanent residency.  As I point out in previous chapters, 
work permit holders who are unskilled workers (foreign domestic workers and 
construction workers) have been coming into Singapore since the 1980s when the 
country embarked on its numerous modernity projects.  With their arrival came voices 
of dissatisfaction from Singaporean residents who felt that their ethnographic landscape 
was being overrun by poorly educated, unskilled and ‘low-class’ non-Singaporean 
Asians.  This class hierarchy between Singaporeans and work permit holders is given 
credence by government labour policies and the already strong negative attitudes 
Singaporeans have towards temporary migrants.   
 
Transient workers such as female domestic workers and unskilled labourers from 
various Asian nations have been a common sight in Singapore for the past three decades.  
Singaporeans have learnt to live with transient migrants, although begrudgingly so.  A 
good example is the anger Serangoon Garden residents felt when a former secondary 
school was turned into a dormitory for unskilled Asian labourers.  Residents of upper-
middle-class Serangoon Garden attempted, unsuccessfully, to block the government’s 
plan through petitions (Forss 2008).  Many Singaporeans have also become increasingly 
disillusioned with the decisions of the government concerning the influx of foreign 
talent whom they believe are taking jobs away from citizens (Chua 2003b:70).  
Singaporeans accuse foreign talent migrants of enjoying the benefits of permanent 
residence and citizenship, which they feel only ‘true Singaporeans’ (Png 2003) should 
enjoy.  Such comments can be seen in online forums such as those in political websites 
such as The Online Citizen and TR Emeritus. Of course not all Singaporeans think this 
way.  Singapore society is ethnically and culturally diverse so there will also be pockets 
of Singaporeans who think and function outside the mainstream. 
 
The dislike Singaporeans feel towards foreign talent migrants meanwhile has been 
attributed to the government’s highly unpopular foreign talent migration policy.  It was 
this policy that became a key issue in the 2011 general elections, which resulted in the 
PAP receiving the lowest percentage of the popular vote since elections were first held 
in 1959.16  Singaporeans complain that the huge rise in foreign talent migrants has 
caused a spike in the income gap, which they claim favours the new foreign talent 
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migrants.  Singaporeans have expressed overwhelmingly in online forums and social 
media that they are being left behind and abandoned by the government that they have 
voted into power for close to fifty years.  The increasing numbers of foreign talent 
migrants have led many Singaporeans to question the government’s loyalty to its 
citizens online in the political websites (e.g. The Online Citizen), news websites (e.g. 
Asiaone.Com) and social media (e.g. Facebook posts on personal and group pages).  
Many read the government’s foreign talent migration policy as a way in which the PAP 
keeps itself in power by recruiting a new loyal electorate. 
  
Others have been voicing their fear that the PAP would grant permanent residents voter 
rights and thus keep the ruling party in power indefinitely.  Singapore-born citizens thus 
feel that they are being replaced by a pro-PAP electorate made up of educated 
professional foreigners principally from India, China and the Philippines.  Such 
sentiments are fuelled by foreign talent migrants who express, privately as well as 
publicly online and in social media, their respect for the PAP and all it has done for 
Singapore.  Whether real or imagined, tensions between Singapore-born citizens and 
foreign talent migrants are increasing.  
 
While Singaporeans are unable to do very much to change the ethnographic landscape of 
their country due to the new migrant workers, they are expressing their Singaporean 
cultural identity and collective solidarity through language.  Singaporean citizens take 
issue with new migrants for not attempting to fit in primarily because of language 
barriers.  Many Singaporeans feel that English and even Malay helps bridge the gap 
between the main racial groups in Singapore.  Older Singaporeans, regardless of 
whether they are Chinese, Indian, Malay or Eurasian, converse cross-culturally through 
the use of basic Malay, and this is also the language of choice between employers and 
their Indonesian domestic workers.   
 
Yet Singaporeans often warm to new migrants if they adopt Singlish, for instance.  In 
2010, RazorTV – a segment in the online version of the nation’s flagship English-
language newspaper The Straits Times – featured the Singlish talents of an American 
teenager living and studying in Singapore.  The teenager’s ability to speak Singlish was 
very well received by the presenters of the segment who felt that he had mastered the art 
of Singlish.  In the same year, RazorTV featured a segment on foreign students studying 
at the Singapore Management University (SMU) who were adapting to Singapore by 
learning Singlish.  The segment painted these students in a positive light because they 
were making efforts to blend into Singapore culture by communicating in Singlish.17   
 
 
PAP sees the light: Educating Migrants about Singapore through Singlish 
Realizing the role Singlish can play in easing tensions and sensing the seething anger the 
population have towards new migrants, and towards the PAP, the government has 
recently embraced Singapore English as part of its campaign to ‘educate’ foreign talent 
migrants, as well as foreign students enrolled in Singapore institutions, about local 
culture.  In 2010, PM Lee Hsien Loong referred to a locally produced guidebook for 
international students in Singapore known as Singapore Sh10k! (Singapore Management 
University 2010) during his National Day Rally.  Shiok is Singlish for ‘feel good’.  
While initially only an SMU guidebook, following the campaign it became a ‘must 
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have’ for new migrants to learn how to integrate and assimilate into Singapore society.  
By doing so, PM Lee placed localism as a pivotal tool for integration.  The campaign 
strongly encourages new migrants in Singapore to embrace Singlish and the multi-tiered 
and complex local discourse that accompanies it.  However, while this seems to be the 
intention of the government, the active encouragement of Singlish is a thinly-veiled 
campaign to convince Singaporeans who trace their ancestral roots to the era of 
colonialism that they still indeed matter.  The primary theme of the 2010 Singapore 
National Day celebrations was the integration of new migrants into Singapore society 
and culture, with the National Day Rally speech (a platform for the government to 
outline its 2010-2011 policies) and a number of focus groups chaired by cabinet 




Singlish functions as a useful type of cement that binds disparate Singaporeans with 
each other while acting as an unconventional shield and offensive strategy against an 
authoritarian government and its more unpopular policies.  It is an unconscious 
collective expression of civil disobedience, which Singaporeans – as well as the local 
film industry – have come to realize is incredibly powerful.  Singlish has also become 
the unifying force Singaporeans have used to express their unhappiness against 
government policies pertaining particularly to the increasing number of migrants – both 
unskilled and white collar – whom locals feel are not only overpopulating the society 
but also diluting Singaporean culture.  This chapter as well as with previous ones 
examining Singaporean attitudes towards new migrants have shown that this ‘foreign’ 









I will always recall the city 
Know every street and shore 
Sail down the river which brings us life 
Winding through my Singapore 
 
This is home truly, where I know I must be 
Where my dreams wait for me, where the river always flows 
This is home surely, as my senses tell me 
This is where I won't be alone, for this is where I know it's home 




In this book I have put forward the idea that even though Singapore projects itself as 
supporting a harmonious multicultural society, a survey of local cinematographic 
representations of ethnicity and migration puts this claim into question.  Yet, the anxiety 
over new migrants has assisted Singaporeans in finding common ground and unity with 
each other.  By examining some key films of prominent film-makers across the 
commercial and independent film-making spectrum in Singapore, I have used film as a 
lens to view, unpack and analyze multicultural Singapore society’s anxieties towards 
ethnicity and migration.  By employing the topics of identity, memory and place, I have 
used the accessible art form of film to scratch below the surface of this seemingly well-
ordered bureaucratic nation.  Singapore-made films are able to provide a window to 
understanding the Singaporean people primarily because they seem to embrace and 
promote the everyday Singaporean.  The films I used in this book have been particularly 
useful in aiding my investigation into the ways in which Singapore society deals with 
both the ethnic other and self, and quotidian encounters with new migrants. 
 
On the surface, Singapore’s brand of multiculturalism works well.  Here is a country 
with no ethnic clashes even though the population is comprised of three major ethnic 
groups: the Chinese, the Malays and the Indians.  These ethnic groups are able to coexist 
primarily because of the government’s putting in place strict laws governing racial 
tolerance and policies celebrating cultural and religious diversity among these groups.  
Scratching below the surface, however, anxieties regarding identity exist particularly 
when the Chinese-Malay-Indian (CMI) is muddled because of globalization and 
intermarriage, thus creating people and communities that while are connected to the 
CMI nexus, exist outside it.  For the purpose of this book, I refer to people who are 
biracial (children whose parents come from different ethnic groups which may or may 
not be from CMI) and Eurasians (community whose heritage is based on European-
Asian pairings during various colonial periods in Singapore and Malaysia).  While 
Singapore is strongly dominated by the ethnic Chinese, the issue of identity is no less an 
issue for this community as it navigates traditional culture and religious practice through 
the challenges of an ever modernizing Singapore.  Whilst multicultural Singapore copes 
with the internal contestations connected with the discomfort and confusion associated 
with ethnicity, the society is currently facing perhaps its most challenging test yet – the 
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entry of new migrants.  Singaporean antagonism towards the presence of new migrants 
is particularly noteworthy since Singapore itself is a settler society whose citizens 
clearly trace their ancestral homes to the very countries the new migrants hail.  
However, as I have argued in this book, it is this very foreign presence that has emerged 
as a force uniting Singaporeans together. 
 
Since gaining independence the country has been rapidly undergoing physical changes 
as part of its journey towards modernity with almost every significant part of Singapore 
utilized for the purpose of industrial or residential use.  The physical and geographical 
transformations that Singapore has undergone because of improvements to 
infrastructure, altering skylines and land reclamation for the purpose of extending the 
Singapore coastline, are sights which Singaporeans have grown accustomed to.  While 
Singaporeans take modifications to their country’s facade in their stride, it is the 
transformation of the ethnographic landscape due to the presence of new transitional and 
permanent migrants that has distressed Singaporeans.  Locals believe that these new 
migrants, colloquially referred to as ‘foreigners’ even though many have permanent 
residence and citizenship, are responsible for the cultural changes they see facing 
Singapore society.  So while many Singaporeans can identify with the ‘Home’ quoted at 
the beginning of this chapter, they are also attempting to make sense of their 
significance and place in their homeland, which through government policy on new 
migrants, they feel, has abandoned them.  ‘Home’ was sanctioned by the government as 
part of Singapore’s 1998 National Day celebrations and remains a very popular 
nationalist song. 
 
Singapore today is no doubt a country strongly shaped by the ruling People’s Action 
Party (PAP).  While the PAP have no doubt played a dominant role in building 
Singapore into the global economy, financial centre and First World nation it is today, 
the ruling party also contributed significantly to the development of the Singaporean 
people.  The PAP created a citizenry loyal not only to country but to the political party 
itself through intensive national campaigns and education.  However, for a variety of 
reasons, the past decade has seen Singaporeans publicly vocalize their discontentment 
with a government that has been very much part of Singapore’s identity, particularly 
through online platforms.   
 
This book has shown that many Singaporeans are obsessing and crying foul about any 
issue concerning migrants living and working in Singapore.  This is because they feel 
increasingly swamped by the presence particularly of mainland Chinese, South Asian 
and Filipino permanent and temporary migrants whom they see as cheaper labour 
alternatives and as polluters of the social fabric and cultural landscape of Singapore.  
Singaporeans have taken to targeting and protesting against individual migrants in 
online forums and social media platforms.  However, instead of targeting individuals 
who have political and economic influence, power, wealth and control, Singaporeans 
protest against individuals who have none of these traits.  In August 2011 Filipino 
Rachelle Beguia, an administrative clerk at a hospital, was targeted by online and social 
media users such as those on TR Emeritus 
(http://www.tremeritus.com/2011/08/11/pinoy-ft-jumps-to-defence-of-malaysian-mp-
penny-low-and-hurls-insults-at-singaporeans/) for ‘anti-Singaporean’ comments about 
national servicemen and the work attitude of Singaporeans that she made while 
defending PAP Member of Parliament Penny Low on the latter’s Facebook page.  
Singaporean netizens took Beguia to task and asked her employer – the National Heart 
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Centre – to investigate.  Some online commentators even called for her resignation.  As 
the saga unfolded, her Singapore-born husband Gay Chao Hui publicly admitted that it 
was he and not she who posted the comments.18  On 8 December 2013 the unthinkable 
happened – Singapore had its first riot since the race riots of 1964.  The incident which 
saw 300 migrant labourers from Bangladesh and Tamil Nadu damage vehicles and set 
an ambulance on fire, happened in Little India and instigated by a fatal accident in 
which a private bus hit an Indian construction worker.  Netizens took to social media to 
express their shock that such a thing could happen in ‘peaceful’ Singapore while taking 
the opportunity to once again point out the ills of having too many foreigners in the 
country (Barimen 2013).  
 
Singaporeans have been expressing their anger at the Singapore government in relation 
to its migration policy in droves on online and social media platforms.  The gist of their 
discourse lies in their belief that the PAP government have forsaken and neglected them 
in favour of these new migrants.  The resulting effect is a Singapore society that is 
becoming more politically active.  Singaporeans are now valuing their freedom of 
speech and openly criticizing the government in organized public, face-to-face and 
online forums.  The biggest show of political might by a formerly conservative and 
apathetic citizenry was demonstrated during the 2011 Singapore general elections (GE).  
This was followed in the first well attended organized protest independent Singapore 
had seen on 16 February 2013 to the newly parliamentary endorsed Population White 
Paper: A Sustainable Population for a Dynamic Singapore which estimated the number 
of people to rise to 6.9 million by 2030 through immigration (the granting of 15,000 and 
25,000 new citizens and 30,000 permanent resident permits annually).  An estimated 
5000 people attended the protest organized through Facebook by Gilbert Goh, the 
founder of Transitioning.Org, an organization set up to help unemployed Singaporeans 
who lost their jobs to foreign talent migrants (Ramesh 2013).  At the same time, the 
presence of these new migrants has galvanized Singaporeans to each other.  For 
instance, while I referred to language playing a part in bringing Singaporeans together in 
Chapter 6, this is not the only cultural trait that gives Singaporeans a collective identity 
that also empowers.  In Chapter 2 I mentioned that besides Singlish, food is a cultural 
trait that is very much Singaporean.  Food is also something which provides a coping 
mechanism when dealing with new migrants as seen in the citizen-organized curry 
sharing campaign. 
 
In 2011 a Facebook campaign to ‘Cook and Share a Pot of Curry’ on Sunday 21 August 
was launched in protest against foreign talent migrants – and to a greater extent even 
temporary migrants – for their inability to accept Singaporean multiculturalism 
(Suhartono 2011).  The campaign attracted tens of thousands of Singaporeans both in 
Singapore and overseas to commit to cooking and sharing curry with friends and 
neighbours.  The event came about because of a newspaper on a local residential 
council’s arbitration in a case involving a foreign talent migrant family from Mainland 
China and their ethnic Indian Singaporean neighbours.  Both families live in a block of 
flats that are part of the government controlled Housing and Development Board 
scheme.  The Mainland Chinese family complained that they were offended by the smell 
of curry emanating from their neighbour’s flat.  As part of the mediation process, the 
Singaporean family agreed to cook curry only on days their Mainland Chinese 
neighbours were not at home – a decision that angered Singaporeans since they felt that 
cultural adaptation and acculturation should be the responsibility of new migrants and 
not locals.  While the campaign targeted new permanent and transitional migrants living 
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in Singapore, it was also meant to send a message to the government for not only siding 
with the Mainland Chinese family but also for allowing so many foreigners into the 
country to live, work and study.  As blogger Singapore Actually, writing in 2011, 
observes: 
I couldn’t help but be annoyed by this story about the Indian 
Singaporeans who had to stop cooking curry when their neighbours who 
are from China, were at home, because they didn’t like the smell of curry. 
If the Indian family does not adhere to this, they can be sued in court. The 
first thought that came to my mind…. ‘What the heck?!’ I am shocked 
that such a request was even entertained by the mediation centre. 
The solution just seems unfair to me. When you’re a guest in another 
person’s home country, you wouldn’t ask them to stop their cultural 
practices that are the norm of that country, would you? I find the situation 
and solution proposed by the mediator highly insensitive. And what kind 
of precedence is being set? It is this kind of thing that upsets locals and 
causes unnecessary friction.... 
 
 
The Singapore government has begrudgingly decreased its foreign talent intake while 
putting into policy hiring practices that favour locals over foreigners.  In a BBC online 
report on the increasing discontent among Singaporeans, Southeast Asian correspondent 
Jonathan Head (2013) clearly alludes to the change in government tactic when he 
comments: 
In a statement to the BBC a government spokesman re-iterated the long-
standing belief, that as a small, open economy, Singapore must remain 
open and connected, for trade or talent flows.  But, the statement said, 
‘we are deliberately slowing our foreign workforce growth rate. This will 
also slow economic growth, but it is a compromise we need to make to 
continue to give Singaporeans a high quality of life’. 
In September 2014 The Straits Times reported that the foreign worker population growth 
rate had decreased from 4 per cent in 2013 to the current 2.9 per cent.   
 
Perhaps as a fitting end to this book I bring the focus back to Singapore films.  So far 
there have been few films that feature new migrants.  Those that do feature new 
migrants as being unsuccessful and bitter when failing to find a good life in Singapore as 
in Shier Lou/12 Storeys, portray ‘foreign talent’ migrants as untalented and uncreative as 
in Xiaohai bu ben/I Not Stupid (Neo 2002) and paint a somewhat sympathetic portrait of 
foreign domestic workers as in The Maid.  With Singapore’s population increasingly 
being populated by new migrants, will Singapore films continue representing 
Singaporeans and their concerns, and thus transform into an advocate for ‘true 
Singaporeans’ over and above new migrants?  Here, could Singapore films’ 
representation of the angst people feel about the government and new migrants lead to 
social unrest, dissent or perhaps violence in this otherwise ordered, manicured and well-
oiled nation?  Also, with Singapore’s ethnic diversity outside the Chinese-Malay-Indian 
nexus, will depictions of the ‘true Singaporean’ be widened to include mixed ethnicities 
and will they be the offspring of Singaporean encounters with new migrants or second 
generation Singaporeans?  Or will Singapore films be an advocate for these ‘foreigners’ 
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living and working in the country?  Questions that go beyond the context of film and 













Appendix 1 – Sample of comments on The Temasek Review Emeritus in response to the 
post ‘400000 expats in Singapore living the best of both worlds’ by Grey Hippo.  
 
 
Article/Source Foreign Talent 
Migrants 




Loyalty to Nation  
Grey Hippo, ‘400000 
expats in Singapore 
living the best of 
both worlds’, The 
TR Emeritus, 29 
May 2011. 
At the time of writing, 
there were 281 
responses to the 
article, which was 
within 2 days after the 
article was published.   
 
Nation of Idiots, May 
29, 2011 at 11:57 am: 
‘PAPPIES LOOK 
HERE - 
Now that we have so 
much Foreign TRASH 
and Permanent 
RUBBISH, 




I am sure we are more 




They STINK and smell 
BAD!’ 
 
F.T.govt, May 29, 
2011 at 12:08 pm: 
‘The Papies FT policy is 
completely flawed. 
All Indians are conferred 
NRI status which means 
that they can get back 
Indian citizenship at any 
time even though they 
have adopted foreign 
citizenship or hold a 
foreign passsport and have 
swore allegiance to 
another country. 
So they can be singapore 
citizen tomorrow and 
revert back to Indian 
citizenship the following 
day.The Indian govt makes 
NRI policy into law to 
enable its citizens to go to 
other countries to work 
and Singapore Papies is 
assisting the migration of 
Indian citizens WHO CAN 
RETURN TO iNDIA AT 
OLD AGE AND ENJOY 





This policy is copied from 
Britain which has a 
PARTRAL law which 
states that all descendents 
of UK who have migrated 
are allowed to get back 
British citizen 
automatically if they can 
show thAt theie parents or 
grand -parents were British 
citizen. 
Singapore deprieved a 
native citizen after 10 
years if u dont return esp 
for polical purpose.A 
Dealay Tactic, May 29, 
2011 at 11:49 am: 
‘I think PM Lee should 
address the FT problem 
first, ahead of any other 
problem. 
The employment, 
housing, healthcare and 
even ministerial pay 
issues have the FTs as a 
major factor for their 
existence. 
For example, FTs drive 
up the GDP artificially, 
increasing ministerial 
bonus but not benefitting 
the ordinary 
Singaporean. 
Maybe he hopes we will 
forget about the FTs as 
he distracts us with other 
matters, and quickly 
import 1.5M foreigners 
instead of the 900K 
which was mentioned by 
LKY, to hit the 6.5M 
target. 
The mass import of FT 
is *ECONOMIC 
GENOCIDE*, and must 
be solved first. If we 
read the earlier article in 
TR (on what directions 
SG should move in), we 
find that, from 2007-
2010, while the 
population has increased 
10.2%, per capita GDP 
has only grown 2.7%. 
Productivity has fallen 
for the last 10 years. 
Yes, FTs will keep the 
MNCs here, and our 
GDP will be maintained. 
But citizens have no 




bloody useless Papie govt. 
PAPIES WELCOME ALL 






economics are totally 
useless. Actually, they 
are never mentioned in 
any economics textbook 
or are they practised by 
any other nation. 
So much for our 1st 
class govt.’ 
 
 I no longer know what 
I'm defending anymore, 
May 29, 2011 at 1:50 
pm: 
‘IN the MRT, i never 
stand nor sit beside 
those Indians from 
India…they stink of 
foul body odour…same 
goes from the China 
people,..stink as hell…’ 
 
I no longer know what I'm 
defending anymore, May 
29, 2011 at 1:49 pm: 
‘I’m indian and am a 
native singaporean and I 
say, ‘PLease go back to 
Motherland India. We 




 Raymond Tan, May 29, 
2011 at 4:12 pm: 
‘Hey all you Indians 
from India, if you are so 
smart as you say you 
are, then why not stay 
back in India and 
develop and fix you 
own country. I’hv lived 
in India for a few years 
in the late 90’s and I 
know what kind of 
people you all are. You 
people are very filthy 
and very unhygenic. 
You bastards shit and 
urinate every where and 
any where you like. 
Most of your degrees 
are faked or bought by 
paying bribes. And most 
of you Bramins are the 
trouble makers for your 
country. If I had a 
choice I would kick 
everyone of the India 
Indians back to their 
motherland till kingdom 
comes. You can also 
take your Prataman with 
you when you leave 
singapore, he will be 
retiring soon. One of 
these days China will 
send their army to kick 
your Indian asses like 





 Belinda Goh, May 29, 
2011 at 4:02 pm: 
The pungent smell of 




Jen, ‘Love Singapore, 
Our Home?’, The 
Online Citizen, 2 May 
2012. 
At the time of writing, 
there were 50 
responses to the 
article, which was 
within 4 days after the 
article was published.   
 
LOL, 2 May 2012:  
‘Sick and tired of 
watching PRs pledging 
faux pride and allegiance 
to a foreign country 
while I have been 
applying unsuccessfully 
every year for NDP 
tickets. 
Off for holiday this time 
round. Couldn't care less 
about NDP.’ 
 
polishapple, 3 May 2012: 
‘I’d love to see how 
foolishly happy 
Singaporeans are to 
celebrate that day.. 
Remember it’s not only 
birthday.. It’s 
independence.. And this is 
what we got.. Maybe the 
‘love’ for our country by 
the guards officer is meant 
for pr,new citizens and of 
course our beloved 
Thrash..’ 
 





BUT,sad to say,we have 
been mistreated in our 
own 'home' by our elite 
countrymen and some of 
us are even being 
mistreated by those 
foreign guests who now 
are 'stealing' our home 
and 'everything' we have 
worked so hard to out in 
our 'home'. 
what a shame that while 
exhorting singaporeans 
to be welcoming of 
migrant workers,we 
actually NEGLECT n 
MARGINLAISED our 
own people. 
tell us,can we still 
honestly call SG OUR 
HOME AND ALL 
TRUE BLUE 
SINGAPOREANS 
OUR 'FAMILY' when 
we keep breaking faith 
with them????’ 
 fair fare, 3 May 2012: 
‘i loathe to say this but i 
do not wish to see our 
country which we 
all,true 
lions,love,become filled 
with ft/pr/new citizesn 
whose only true love for 
this dearly beloed 
country we all help to 
build is only the 
MONEY they could 
harness for themselves at 
our expense. 
please,gahmen,wake 
up,you are going into the 
wrong direction. 
time will prove who are 
truly LOYAL N 
FAITHFUL to 
SINGAPORE,if not our 
own singaporeans,who 
Homeless, 3 May 2012: 
‘Love Singapore, our 
Home. 
Our home? No more our 
country?’ 
 
Libran, 2 May 2012: 
‘Singaporeans may not 
realise it now, but the 
PAP govt. has sold our 
children's future away to 
foreigners. All the 
‘prosperity’ we thought 
we had were bought by 
1) selling a large chunk 
of Singapore to 
foreigners, 2) by 
enslaving our young with 
30-year mortgage loans, 
and 3) by flooding the 
small country with 
millions of foreigners. In 
a small country where we 
have to jostle with 
foreigners for everthing 
from publuc housing to 
transportation to health 





what pride can we feel? 
While our PAP 
politicians enrich 
themselves with millions 
while we slave for 
peanuts?’ 
 Duh 3 May 2012: 
‘Singapore has already 
ceased to be a nation – it 
is now a resort island 
where every foreigner is 
welcomed and endorsed 
by our govt to come take 
a chunk of the Singapore 
pie so that they can retire 








At the time of writing, there were 257 responses to the article, which was within 2 days 
after the article was published.   
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Appendix 2 – Singapore Shared Values (National Library Board Singapore 2012) 
 
1. Nation before community and society above self: 
Putting the interests of society ahead of the individual. 
 
2. Family as the basic unit of society: 
The family is identified as the most stable fundamental building block of the 
nation.  
 
3. Community support and respect for the individual: 
Recognizes that the individual has rights, which should be respected and not light 
[sic] encroached upon.  Encourages the community to support and have 
compassion for the disadvantaged individual who may have been left behind by the 
free market system.  
 
4. Consensus, not conflict: 
Resolving issues through consensus and not conflict stresses the importance of 
compromise and national unity. 
 
5. Racial and religious harmony: 
Recognizes the need for different communities to live harmoniously with one 
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 Notes                                                         
Introduction 
1 I use the term ‘ethnicity’ rather than ‘race’ in this book because Singapore tends to group different ethnic 
groups into big racial categories.  However, in recent years, there has been some subtle amendments to big 
racial groupings with ancestral origins of Malays (for example, Bugis) documented in their identity cards.   
2 Any public critical discussion of race and ethnicity are considered not only racist but criminal under the 
Sedition Act (Cap. 290, 1985 Rev. Ed.). 
3 Selvaraj Velayutham (2007) provides a good background and analysis of Singapore’s march towards 
globalisation. 
4 I examine these ethnic classifications in more depth in Chapter 2. 
5 Chua’s paper provides a good explanation of multiculturalism as practiced in Singapore in terms of the 
politics and hierarchy of ethnicity where the Chinese are predominant in these areas over others, particularly 
the Malays.  His paper has a useful list of work on multiculturalism in Singapore by local academics. 
6 Despite the PAP still retaining power in the General Elections, they lost almost 40% of the popular vote and 
6 out of 87 parliamentary seats while their candidate for the Presidential elections  — Tony Tan — only won 
by less than 1% of the final vote (Lim 2011). 
7 The environment that cinema provides, in terms of the opportunity to read films according to the lens 
audiences are armed with or prepared to use, is a far cry from less nuanced live action theatre or performance-
based art forms which can be more confronting.  An excellent example of such a performance is the one given 
by Vincent Leow in 1992.  Leow’s performance received notoriety primarily because his act involved drinking 
his own urine.  His performance received wide publicity in the local papers, not for the themes or metaphorical 
messages that were soon lost, but for the consumption of his urine.  The general public were frank about their 
distaste of the performance and raised the issue of public decency in the arts space.  Leow’s practice, as the 
curator of his work Lindy Poh (2007) explains ‘has maintained the element of anarchy and rebellion so critical 
to alternative practices’.  Unfortunately local audiences at the time were not really ready for confronting 
themes of anarchy and rebellion in theatre.  Singaporean audiences, however, are not resistant to such themes 
presented in the moving picture.  A very good example of this are the films of Eric Khoo which often display 
images and narratives of the dark underbelly of Singapore such as necrophilia are openly presented.  Both 
local art house and general audiences appreciate and applaud Khoo’s use of dark matter in his films. 
8 A Google search of the phrases ‘Singapore blogs’ and ‘Singapore online forums’ produced 54 million and 
223 million hits respectively.  This book specifically refers to some of the more popular online sites. 
Chapter 1 
1 The high production value of commercial local films, however, is not comparable to Hollywood productions.  
These more modest productions are financially supported by the Singapore government under its various 
schemes to build up the city state as a media hub, as well as through transnational studios such as Raintree 
Pictures, which is a partnership between Singapore’s state-owned broadcaster MediaCorp and Hong Kong 
financers. 
2 Film of course allows for an understanding of societies closed off to the rest of the world, such as China 
during the height of communist rule.  China through the lens has been fodder for international audiences and 
scholars alike (Cui 2003, Berry & Farquhar 2006) who have been captivated and enamoured by the local 
filmic presentations of China which they feel provides the international community an understanding of this 
significant nation. 
3 A collection edited by David C. L. Lim and Hiroyuki Yamamoto (2011), dedicated to examining cinema as 
providing a form of cultural interpretation and social intervention, contains several chapters outlining the 
success Singapore films have achieved in this regard. 
4 Reading international film reviews of Singapore films reveals that international audiences sometimes struggle 
to understand local Singaporean cultural nuances such as language (Singapore English or Singlish).  However, 
like local audiences, they too are attracted by the uniqueness of Singapore cinema’s ability to capture local 
society and culture.  Although Singapore films look experimental and lack the sophisticated film and narrative 
techniques of popular Hollywood films, these very nuances prove successful in the international art-house 
market. 
5 The use of the term ‘The Everyman’ is by no means meant to be misogynistic.  With the exception of a few 
films such as The Maid (Tong 2005) and 881 (R. Tan 2007), most Singapore made films feature male 
protagonists.   
6 Historically, the state of Kedah had contact with Imperial China through such famous events as the visit by 
Admiral Cheng Ho in the early 15th century.  The sultan of Kedah at the time presented Cheng Ho with one of 
his daughters as a wife to the famous mariner.  Evidence of Chinese and Malay contact in Kedah is evidenced 
151 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
in the Kedah State Museum, which possesses early Chinese porcelain from archaeological excavations in the 
Bujang Valley (The Ministry of Tourism, Malaysia 2011). 
7 The Everyman is a popular figure even amongst Singaporean audiences in contemporary locally made films 
featuring Chinese languages. 
8 Raintree Pictures is the most prominent, prolific and successful production studio in Singapore. It has 
produced a number of Jack Neo films such as I Not Stupid and Homerun.  Raintree has also collaborated with 
other Hong Kong film companies to produce The Truth About Jane and Sam (Yee 1999), The Eye (Pang & 
Pang 2002), The Eye 2 (Pang & Pang 2004) and Infernal Affairs II (Lau & Mak 2003).  Rice Rhapsody starring 
Taiwanese Sylvia Chang, Americans Martin Yan and Maggie Q, and French Mélanie Laurent, was produced 
by Jackie Chan with Hong Kong film-maker Kenneth Bi.  Forever Fever – also known as That’s the Way I 
Like It – may be set in 1970s Saturday Night Fever obsessed Singapore, but the content (language, narrative 
and characters) are principally Singapore-centric. 
9 At a conference I attended in Pennsylvania on American literature and film, both the literary text and the film 
adaptation of Grapes of Wrath were still being discussed as necessary texts for the study of American culture 
(Lev 2005).   
10 Singapore, like Hong Kong, is host to a large diasporic ethnic Chinese population. 
11 The Singaporean Shared Values – a set of values which the government developed around the time of the 
Asian values debate circa 1991 – is also based on selected Chinese Confucian teachings (Gomes 2009). 
12 For examples, see forums in online sites such as the news site AsiaOne (Singapore Press Holdings 2012) and 
popular political sites The Online Citizen (2012.), Sam’s Alfresco Haven: Celebrating Singapore’s Golden 
Period! (Leong 2012) and TR Emeritus (n.d.). 
13 These identification cards are known as National Registration Identity Card or NRIC. 
14 Singaporean-Chinese who are not atheist, Christian or Muslim tend to combine Buddhism and Taoism 
together as a unified faith. 
15 Catholicism, for example, was spread by Spanish and Portuguese colonists in South East Asia particularly 
the Philippines and Malacca.  Other incarnations of Christianity such as Methodism and Protestantism found 
their way to the colonies particularly through European conquerors in different parts of South East Asia.  
Being a transnational and transitional place of trade, the British crown colony of Singapore became a valuable 
place for proselytizing by Christian missionaries who set up churches for the newly baptized and educational 
institutions known as ‘mission schools’ catering at first for orphaned or abandoned children.  In Singapore, 
Christianity grew by leaps and bounds with more new converts today particularly amongst the Chinese.  
Today, mission schools have become exclusive, often catering to the English-educated and middle class rather 
than the poor and orphaned.   
16 It is not far-fetched to say that Christianity is openly practised and performed in Singapore.  When I worked 
for the government service, a number of my colleagues were practising Christians who brought their religion 
into the workplace.  A small unit in the government department I worked in, for example, made Christianity 
part of their daily discourse by peppering their conversations with biblical references, playing Christian music 
on the radio at all times and displaying posters in the room dedicated to Jesus Christ and passages from the 
bible.  Today, this display of Christianity has been taken to new heights of performance with the advent of 
social networking sites; Sites such as Facebook have numerous groups with strong memberships allowing 
users to display their allegiance to the faith through status updates, with forums dedicated to different facets, 
issues and denominations of Christianity in Singapore.  Typing in the words ‘Singapore’ and ‘Catholics’ 
revealed 21 groups while ‘Singapore’ and ‘Christians’ displayed 86 groups.   
17 Whenever I talk to Singaporeans, whether they may be family members, friends, acquaintances or even 
students I teach, the love-hate relationship they have with the PAP government is often expressed when 
discussing Singapore. 
18 The Facebook page for TR Emeritus still goes by the name ‘The Temasek Review’ 
(https://www.facebook.com/pages/The-Temasek-Review/190806675782). 
19 Many locals have long regarded the ISA not as a means for national security but as a tool used by the PAP to 
silent troublesome critics of the PAP government. 
 
Chapter 2 
1 The comedy genre provides a platform to present a society’s anxieties through parody.  State cinemas have 
long represented ethnicities and nationalities they have difficulties with through playful, humorous and 
sometimes absurd depictions.  Hong Kong comedies for instance portrayed Caucasians as buffoons, idiots and 
villains in the 1980s and 1990s when the colony was collectively anxious and nursing feelings of betrayal 
when the British were preparing for the 1997 handover of Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China.  
There is a similar phenomenon in television.  The British for instance dealt with the trauma of World War II by 
creating the long-running comedy ‘Allo ‘Allo which was set in German-occupied France. 
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2 Since the 1980s however, Singapore’s ethnic landscape has been changing with the rising tide of both 
unskilled and skilled workers from neighbouring Asian countries and beyond who address the nation’s 
incredible need for manual labour and professional expertise.  Singaporeans have been struggling to come to 
terms with the increasing tide of different ethnicities and new migrants from China, India, and the Philippines 
in particular living and working both temporarily and permanently in Singapore.  I discuss the issues 
connected to the presence of foreigners in Singapore in different parts of this book.   
3 Visitors to Singapore come in droves from all round the world partly because Singapore is a safe spot to 
indulge in everything the imagined exotic Asia has to offer while still enjoying Western standards of comfort 
and amenities. Singapore Zoo, for instance, is world renowned for having the cleanest toilets amongst tourists, 
who can experience the sounds of a rainforest, with the amenities are fitted out with waterfalls. 
4 The Ministry of Education website (http://vs.moe.edu.sg/national_symbol.htm) explains the Singapore 
Shared Values as a set of values that ‘incorporates the various aspects of our cultural heritage, namely the 
attitudes and values which have helped us survive as a nation.  In essence, it was to be a blueprint for the 
development of a national ideology that Singaporeans of all races and faiths could subscribe to and live by’.  
The Singapore Shared Values basically emphasizes hard work, hierarchy, and religious and ethnic tolerance.  
See Appendix 2 for the Singapore Shared Values. 
5 PCK Pte Ltd’s appeal through cultural cringe is similar to the appeal popular Australian sitcom Kath & Kim 
(2002-08) enjoys.  Kath & Kim follows the exploits of lovable mother and daughter bogans Kath and Kim.  
Bogan is a term that refers to Australians of lower-class backgrounds and whose behaviour reflects this 
(Campbell 2004).   
6 I am Eurasian, having grown up and lived in Singapore as a young adult.  Often, though, I was confronted by 
both work colleagues and people on the street wanting to know what ethnicity I belonged to, since my 
appearance did not neatly fall into any of the CMI categories.  The temptation to reply ‘human’ whenever 
someone asked ‘What are you?’ was at times overwhelming. 
7 Singaporean Eurasians even helped form an official collective in 1989 called Australian Eurasian Association 
of WA Inc. (2011) ‘with the objective of promoting social activities and goodwill among migrants from mixed 
Asian and European ancestry, many of whom originated from Singapore and Malaysia’. 
8 Eurasians, particularly those who were light skinned and spoke English well, thrived under the British.  Often 
associating themselves with the white colonizer, these Eurasians saw Lee Kuan Yew and the PAP as a threat to 
their lifestyle and their culture, since they felt that in independence the postcolonial government favoured the 
Chinese above all other communal groups.   
9 Marghese also played Kenny Pereira in the original 1987 play. 
10 The use of sexuality as a platform for discussing issues that confront society is not new.  Hong Kong 
cinema’s martial arts cinema of the 1980s and 1990s, for instance, often featured a transgender figure, which 
has been often theorized as a site for discussion of the angst and trauma Hong Kong people experienced prior 
to the 1997 handover of the then British colony to mainland China.  The late 1980s and the 1990s saw a 
barrage of swordplay films produced, such as Zu: Warriors from the Magic Mountain, A Chinese Ghost Story, 
New Dragon Gate Inn and Ashes of Time.  Film-maker Tsui Hark became popularly associated with this 
revival.  The 1980s/90s swordplay films were different from their 1960s predecessors.  These films attempted 
to reflect the fears and anxieties of the 1997 British handover to mainland China through the use of technology 
in order to create fantastical effects, confusing and far-fetched narratives and transgendered characters 
(Bordwell 2000). 
1 When I was living in Singapore, Growing Up was screened at prime time on Sunday nights.  Each episode 
generated much discussion within my own family and amongst my friends and my colleagues every week.  
The Little Nyonya was screened while I was teaching in Australia and the serial received very positive reviews 
from my Singapore-born students who downloaded episodes from YouTube. 
2 Singapore films have equally tragic narratives with lead characters or their loved ones succumbing to cancer.  
In Royston Tan’s 881 (2007) for instance, protagonist Little Papaya (Mindee Ong) dies of cancer at the age of 
25. 
3 Not so much nostalgic but the retelling of a traumatic event in Singapore’s history, the film Medium Rare 
(Smith 1992), that kick-started the renaissance of Singapore cinema, was based on the 1979 true crimes of 
executed serial killer Adrian Lim.   
4 The ruling party has often told Singaporeans, particularly during election time, that the PAP provides stability 
that attracts foreign investment.   
5 Tan’s cinema’s dedication to memory is acknowledged by Ben Slater (2012) whose review of her films 
Singapore GaGa and Invisible City is captured in his aptly titled essay ‘Stealing Moments: A History of the 
Forgotten in Recent Singaporean Film‘.  In this essay Slater provides a narrative of the people featured in her 
work as providing a glimpse of Singapore outside official discourse. 
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6 Memory, according to de Certeau ‘derives its interventionary force from its very capacity to be altered – 
unmoored, mobile, lacking any fixed position.  Its permanent mark is that it is formed (and forms its ‘capital’) 
by arising from the other (a circumstance) and by losing it (it is no more than a memory). … Far from being 
the reliquary or trash can of the past, it sustains itself by believing in the existence of possibilities and by 
vigilantly awaiting them, constantly on the watch for their appearance’ (de Certeau 1988: 86-87). 
7 The Speak Mandarin Campaign is still ongoing.  For an official history of the campaign, see its website 
http://www.mandarin.org.sg. 
8 In their work on racial and gender hierarchies in Singapore, Geraldine Heng and Janadas Devan (1995: 203) 
explain that the version of Chineseness the state chose is comprised of ‘the retrieval of a superior, “core” 
Chinese culture in the name of a fantasmatic “Confucianism”; the promotion of Mandarin, the preferred dialect 
of the ruling class of imperial China, as the master language of Chineseness, and the concoction of a “national 
ideology,” grounded in a selective refiguration of Confucianism, to promote the interests of the state’.   
9 There is a Taoist festival known as Qingming that takes place on the fifteenth day of the spring equinox, 
dedicated to ancestor worship.  This festival, also known as Tomb Sweeping Day, sees Taoists visit their 
ancestors’ resting places as a mark of respect and also to clean the gravesites.  There is also the Hungry Ghost 
Festival, which is a month long, held around August-September.  Taoists believe that during the Hungry Ghost 
Festival the gates of hell are flung open and the ghosts run around amongst the living.  In order to placate the 
dead, entertainment is held specifically for them in the form of Cantonese opera and getai shows.  Getai shows 
are immensely popular and significant in Singapore, as seen by the large crowds gathered at make-shift stages.  
Usually Cantonese opera and getai singers share the stage together.  The significance of getai performers in 
particular can be seen in the media with the very popular Royston Tan film 881 –a tragic comedy about two 
getai singers – and the daily feature on getai performers in the citizen journalism website STOMP! (Singapore 
Press Holdings 2011).    
10 Columbariums in Singapore have attracted international attention.  In May 2011 the German television 
programme Galileo featured Singapore’s columbariums, however from a comedic perspective (Ravikrishnan 
2011).   
 
Chapter 4 
1 Mee Pok Man is a tragic tale of two people: the mildly mentally retarded mee pok seller (Joe Ng) and 
prostitute Bunny (Michelle Goh).  The mee pok (Mee pok is a noodle soup dish served with minced meat) man 
is quietly in love with Bunny, who in turn is having a relationship with sleazy and unfaithful British 
pornographer Jonathan Reese (David Brazil), whom she thinks will rescue her from her sad life in Singapore 
by taking her to England with him.  Tragedy strikes when Bunny is left for dead in a hit-and-run accident.  
Discovering the injured Bunny, the mee pok man takes her to his flat and attempts to nurse her back to health.  
Slowly, Bunny and the mee pok man get to know each other, with Bunny learning to appreciate his kindness.  
She may even be falling in love with him, even though he fails to get proper medical help for her.  Bunny and 
the mee pok man then make love, which tragically ends with Bunny dying just when they are about to reach a 
sexual climax.  The mee pok man refuses to part with Bunny, instead carrying on a relationship with her 
corpse.  While the depiction of necrophilia is obviously disturbing and depressing to watch, the mee pok man’s 
tenderness towards Bunny’s corpse is incredibly moving and sad.   
2 The Singapore government does have a hand in funding both independent and commercial films through 
various organisations.  The Singapore Film Commission, which is a government organisation, helps the local 
film industry not only through funding but by assisting to promote Singapore as both a media and a film-
making hub.  The Singapore government is also involved in funding bigger budget films that are produced by 
established studios.  MediaCorp, the government-funded television and radio broadcaster, is a partner in 
Raintree Pictures, which is a transnational production company with links to the Hong Kong film industry.  In 
Singapore independent films are financed through independent film studios such as Objectifs Films and Zhao 
Wei Films, grants from the Singapore Film Commission, research institutions such as the Institute of Policy 
Studies and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, and by private benefactors. 
3 While some of Martyn See’s films have been banned or heavily censored, implying strongly that the 
government considers his productions harmful to Singapore and the need to protect Singaporean audiences, he 
argues that dissent should not be equated as being disloyal to Singapore (Mohan 2012).  
4 I use the masculine here intentionally since a lot of Singapore films overwhelmingly feature strong male 
protagonist and ensemble characters. 
5 Likewise in Khoo’s Be With Me.  In this film, themes of young lesbian love and sexual obsession end 
tragically. 
6 While Singapore-made films do portray sexuality, it is often done in order to create a comedic effect rather 
than as a point of serious contemplation or discussion.  Films such as Army Daze (Ong 1996) which features 
the effeminate Kenny Pereira, Liang Po Po: The Movie (Teng 1999) featuring Jack Neo in drag and to a 
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certain extent the gay and transgendered characters in the daring yet poignant Bugis Street (Yonfan 1995) rely 
on the over-effeminized portrayal of homosexual characters in order to entertain audiences.   
7 Singaporeans accuse the mainland Chinese collectively, privately and publicly, of not being able to assimilate 
into Singaporean society and culture through their lack of English language skills and social ineptness.  In 
2011 a Facebook campaign to ‘Cook and Share a Pot of Curry’ on 21 August was launched in protest against 
mainland Chinese – and to a greater extent, recent temporary and permanent residents – for their inability to 
accept Singaporean multiculturalism and live harmoniously amongst people of various ethnicities in 
Singapore.  The campaign, which attracted tens of thousands of Singaporeans both in Singapore and overseas 
and asked them to commit to cooking curry, came about because of a mainland Chinese family’s complaint 
over the smell of curry being cooked by their Indian neighbours in the block of flats they all resided in.   
8 For a humorous list of ‘True Singaporean cultural nuances, see the post by Kway Png (2003) in the satirical 
Singaporean website Talkingcock.Com (www.talkingcock.com). 
 
Chapter 5 
1 The Maid’s critical overseas reception, however, can best be described as lukewarm.  It was panned by cross-
cultural online critics for its lack of originality within the Asian horror genre.  For examples see AnthroFred 
(2008) and Young (2006). 
2 For a concise description of the Hungry Ghost Festival, see T.S Lee (2000).  
3 Esther’s death and the attempt to kill Rosa seem very poignant, given the number of FDW deaths in the news 
the past few years. 
4 At the time of editing this manuscript, Maidlibrary requires a login name and password while the Bad Maid 
Database URL has become defunct. 
 
Chapter 6 
1 This is purely because of demographics.  Singapore residents are 74.1 per cent ethnic Chinese who are more 
comfortable speaking in the Chinese dialects of Hokkien, Teochew and Cantonese (Department of Statistics, 
Singapore, 2011).  
2 Singapore films are generally not solely in (Singapore) English or Chinese.  Instead, most Singapore films 
are (Singapore) English-Chinese language productions with language classifications dependent sometimes on 
the dominant tongue.  With that said, Chinese films are never in a specific language (Mandarin) or dialect 
(Hokkien, Teochew and/or Cantonese) but rather a mixture of (Singapore) English, Mandarin and the Chinese 
dialects.  It is also necessary to note that Singaporeans appreciate Chinese language films heavily peppered 
with Hokkien, Teochew and Cantonese since they are commonly spoken amongst ethnic Singaporean-Chinese.  
For the purpose of this book however, I am concentrating on Singlish since a discussion of the other dialects in 
a single chapter would not do justice to the rich cultural nuances that vernacular brings. 
3 Good spoken English is also the pride of Singaporeans who are ethnically Eurasian and who are educated in 
Christian mission schools well known for producing students with an extremely high proficiency of spoken 
and written English.   
4 Singaporean-Chinese Chinese dialects indicate the ancestral regions and provinces Singaporean-Chinese are 
able to trace their lineage to. Han Chinese originally come from Southern China.  Teochew-speaking people 
are Chaozhou or Teochew people who originally come from the Chaozhou region of Guangdong.  The 
Cantonese-speaking people come from Canton (Guangzhou).  The Hokkiens, whom many Singaporean-
Chinese consider themselves to be, are able to trace their ancestral lineage to the Southern Fujian province. 
5 It is also necessary to acknowledge that some Singaporeans who are of non-Chinese ethnic backgrounds 
become frustrated with more extreme usages of Singlish.  This is perhaps due to the strong connections 
between ethnic Chinese and Singlish.  Anecdotally, non-Singaporean-Chinese have somewhat felt left out in 
Singapore because they are not part of the Singaporean-Chinese majority.  
6 The lyrics for ‘Why you so like dat?’ are: 
I give you all my chocolate, 
I give you my tic tac, 
But when I wan a kit kat, 
You never gimme back! 
 
Oui, why u so like dat ah? 
Hey why u so like dat? 
Why u so like dat ah? 
Hey why u so like dat? 
 
I let you kopy all my sum, 
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Because you always blur, 
But when I try to kopy back, 
You always call the Sir! 
 
Oui, why u so like dat ah? 
Hey why u so like dat? 
Why u so like dat ah? 
Hey why u so like dat? 
 
You tell me dat you don't like girl, 
I also donno why, 
But when you see a pretty girl, 
Your voice go up damn high! 
 
Oui, why u so like dat ah? 
Hey why u so like dat? 
Why u so like dat ah? 
Hey why u so like dat! 
7 Kumar’s performances, for instance, are best described as risqué due not only to the sexual content of his 
jokes but also to the taboo twin topics of government and race which he successfully satires.  While Kumar’s 
performances are raunchy and provocative, this has not stopped his transgendered performing self from 
becoming the accepted and comfortable face of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) community 
in Singapore.  Kumar has been featured performing in national events such as the National Day Parade and the 
LGBT-friendly Nation Party.  Phua Chu Kang, on the other hand, is considered more family friendly as his act 
(persona and jokes) pertain to the idiosyncrasies of everyday Singaporeans.  The local popularity of Phua Chu 
Kang has prompted the government to allow Singh to promote his alter ego to overseas audiences.  In 2002, 
Phua Chu Kang was featured prominently on the globally distributed popular Hollywood television reality 
show The Amazing Race when Singapore was one of the destinations.  Singh has also been part of the local 
entertainment troupe during the yearly Singapore Day events which are held in cities that support a sizable 
Singaporean diaspora such as New York, Melbourne and Shanghai.   
8 With the exception of I Not Stupid, all other films are considered mostly English language productions.  I Not 
Stupid is predominantly in Mandarin with Chinese dialects and Singlish.   
9 Visiting Singapore every year particularly throughout my doctoral study, it always amazed me how the 
landscape changed within a year.  This included both the city shopping district in Orchard Road and residential 
areas (landed and high rise property neighbourhoods).  
10 Of course there are many other reasons why Singaporeans are attracted to opposition candidates during the 
lead up to the general elections.  The primary reason is because they are not the PAP.  While the opposition 
has usually been somewhat fractured and disorganized, they have been increasingly becoming a viable force 
due to their recruitment of professional and university-educated candidates.  They also have been voicing the 
bread-and-butter issues Singaporeans are concerned about.  Opposition rallies are usually packed, primarily 
because this is one of the rare occasions when Singaporeans are able to express their collective resistance to 
the government.  With that said, however, the most number of opposition candidates Singaporeans have ever 
voted in has been six out of 87.   
11 When I was a young girl, I accompanied my father to one of Low’s election rallies in the year he first 
contested the seat of Hougang.  My father – who was half-Teochew on his mother’s side and could speak the 
dialect relatively well – was incredibly impressed at Low’s use of language.  My father was not the only one 
that day impressed with Low.  The crowds at that rally were whipped into a frenzy when Low spoke to them.   
12 For instance, by flying the Singapore flag for a month as part of the National Day celebrations and by 
joining various Facebook groups that support Singapore nationalism.              
13 When I used to work for the Singapore civil service, there were mentoring sessions organised for select 
graduate staff with management.  At departmental level these sessions were chaired by the head and deputy 
head while at ministry level, the permanent secretary or deputy permanent secretary who are the top civil 
servants in any ministry, were the chairs.   
14 The matchmaking agency, known initially as the Social Development Unit (SDU) and currently as the 
Social Development Network (SDN), helps single Singaporeans meet with the hope of marriage.  I discuss 
Singapore’s national movement for procreation as well as the SDU and SDN in more detail in Chapter 6. 
15 Foreign talent migrants enter Singapore on a work visa, as opposed to a work permit, which is reserved for 
temporary blue-collar unskilled workers such as foreign domestic workers and labourers.  As of September 
2012, minimum eligibility for a work visa includes a minimum fixed salary of SGD$3000 a month and 
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recognized tertiary education.  There is also hierarchy of categories – P1, P2 and Q1 – designated further by 
income levels.  The eligibility income levels are as follows: more than $9000 for P1, more than $4500 for P2 
and more than $3000 for Q1.  Most often, these temporary migrants are able to attain permanent residence 
without much difficulty and are able to change employers without repatriation (Ministry of Manpower 2013).  
16 This election saw the PAP lose six out of 87 parliamentary seats, with a general movement on social media 
to vote for the opposition, and is considered the poorest showing of the PAP since self-government in 1959.   
17 It is not only language that the local media has highlighted as a way for migrants to blend into Singapore 
society and culture: living in HDB flats, eating at hawker centres and mixing with locals have been identified 
as generally blending into the local cultural landscape.  In the 2000s, The Straits Times, for instance, featured 
Caucasians working in Singapore who had opted to live with Singaporeans in heartlander neighbourhoods 
rather than in gated expatriate communities.   
 
Conclusion 
18 Responding to his admission, netizens trawled the Internet for dirt on him.  This proved to be a simple task 
since Gay, a teacher in a junior college (high school), often commented on public forums which seemingly 
either took a pro-PAP or anti-Muslim stance.  At the time of writing, netizens have written to the Ministry of 
Education to look into the matter, asking for his resignation, as they feel that Gay is not fit to be a teacher due 
to his anti-Muslim comments that contravene Singaporean multicultural policies.      
